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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
Patients with disorders of the basal ganglia, such as Parkinson’s disease, 
Huntington’s disease and Tourette’s Syndrome, exhibit characteristic motor symptoms and 
less obvious cognitive deficits. These deficits can be understood with reference to the model 
of cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical circuitry proposed by Alexander et al. (1986) which 
highlights how the basal ganglia can affect the functioning of the whole of the frontal lobe. 
This thesis explored the possibility that patients with these disorders also have difficulties 
with social cognition.  
Patients with Parkinson’s exhibited deficits in reasoning about mental states. These 
deficits can largely be attributed to executive dysfunction which results from disordered 
activity in the circuitry linking the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia. 
Patients with Huntington’s exhibited reduced fear responses which most likely results from 
abnormal amygdala activity. Patients with Tourette’s exhibited deficits on a wide range of 
social cognitive tasks involving reasoning about mental states, non-literal language 
interpretation and economic decision making. These difficulties probably reflect dysfunction 
in circuitry linking the anterior cingulate and insula with the basal ganglia. 
These studies offer insight into the neuroanatomical basis of the behavioural 
symptoms associated with these conditions whilst highlighting the necessity to develop more 
precise and inclusive models of frontostriatal circuitry. 
 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I express heartfelt gratitude and thanks to my supervisors Ian Mitchell and Sarah 
Beck. They have always provided me with nothing less than outstanding support and 
encouragement. I have thoroughly enjoyed our times spent in discussion, and feel very lucky 
to have worked with two people who provided me with so much knowledge, guidance and 
inspiration.  
I also feel blessed by having met many other wonderful people while carrying out my 
research at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital. These include Peter Praamsta, Hardev Pall and 
Karen Healey. I would like to say a special thank you to Hugh Rickards and Andrea 
Cavanna, who invest tremendous faith in me and have always made me feel so welcome. 
My utmost appreciation is extended to all of those special people who have 
participated in my research. None of this work would have been possible without their trust, 
patience and generosity. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the family and friends who have experienced 
both the pros and the cons of my educational career. I thank them for enduring my intense 
intellectual ramblings and for turning the gas down when I was boiling over. I am sure I 
could not have achieved this without them. 
 
 
  CONTENTS 
 
 
 
Chapter 1.  General Introduction       1 
 
1.1  The Basal Ganglia and Movement Disorders    2  
1.2  Disorders of the Basal Ganglia: Parkinson’s Disease,  
Huntington’s Disease and Tourette’s Syndrome   4 
1.3 The Model of Frontostriatal Circuitry    11 
1.4 The Neural Basis of Striato-cortical Influences   16 
1.5 Behavioural Evidence for Frontostriatal Circuit  
Dysfunction in Disorders of the Basal Ganglia   18 
1.6  Social Cognition       23 
 1.7  Social Cognition in Disorders of the Basal Ganglia   32 
 
 
Chapter 2.  Social Cognition in Parkinson’s Disease    35 
 
 2.1   Social Cognition in PD: Introduction     36 
 2.2  PD Experiment 1       41 
 2.3 PD Experiment 2       55 
2.4 PD Experiment 3       71 
2.5 Social Cognition in PD: Discussion     87 
 
 
Chapter 3. Social Cognition in Tourette’s Syndrome    93 
 
 3.1 Social Cognition in TS: Introduction     94 
 3.2 TS Experiment 1       97 
 3.3 TS Experiment 2       108 
 3.4 TS Experiment 3       126 
 3.5 Social Cognition in TS: Discussion     154 
 
 
Chapter 4. Social Cognition in Huntington’s Disease    159 
 
 4.1 HD Experiment       160 
 
Chapter 5. General Discussion       185 
 
5.1 Social Cognition in Disorders of the Basal Ganglia   186  
5.2 Implications for Social Cognition     200 
5.3 Implications for Models of Frontostriatal  
Circuitry        207 
5.4 Future Research and Concluding Remarks    212 
 
References          225 
 
 
  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Chapter 1.  General Introduction 
 
Figure 1. The direct and indirect pathways through the basal ganglia  5 
 
Figure 2. The cortio-striato-thalamo-cortical circuits (Alexander et al., 1986) 12 
Figure 3. Diagram showing different regions of the frontal cortex involved  
in cognitive functions         13 
 
 
Chapter 2.  Social Cognition in Parkinson’s Disease 
 
Figure 4. Example of a false belief vignette comic strip used in PD  
experiment 3          75 
 
 
Chapter 3. Social Cognition in Tourette’s Syndrome  
 
Figure 5. Example of stimuli used in the ‘socially competitive emotions’  
task modified from Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2007)     134 
 
 
 
 
 
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Chapter 2: Social Cognition in Parkinson’s Disease 
 
Table 1. Errors made by patients on ToM vignette questions  
(experiment 1)          47 
 
Table 2. Percentage of faux pas recognition errors made 
by patients and controls (experiment 1)      48 
 
Table 3. Percentage of incorrect responses for patients and controls  
for faux pas check questions (experiment 1)      49 
 
Table 4. Correlations for patient performance on tasks and time since  
medication (experiment 1)        51 
 
Table 5. Errors made by patients on short unexpected transfer and  
deceptive box vignettes (experiment 2)      62 
 
Table 6. Errors made by patients on longer ToM vignettes (experiment 2)  64 
 
Table 7. Comparison of patients’ errors made on longer ToM vignettes,  
deceptive box vignettes and unexpected transfer vignettes (experiment 2)  65 
 
Table 8. Correlations between patients’ performance on executive  
and ToM tasks (experiment 2)        67 
 
Table 9. Errors made by patients on the ToM vignette task across  
presentation conditions (experiment 3)      78 
 
Table 10. Number of errors made in each condition of the ToM vignette  
task according to conditions undertaken first and last (experiment 3)  79 
 
Table 11. Errors made on the ToM vignette test by patients with higher  
(WM+) and lower (WM-) working memory scores (experiment 3)   81 
 
Table 12. Correlations for patient performance on executive and ToM  
tasks, and time since onset of PD (experiment 3)     83 
 
Chapter 3. Social Cognition in Tourette’s Syndrome 
 
Table 13. Patient and Control Performance on the ToM measures  
(experiment 1)          102 
 
Table 14. Correlations for patient performance on executive and ToM  
measures (experiment 1)        104 
 
 
 
 LIST OF TABLES (Continued) 
 
 
Table 15. Errors made by patients on different trial types during the  
Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task (experiment 2)    115 
 
Table 16. Errors made by patients on the faux pas task (experiment 2)  116 
 
Table 17. Correlations for patient performance on executive and ToM  
measures (experiment 2)        119 
 
Table 18. Rejections made by patients and controls during the  
Ultimatum Game (experiment 3)       139 
 
Table 19. Amusement ratings given by patients and controls in 
response to baseline (non-humourous) and test (humourous) cartoons  
(experiment 3)          140 
 
Table 20. Unconventional responses given by patients and controls  
during the humourous cartoons comprehension task (experiment 3)   142 
 
Table 21. Correlations for patient performance on executive measures,  
the socially competitive emotions task, the UG, the ‘Eyes Test’ and the  
humourous cartoons comprehension task (experiment 3)    145 
 
Chapter 4. Social Cognition in Huntington’s Disease 
 
Table 22. Mean and standard deviation of emotional ratings given by  
patients and controls in response to pictures within the four  
emotional categories         170 
 
Table 23. Mean and standard deviation of emotional ratings given by  
patients and controls in response to scenarios within the four 
emotional categories         173 
 
Table 24. Correlations between patients’ performance on executive  
tasks and target emotional ratings for picture and scenarios selected  
to elicit fear, happiness, core disgust and moral disgust     178 
 
Chapter 5. General Discussion 
 
Table 25. The deficits on social cognitive and executive tasks exhibited  
by patients with basal ganglia disorders documented in this thesis   187 
 
 
 
  
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ACC  anterior cingulate cortex 
ADHD attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
BG  basal ganglia 
CSTCC cortico-striato-thalamic-circuit (as defined by Alexander et al., 1986) 
CN  caudate nucleus 
DA  dopamine 
DBS  deep brain stimulation 
DCCST dimensional change card sorting task 
DLPFC dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
DOT-A Digit Ordering Test-Adapted 
GABA  gamma-amino-butyric-acid 
GP  globus pallidus 
GPe  globus pallidus external (lateral) 
GPi  globus pallidus internal (medial) 
HD  Huntington’s disease 
IAPS  International Affective Picture System 
IFG  inferior frontal gyrus 
MNS  Mirror Neuron System 
MWU  Mann Whitney U-test 
NA  nucleus accumbens 
NOSIS non-obscene socially inappropriate symptoms 
OCD  obsessive compulsive disorder 
OFC  orbitofrontal cortex 
PD  Parkinson’s disease 
rP  Pearson’s correlation co-efficient 
SCRs  skin conductance responses 
S.D.  standard deviation 
SN  substantia nigra 
SNc  substantia nigra pars compacta 
SNr  substantia nigra pars reticulata 
rs  Spearman’s Rho correlation co-efficient 
STN  subthalamic nucleus 
ToM  Theory of Mind 
TS  Tourette’s syndrome 
UG  Ultimatum Game 
VMPFC ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
VTA  ventral tegmental area 
WM  working memory 
 
 
General Introduction 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Section 1.5 contains edited parts of an article in press:  
Eddy, C.M., Rizzo, R. & Cavanna, A.E. Neuropsychological aspects of Tourette 
Syndrome: a review. Journal of Psychosomatic Research. 
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General Introduction 
1.1: The Basal Ganglia and Movement Disorders 
 
The first documented example of a movement disorder associated with basal 
ganglia (BG) dysfunction was written by James Parkinson in 1817 and entitled “the 
shaking palsy” (Parkinson, 2002). Many years later during that century the BG were 
recognized as having a major role in motor function, but it was only as recently as the 
1950s that Arvid Carlsson (see Carlsson, 1987) identified the critical neurochemical 
changes affecting the BG that result in Parkinson’s disease (PD). Dysfunction of the 
BG also leads to the disordered movement that characterizes Huntington’s disease 
(HD) and Tourette’s Syndrome (TS). 
The major components of the BG (for a review see Parent, 1990) are the 
striatum, globus pallidus (GP), subthalamic nucleus (STN), substantia nigra (SN) and 
the nearby ventral tegmental area (VTA). The striatum is so called due to its striped 
appearance (particularly apparent in the rodent brain), which is created by radiating 
bundles of cortico-fugal axons. In primates, the striatum consists of the caudate 
nucleus (CN) and putamen, along with the ventrally lying nucleus accumbens (NA). 
This latter striatal component is considered part of the limbic sector of the BG along 
with the VTA (Parent, 1990). The striatum is the main input structure of the BG, and 
receives excitatory (glutamatergic) inputs from all cortical regions, the thalamus and 
limbic structures such as the amygdala (Nauta, 1979; Parent, 1990). Outputs from the 
BG influence cortical regions in the frontal lobe, as well as midbrain targets such as 
the SN and pedunculopontine nucleus (McHaffie, Stanford, Stein, Coizet & Redgrave, 
2005; Nauta, 1979; Parent, 1990).  
The characteristic motor symptoms of movement disorders such as PD result 
from disturbances in the output of striatal neurons, which affect the functioning of the 
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supplementary motor area via the motor thalamus (Alexander, Delong & Strick, 1986; 
Alexander & Crutcher, 1990). More recently, attention has been drawn towards 
evidence of significant non-motor symptoms in patients with BG disorders. For 
example, during the 1980s, patients with PD were shown to exhibit changes in 
cognitive functioning. Delis, Direnfield, Alexander & Kaplan (1982) reported 
cognitive difficulties during medication ‘off’ periods (when motor symptoms return 
because dopamine levels are low). Research conducted since has revealed evidence of 
a range of cognitive and behavioural changes indicating that BG dysfunction can exert 
profound effects on many non-motor functions reliant on the frontal cortex. The work 
contained in this thesis extended research in this area by investigating social cognition 
in patients with disorders of the BG.  
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1.2: Disorders of the Basal Ganglia: Parkinson’s Disease, 
Huntington’s Disease and Tourette’s Syndrome 
 
The cardinal motor signs of PD are tremor, rigidity, bradykinesia (slowness of 
movement) and progressive loss of voluntary movement (Jankovic, 2008). The 
symptoms of this hypokinetic movement disorder are in contrast to the hyperkinetic, 
graceful involuntary writhing movements (termed ‘chorea’) exhibited by patients with 
HD (Walker, 2007). Involuntary movements are also present in TS, which is 
characterized by tics: compulsive and repetitive movements or vocalisations that may 
be simple or complex in nature, and vary in number, frequency and severity over time 
(Leckman, 2002; Robertson, 2000).  
The varying motor symptoms of PD, HD and TS, are assumed to result from 
different forms of dysfunction within the neural pathways through which the BG 
exerts movement control (Figure 1). There is clear evidence that the symptoms of PD 
and HD result from striatal dysfunction, with PD resulting from loss of striatal 
dopamine and HD from striatal degeneration. Patients with TS have also been shown 
to exhibit abnormalities of the BG (e.g. Singer et al., 1993) and these neural structures 
are likely to be involved in tic generation (Salloway & Cummings, 1996). In PD and 
HD, degenerative processes result in structural changes to motor circuits, while the 
efficacy of dopaminergic pharmacotherapy in treating both TS and PD indicates an 
important role for neurochemical dysregulation in these disorders. 
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Figure 1. The direct and indirect pathways through the basal ganglia. 
Dashed arrows show the direct route 
Dotted arrows show the indirect route 
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ABBREVIATIONS: 
 
SNc Substantia nigra pars compacta 
SNr Substantia nigra pars reticulata 
GPe Globus pallidus external 
GPi Globus pallidus internal 
STN Subthalamic nucleus 
D1 Projections with type 1 dopamine 
receptors 
D2 Projections with type 2 dopamine 
receptors 
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The BG can affect motor control via a direct and an indirect route (Penney & 
Young, 1986). The direct route originates from medium spiny striatal GABAergic 
projection neurons which also contain dynorphin/substance P and express high levels 
of D1 receptors (Gerfen et al., 1990). These neurons project directly to the medial 
segment of the globus pallidus (GPi) and the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr). 
The indirect route begins with GABAergic neurons which use the peptide transmitter 
enkephalin and express high densities of D2 receptors (Gerfen et al., 1990). These 
neurons project to lateral segment of the globus pallidus (GPe). This in turn sends 
GABAergic projections to the STN. Glutamatergic efferents travel from the STN to 
the BG output nuclei (GPi and SNr) (Albin, Aldridge, Young & Gilman, 1989; 
Mitchell, 1990; Smith & Parent, 1988). Both routes end via inhibitory GABAergic 
efferents leading from the BG output nuclei to motor nuclei in the thalamus. 
Glutamatergic projections travel from the thalamus to the supplementary motor cortex 
(McCormick, 1992).                                                                                                                                        
The activation of these two different pathways leads to opposite net effects on 
the output of BG circuitry (see Blandini, Nappi, Tassorelli & Martignoni, 2000). 
Activation of GABAergic neurons at the start of the direct pathway leads to inhibition 
of GABAergic neurons affecting the BG output nuclei, leading to disinhibition of 
thalamic motor nuclei. In contrast, activation of striatal neurons at the start of the 
indirect pathway leads to inhibition of GPe, resulting in disinhibition of the STN. The 
resulting increase in STN activity leads to increased excitation of glutamatergic 
projections, increased excitation of output nuclei, and so inhibition of motor thalamic 
nuclei. The final output of the BG circuit is therefore under direct control of the STN 
(Mitchell, Jackson, Sambrook & Crossman, 1989; Mitchell, 1990; Mitchell, Boyce, 
Sambrook & Crossman, 1992). 
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PD and HD are progressive neurodegenerative conditions. In PD, neuronal 
degeneration begins in those parts of the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) that 
innervate the dorsal striatum. Degeneration progresses to eventually encompass the 
nigral inputs to more ventral regions of the CN. Dopaminergic degeneration of the 
SNc leads to overactivity or disinhibition of the BG output structures through the 
indirect pathway, leading to increased inhibition of the motor thalamus, and reduced 
glutamatergic output to the motor cortex. This hypoactivity is enhanced by sustained 
glutamatergic inputs to the BG output nucei received via the STN. This may be due to 
decreased inhibitory control exerted by the GPe. However, changes in dopamine (DA) 
may also affect the STN directly (Blandini et al., 2000). Pharmacological treatments 
include DA precursors (Levodopa) and direct agonists (e.g. Bromocriptine, 
Pramipexole), which temporarily reinstate normal neurochemical functioning within 
the motor circuits (Hagan, Middlemiss, Sharpe & Poste, 1997). Surgical interventions 
have included deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the STN. This procedure involves the 
insertion of a stimulator into a brain region which when activated at a high frequency 
paradoxically leads to reduced activity in that region (Wichmann & DeLong, 2006). 
Although the resulting reduction in activity offers symptomatic relief, concerns have 
been raised that some patients with DBS exhibit changes in mood and behaviour (e.g. 
Okun et al., 2009).  
In HD cell death progresses ventrally, at first affecting the CN, then putamen, 
leaving the NA relatively intact (Vonsattel et al., 1985; Vonsattel & DiFiglia, 1998). 
Chorea is likely to result from death of enkephalinergic medium spiny projection 
neurons that project to GPe, in the indirect pathway (Mitchell, 1990; Penney & 
Young, 1986). The injection of bicuculine (a GABA antagonist) directly into GPe can 
result in choreiform movements (as shown in monkeys by Crossman, Mitchell, 
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Sambrook & Jackson, 1988). This chorea is seen in association with reduced 2-
deoxyglucose uptake by the STN, indicating reduced activity of this structure 
(Mitchell et al., 1989; Mitchell, 1990; Mitchell et al., 1992). The motor symptoms of 
HD are therefore likely to result from abnormal outputs in the indirect pathway. That 
is, reduced excitation of glutamatergic projections which travel from the STN to the 
BG output nuclei, which leading to decreased inhibitory output from these structures 
and resultant disinhibition of motor thalamic nuclei. 
Disinhibition of excitatory neurons in the thalamus may lead to tics in TS 
(Ackermans, Temel & Visser-Vanderwalle, 2008). Mink (2001) described how 
movement initiating pattern generators in the cerebral cortex and brainstem are 
controlled by the striatum, which acts as a braking mechanism.  Healthy striatal 
functioning ensures that only a chosen motor pattern generator is disinhibited by BG 
output nuclei. The rest of the BG inhibits potentially interfering motor patterns, 
ensuring that only selected voluntary movements are performed. Mink suggested that 
tics occur from abnormal activity in the striatum leading to a loss of inhibitory control 
over striatal output. Mink further suggested that each tic is related to a separate set of 
striatal neurons, and that the repetitive, stereotyped, involuntary movements 
associated with TS result from a focal population of striatal neurons becoming 
overactive in discrete, repetitive episodes. This overactivity may occur due to 
excessive input from the cortex or thalamus to the striatum, poor intrastriatal 
inhibition, altered DA transmission or changes in membrane excitability.  
Support for the role of DA in TS is provided by the clinical efficacy of 
pharmacological agents that antagonize this transmitter (e.g. Risperidone, 
Haloperidol). These agents may counteract the increased DA transporter binding that 
has been reported in TS (Singer, 1992), or the influence of DA on corticostriatal 
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transmission via long term depression or potentiation (Mink, 2001). Mink suggests 
that abnormalities in the regulation of the resting potential of striatal neurons in TS 
may alter responses to DA and DA transmission. More specifically, tics could occur 
due to striatal cells spending an excessive time in a hypopolarised resting state, 
leading to a facilitatory effect of DA on D1 receptors and the firing of cells to weak 
cortical output. Changes in the probability of the membrane potential being 
hypopolarised over time may also explain the waxing and waning of tics (Ackermans 
et al., 2008). 
Recent successful surgical therapeutic interventions for TS have included DBS 
of the centromedian nucleus, substantia periventricularis and nucleus ventrooralis 
internus of thalamus (Temel & Visser-Vanderwalle, 2004) and bilateral lesion of 
median, intralaminar and inner ventral oral thalamic nuclei (Visser-Vanderwalle, 
Temel & Boon, 2003). These are thalamic intralaminar nuclei which project to the 
striatum and receive projections from striatal output nuclei. 
Although alterations in motor functions play a prominent role in PD, HD and 
TS, other features of these disorders cannot be explained by dysfunction within 
frontostriatal motor circuits. Patients with PD often suffer from depression, while 
patients with HD can experience obsessive or psychotic episodes (Shoulson, 1990). 
Patients in the later stages of PD and HD may develop ‘subcortical dementia’, a 
condition associated with changes in arousal, motivation and personality rather than 
difficulties with language and memory (Cummings, 1986). Attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) are 
common comorbidities in TS. Patients may exhibit tics specifically relating to socially 
inappropriate behaviour involving offensive language (coprolalia) or gestures 
(copropraxia) (Cavanna, Servo, Monaco & Robertson, 2009). Some patients with TS 
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also exhibit non-obscene socially inappropriate symptoms (NOSIS: see Kurlan et al., 
1996) and/or a tendency to self-injurious behaviour (Robertson, 2000). These 
symptoms may involve dysfunction within other frontostriatal circuits involving the 
BG. 
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1.3: The Model of Frontostriatal Circuitry 
 
Investigation of the non-motor symptoms of BG disorders emerged as a 
product of growing awareness that the influence of the BG on cortical functioning 
was not limited to the supplementary motor cortex. This new understanding of the 
critical underlying functional neuroanatomy was expounded in the seminal paper by 
Alexander, Delong and Strick (1986), that described the involvement of the BG in 
five parallel cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical circuits (CSTCC)s. These circuits are 
formed by neurons originating in different regions of the cortex, which project to the 
striatum, the GP and SN, before returning to the frontal cortex via the thalamus 
(Figure 2). Two of these frontal regions (the supplementary motor and oculomotor 
cortex) perform motor functions. Three other cortical regions that form part of 
different CSTCCs subserve non-motor functions (Figure 3). These are the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC). 
Evidence supporting this model rests on the finding that dysfunction of the 
subcortical components within a CSTCC can result in deficits that resemble those that 
would be observed if the cortical area involved in the circuit was damaged directly 
(Middleton & Strick, 2000). Although tremendously influential, it should be noted 
that the model was developed before the role of the STN in movement disorders was 
understood and prior to the conceptualization of the direct and indirect pathways 
through the BG (as explained in section 1.2). The description of circuitry involving 
different regions of the OFC (i.e. medial and lateral) is also problematic, as existing 
literature reflects limited consensus in relation to the precise anatomical interactions 
and functional specifications that may apply to these different sectors. 
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OFC
Figure 2. The cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical circuits (Alexander et al., 1986) 
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ANTERIOR 
CINGULATE 
CORTEX (ACC)
 
DORSOLATERAL 
PREFRONTAL 
CORTEX (DLPFC)* 
ORBITOFRONTAL 
CORTEX (OFC)  
 
Figure 3. Diagram showing different regions of the frontal cortex involved in 
cognitive functions (scan courtesy of Birmingham University Imaging Centre). 
 
* Arrow shows the approximate position of DLPFC on a medial scan. This region is 
actually located more laterally 
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The motor circuit begins in the supplementary motor cortex and passes 
through the putamen, then through the ventrolateral GPi and caudolateral SNr, and 
next through the ventrolateral nucleus of the thalamus, before returning (primarily) to 
the supplementary motor cortex. This circuit is involved in the preparation, execution, 
control and sequencing of movement. The other motor circuit (oculomotor) originates 
in the frontal and supplementary eye fields and has a striatal component within the 
CN. It travels through the dorsomedial GPi and the ventral anterior and dorsomedial 
thalamic nuclei before passing back to the frontal eye fields. Dysfunction within this 
circuit affects the control of voluntary visual fixation. 
The dorsolateral prefrontal circuit begins in the DLPFC, and passes through 
the dorsolateral head of the CN, and then through the lateral dorsomedial GPi and 
rostrolateral SNr to the ventral anterior and dorsomedial thalamic nuclei, before 
returning to the DLPFC. The DLPFC is important for executive functions such as 
working memory (WM) (Aleman & van’t Wout, 2008), cognitive flexibility or set-
shifting (Smith, Taylor, Brammer & Rubia, 2004), attentional processes (Johnson, 
Strafella & Zatorre, 2007) and verbal fluency (Gallard et al., 2000).  
The lateral orbitofrontal circuit begins in inferolateral frontal cortex and passes 
through the ventromedial CN, dorsomedial GPi and rostromedial SNr, before passing 
through the ventral anterior and dorsal thalamic nuclei and returning to the lateral 
OFC. The lateral OFC is important for learning involving negative reinforcement 
(O’Doherty et al., 2001) and recognizing negative facial expressions (Liang, 
Zebrowitz & Aharon, 2009). Damage to the OFC may lead to irritability, poor 
empathy and impulse control, and changes to personality and social functioning (Blair 
& Cipolotti, 2000).  
 
14 
 
General Introduction 
The anterior cingulate circuit originates in the ACC and projects to the ventral 
striatum (NA), olfactory tubercle and regions of the ventromedial CN and putamen. 
There are other multiple inputs to the ventral striatum. The circuit returns via 
rostrolateral GPi and rostrodorsal SNr through the dorsomedial thalamic nucleus to 
the ACC. The ACC is implicated in drive and motivation (Devinsky, Morrell & Vogt, 
1995) and cognitive functions related to conflict monitoring and resolution (Carter, 
Braver, Barch, Noll & Cohen, 1998) and response inhibition (Barch et al., 2001), 
which is needed during tasks such as the Stroop. The CSTCC involving this region 
(described by Alexander et al., 1986) may also involve connections to medial OFC 
(Nauta, 1962; Yeterian & VanHoesen, 1978), which appears to play a role in social 
cognition (Fletcher et al., 1995). Note that some clinical studies use the term 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a region that includes medial OFC.  
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1.4: The Neural Basis of Striato-cortical Influences 
 
 
Patients with BG disorders experience motor symptoms as a result of striatal 
dysfunction. However, striatal dysfunction may have the potential to affect cognitive, 
social and emotional functioning in these disorders. This is due to connections 
between striatal output structures and the prefrontal cortex, which result in the 
CSTCCs (described by Alexander et al. 1986).  
In PD, neural loss is greatest in regions of the SN that project to the CN 
(Rinee, Rummikainen, Paljarvi & Rinne, 1989). The greatest DA decline is seen in 
the anterodorsal head of the CN (Kish et al., 1986), which receives projections from 
the DLPFC (Rosvold, 1972). Changes in DA receptor levels have also been reported 
in the DLPFC (Kaasinen et al., 2003). There is less evidence for the involvement of 
other non-motor frontostriatal circuits in PD. More ventral regions of the CN, that 
have greater connectivity with the OFC, are relatively preserved in early PD. 
Furthermore, the ventral striatum (NA, olfactory tubercle and ventral pallidum), 
which forms part of the ACC circuit, receives DA from the VTA, so may be expected 
to be less disrupted by neurochemical alterations in PD. 
Early degeneration of the dorsal striatum in HD is also likely to lead to 
dysfunction within the DLPFC CSTCC (described by Alexander et al., 1986). The 
ventral striatum appears relatively intact in comparison to the dorsal striatum (at least 
until later disease stages: Vonsattel & DiFiglia, 1998). The involvement of ACC 
circuitry may therefore appear unlikely. However, it is possible that as degeneration 
progresses to encompass more ventral regions of the CN, the CSTCC involving lateral 
OFC may be affected. Loss of inhibitory striatal output neurons to the medial segment 
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of the GP later in HD (Bradshaw, 2001) could further implicate the involvement of 
this circuit.  
A range of findings implicate alterations in the functioning of the CSTCC 
involving the ventral striatum and ACC (described by Alexander et al., 1986) in TS. 
Imaging studies have highlighted abnormalities in the ACC (Muller-Vahl et al., 2009; 
Peterson et al., 2001; Watkins et al., 2005) and differences in the functional 
connectivity of the ventral striatum in patients with TS and controls (Jeffries et al., 
2002). Reports of structural changes to the CN in TS (e.g. Peterson et al., 2003) may 
implicate the involvement of many frontostriatal pathways. However, such alterations 
may be more closely associated with comorbidities. Compensatory changes may lead 
to increased DLPFC volumes in children with TS (Peterson et al., 2001), and 
abnormalities of the DLPFC have also been reported in ADHD (Seidman et al., 2006). 
Studies implicate the OFC in association with obsessive symptoms in TS (Braun et 
al., 1995) and increased lateral OFC activity is apparent in patients with OCD (Ursu 
& Carter, 2009). Jeffries et al. (2002) report that activity in motor circuitry and the 
lateral OFC circuit is positively coupled in patients with TS, whereas a negative 
relationship exists in controls. A more recent study (Muller-Vahl et al., 2009) reported 
changes in the volume of regions including the ACC and medial OFC in TS. 
In summary, many anatomical and pathological findings indicate that 
dysfunction of the BG in PD, HD and TS could affect the functioning of prefrontal 
regions that subserve social, cognitive and emotional functions. 
17 
 
General Introduction 
1.5: Behavioural Evidence for Frontostriatal Circuit 
Dysfunction in Disorders of the Basal Ganglia 
  
Behavioural studies support the possibility that BG disorders are associated 
with dysfunction within CSTCCs (Alexander et al., 1986) that subserve cognitive, 
social and emotional functions. Key findings include both the psychiatric symptoms 
and difficulties with higher cognitive functions that are exhibited by patients with PD, 
HD, and TS. This section discusses the behavioural evidence for frontostriatal 
dysfunction in each of these patient groups in turn. 
Changes in the functioning of DLPFC circuitry may be associated with 
deficits in executive functions: higher cognitive abilities which include WM, 
inhibition, verbal fluency and attentional set-shifting. Zgaljardic et al. (2006) showed 
that the most significant executive impairments demonstrated by patients with PD are 
evident on tasks linked to the DLPFC. Patients exhibit impairment in WM (Gabrieli, 
Singh, Stebbins & Goetz., 1996), verbal fluency (Akinyemi et al., 2008), cognitive 
flexibility or set-shifting (Lees & Smith, 1983) and planning (Owen et al., 1995), as 
well as more general attentional impairments (Brown & Marsden, 1988; Drago et al., 
2008; Poliakoff & Smith-Spark, 2008; Price & Shin, 2009). Patients with PD also 
exhibit other evidence of memory dysfunction, including deficits in temporal ordering 
and poor recency discrimination (Sagar, Sullivan, Gabrieli, Corkin & Growdon 1988; 
Vriezen & Moscovitch, 1990). The WM deficits exhibited by patients with PD have 
the potential to contribute to other difficulties, such as poor sentence comprehension 
(Grossman et al., 2002; Hochstadt, Nakano, Lieberman & Friedman, 2006), inference 
generation (Monetta, Grindrod & Pell, 2008) and deductive and inductive reasoning 
(Natsopoulos et al., 1997). 
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Executive deficits resulting from dysfunction of DLPFC in PD are likely to 
reflect the early degeneration of dopaminergic neurons in the dorsal region of the CN 
that project to this region (Lewis et al., 2003). These deficits may be alleviated by the 
action of medications such as Levodopa on the DLPFC (Lange et al., 1992). 
However, due to the uneven pattern of degeneration of DA neurons, systemically 
administered agents are likely to exert a differential effect on DA systems. Activity in 
the dorsal striatum will be normalised through such methods. However, the relatively 
intact ventral systems, which may be involved in more basic mnemonic functions, 
such as encoding and retrieval, or other executive tasks, may be overtreated (Cools, 
Barker, Sahakian & Robbins 2001a; Lange et al., 1992).  
Patients with HD exhibit deficits in a range of cognitive abilities, including 
executive functions. Deficits have been reported in WM, planning, cognitive 
flexibility (Phillips, Shannon & Barker, 2008); attention (Butters, Wolfe, Granholm & 
Martone, 1986); response control and pattern recognition memory (Blackwell, 
Parterson, Barker, Robbins & Sahakian, 2008). Many of these deficits could result 
from DLPFC dysfunction. Studies by Wolf and colleagues revealed poor performance 
during high-load WM tasks that was associated with reduced activation in the DLPFC 
in patients with HD (e.g. Wolf et al., 2009). Even asymptomatic gene carriers (who 
express the mutant gene but do not yet exhibit frank clinical symptoms) can exhibit 
executive deficits. For example, impairments have been found in attentional set 
shifting (Lawrence et al., 1998) and verbal fluency (Larsson, Almkvist, Luszcz & 
Wahlen, 2008; Lawrence et al., 1998). Some aspects of cognitive functioning also 
decline with disease progression. For example, Ho et al. (2003) reported 
deteriorations in performance on attentional and inhibitory executive measures (e.g. 
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Stroop test, Trail Making Test) over a period of three to six years, in early to moderate 
HD.  
Other behavioural changes in HD may result from dysfunction within OFC 
circuitry. Patients can exhibit increased irritability and aggression (Calder, Keane, 
Lawrence & Manes, 2004) and difficulties with social relationships which may reflect 
reduced empathy (Snowden et al., 2003). Similar changes have been seen in 
association with OFC dysfunction (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). Some patients with HD 
exhibit comorbid obsessive compulsive symptoms (Baxter et al., 1987) and deficits in 
the recognition of facial expressions expressing negative emotions (Henley et al., 
2008). These findings implicate dysfunction of frontostriatal pathways involving 
lateral OFC, which is dysfunctional in OCD (Ursu & Carter, 2009) and is activated 
during the recognition of facial expressions of negative emotion (Liang et al., 2009) in 
HD. 
The investigation of higher cognitive functioning in TS is complicated by the 
high prevalence of comorbidities such as ADHD. Some reports of deficits in WM 
(Channon, Flynn & Robertson, 1992; Watkins et al., 2005) may reflect an influence of 
comorbid ADHD on performance. While some studies that have controlled for ADHD 
have reported deficits in WM (Chang, McCracken & Piacentini, 2006) and strategic 
and procedural memory (Stebbins et al., 1995), other investigations have yielded no 
evidence of impairment (e.g. Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs & van den Brink, 2006; 
Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001). Reports of poor verbal fluency (Bornstein, 1990; 
Bornstein, 1991; Sutherland et al., 1982) may also have been influenced by 
comorbidities, although Schuerholz (1998) provided evidence of deficits in a sample 
without ADHD. Other studies report no such difficulties (Channon, Pratt & 
Robertson, 2003; Goudriaan et al., 2006; Stebbins et al., 1995; Watkins et al., 2005). 
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Comorbid ADHD may also have contributed to attentional difficulties reported during 
the Trail Making Test (Bornstein & Yang, 2001; Channon et al., 1992) and on 
continuous performance tasks (Harris et al. 1995; Shucard, Benedict, Tekokkilich & 
Licter, 1997). However, one study (Chang et al., 2006) reported deficits in spatial 
attention after controlling for comorbid ADHD. A number of studies found that 
patients with TS exhibited little difficulty on tasks involving planning (Goudriaan et 
al, 2006; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Verte, Geurts, Roeyers, Oosterlaan & Sergeant, 
2005; Watkins et al., 2005), multitasking (Channon, Pratt & Robertson, 2003; 
Channon, Sinclair, Waller, Healey & Robertson, 2004) or shifting (Bornstein, 1990; 
Bornstein and Yang, 2001; Brand et al., 2002; Channon, Pratt & Robertson, 2003; 
Channon, Gunning, Frankl & Robertson, 2006; Chang et al., 2006; Cirino, Chapieski 
& Massmans, 2000; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Sutherland et al., 1982). In summary, 
there is little evidence overall that patients with TS exhibit deficits on tasks involving 
fluency, planning, WM and cognitive flexibility, which have been linked to the 
DLPFC (Alexander et al., 1986; Gallard et al., 2000; Milner, 1963; Rassner et al., 
2005). 
Inhibitory ability has received most attention in TS, which is likely to be due 
to the involuntary nature of the tics exhibited by patients. These investigations are 
complicated by the fact that inhibition is not a unitary construct but is composed of 
separable facets with different underlying neural substrates (Aron, 2007). The results 
of studies that have assessed patients’ ability to inhibit a motor response have been 
mixed (Baron-Cohen, Cross, Crowson & Robertson, 1994; Goudriaan et al., 2006; 
Hershey et al., 2004; Muller et al., 2003; Ozonoff, Strayer, MacMahon & Filloux, 
1994; Roessner, Albrecht, Dechent, Baudewig & Rothenberger, 2008), and 
comorbidities may have influenced some of these findings. One study of patients with 
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uncomplicated TS reported impaired performance during a flanker test that involved 
inhibition of a prepotent motor response (Crawford, Channon & Robertson, 2005). 
However, a later study failed to replicate these findings (Channon et al., 2006). 
Patients with TS can successfully inhibit verbal responses during the Stroop test 
(Brand et al., 2002; Channon et al., 1992; Chang et al., 2006; Goudriaan et al., 2006; 
Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999) even when comorbidities are present. However, reports of 
impairment during the Hayling test, which requires the inhibition of a prepotent 
verbal response, are persuasive. A number of studies by Channon and colleagues 
(Channon, Crawford, Vakili & Robertson 2003; Channon et al., 2006; Crawford et al., 
2005) have revealed deficits in ‘uncomplicated’ TS. The failure of many studies to 
control for comorbidity makes it unclear whether any evidence of cognitive or 
executive dysfunction is specifically attributable to TS. However, evidence of 
impairment on the Hayling test in uncomplicated samples may indicate dysfunction 
within the CSTCC involving the ACC (described by Alexander et al., 1986), which 
has been linked to this task (Nathaniel-James, Fletcher & Frith, 1997). 
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1.6: Social Cognition 
 
Social cognition involves the medial prefrontal cortex (e.g. Fletcher et al., 
1995; Gallagher et al., 2000), and has been described as “the sum of those processes 
that allow individuals of the same species (conspecifics) to interact with one another” 
(Frith & Frith, 2007, pp. R724). One facet of social cognition is Theory of Mind 
(ToM), which involves the understanding of mental states, and may require 
representation of the perspective of another person. An understanding of beliefs, 
desires, emotions and intentions can offer covert explanations for overt behaviour and 
enable the prediction of others’ actions. 
 
MEASURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL COGNITION IN CHILDREN 
 
A number of test materials have been designed to measure the development of 
ToM in children. Many of these tasks are now also used with clinical populations, so 
could be used to investigate social cognition in patients with BG disorders. Some 
tasks involve reasoning about different kinds of mental states, such as cognitions (e.g. 
beliefs) or emotions, and certain tasks are passed later in development than others. 
One well documented task that addresses the understanding of a story 
character’s false belief is the ‘unexpected transfer’ task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). 
The task is presented using puppets or as a story. In the story, an object that is in one 
location during the protagonist’s presence is transferred to a new location in their 
absence. The child is required to identify where the protagonist will search for the 
object on returning. Solving this task requires an appreciation of the protagonist’s 
false belief (the object is in the original location), which is contrary to both reality and 
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one’s own perspective. Up until around age four children respond on the basis of their 
own knowledge (Wellman & Brandone, 2009), indicating that the protagonist will 
look in the true location of the object, rather than the location the protagonist last saw 
it in.  
Another task used in developmental research is the deceptive box or 
‘unexpected contents’ task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). During this task, the 
experimenter shows the child a closed container with a familiar name or logo on it 
that indicates the likely content of the container (e.g. a Smarties tube). The 
experimenter asks the child what they think is inside the container before revealing 
unexpected contents (e.g. pencils). The child is then asked what another person (such 
as a schoolmate) would think was inside the container. Young children often respond 
incorrectly, and suggest the other person will think the container holds what they now 
know it contains (e.g. pencils). Gopnik and Astington (1988) suggest that children fail 
this task because they cannot understand how two people can have different 
representations of the same object. It has also been shown that children aged 3 often 
fail to report their own previous false belief correctly after learning the true state of 
affairs (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991). Young children therefore find it difficult to 
appreciate another perspective or representation of an object or situation that contrasts 
with their own current knowledge. 
Although many studies suggest children begin to pass these ToM tasks from 
around age four (e.g. Mitchell & Neal, 2005), some recent research indicates that 
infants may have some understanding of an actor’s false belief during the unexpected 
transfer task. One anticipatory looking task reported that 25 month olds looked to 
where actor’s false belief would lead them rather that the true location of the 
transferred object (Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2007). Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) 
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showed that in addition to looking where the returning actor would expect the object 
to be, 15 month olds who witnessed an unexpected transfer also looked longer if the 
actor looked towards the other location, perhaps reflecting surprise. Perner and 
Ruffman (2005) suggest that these infants’ behaviour does not indicate they 
understand an actor’s mental state, but simply reflects the neuronal events associated 
with making actor-object associations. That is, the increased looking when the actor 
looks in the true location (as shown by Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) may simply be 
the result of the greater mental effort needed to create a new object actor association 
(between the actor and the novel location) which is in contrast to the actor object 
association already made (between the actor and the original location). The exact age 
at which children may be considered to understand false belief remains a topic of 
debate. It is clear however, that children do not master more complex tasks, such as 
those involving second order ToM (eg. understanding one person’s belief about 
another person’s belief) until perhaps seven years of age (Perner & Wimmer, 1985).  
A more complex task involving ToM that has been used with older children is 
the faux pas task, which children pass between 9 and 11 years of age (Baron-Cohen, 
O’Riodan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted, 1999). Faux pas occurs when someone says 
something that may be detrimental or offensive towards another person. The remark is 
not a deliberate insult because the protagonist making the inappropriate remark has no 
intention to cause harm to the person they are speaking about or to. The understanding 
of faux pas therefore requires ToM reasoning because it involves consideration of the 
protagonist’s lack of intent to offend and their failure to realize that their remark is 
socially inappropriate. It also involves consideration of the victim’s likely emotional 
response.  
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Faux pas tasks may be more complicated than simple false belief tasks 
because of a need to integrate information about cognitive and affective (emotional) 
mental states (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Goldsher & Aharon-Peretz, 2005). 
Understanding faux pas also requires second-order ToM, in order to appreciate the 
perpetrator’s belief about the victim’s mental state (as a result of their remark). As 
tasks involving the understanding of faux pas may make more complex social 
reasoning demands, they may be more sensitive to subtle changes in ToM. Indeed, 
some clinical groups, such as patients with damage involving the VMPFC, have been 
found to exhibit deficits on a faux pas task alongside intact performance on first order 
false belief tasks (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Goldsher & Aharon-Peretz, 2005; 
Stone, Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998). The involvement of the different factors 
described above may make the faux pas task a particularly sensitive tool for assessing 
possible ToM impairment in patients with BG disorders.  
One group that has been studied extensively with regard to ToM is children 
with autism. These children are thought to exhibit specific difficulties with ToM. 
Research with these children has led to the development of other tasks, which have 
been modified for use with normal adults and clinical populations. One task is the 
‘Eyes Test’ developed by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright 
& Joliffe, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). This task 
requires participants to make judgments about the mental states of a person based on 
observation of expressions in the eyes alone. Another example is The Strange Stories 
test (Happé, 1994) which features persuasion, white lies and double bluff. This task 
highlights a role for ToM in the understanding of language that must be interpreted in 
a non-literal way.  
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Non-literal language relies on an understanding of the speaker’s mental state 
to ensure accurate interpretation. In the case of sarcasm for example, the words used 
by the speaker typically communicate the literal opposite to what they think or feel. 
Happé (1994) showed that children with autism exhibit poor understanding of non-
literal language that is likely to be linked to their difficulties with ToM. Support for a 
role for ToM in the interpretation of non-literal language comes from imaging studies 
that indicate regions commonly activated by ToM tasks such as the OFC and inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) are active in healthy adults during the processing of sarcasm 
(Uchiyama et al., 2006). 
 
FACTORS THAT MAY CONTRIBUTE TO TOM: SIMULATION, ABSTRACT 
PERSPECTIVE TAKING AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING  
 
Patients with BG disorders could exhibit deficits on social cognitive tasks as a 
result of deficits in different factors that contribute to ToM. These factors include 
simulation and abstract perspective taking. Executive functions can also contribute to 
performance on ToM tasks, but may be more important for some kinds of tasks than 
others. 
Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder and Tager-Flusberg (2006) showed that some of 
the deficits in ToM exhibited by children with autism could be linked to abnormalities 
of neural regions involved in the Mirror Neuron System (MNS). The MNS is a 
network of brain regions that allows the imitation of observed behaviour. This 
network involves frontoparietal neurons that are active when both observing, and 
performing the same action (Rizolatti & Craighero, 2004). Iacoboni et al. (1999) 
suggest that a visual representation of the observation of an action is formed in the 
27 
 
General Introduction 
superior temporal sulcus and sent via the parietal cortex to inferior frontal regions, 
which convert the representation to a motor plan and allow imitation. The 
performance of an action influences the concurrent perception of an action. 
Recognition is facilitated if the actions that are performed and observed are 
compatible. If the two actions are incompatible, interference occurs (Oberman, 
Winkielman & Ramachandran, 2007). These findings suggest there is a common 
representational code and neural substrate for the perception of and performance of a 
particular action. 
The MNS may be involved in processes related to ToM, as it can be described 
as a system in which one’s own experience and the observable results of the same 
experience felt by another overlap. The MNS may therefore act as a mechanism to 
allow one to understand the perspective of another through simulation. This network 
provides a basis for the overt or covert mirroring of posture and gestures (Oberman et 
al., 2007) and emotional facial expressions (Adolphs, 2002; Wicker et al., 2003) thus 
facilitating recognition of others’ mental states. Oberman et al. (2007) showed that the 
recognition of emotional facial expressions in others is associated with covert 
mimicry of the perceived facial expression, and that blocking this mimicry can 
interfere with recognition.  
Automatic mimicry may be described as emotional contagion. This implies 
that the observation of an emotion in another may lead to activation of the neural 
substrate involved in that emotion in the perceiver, allowing them to relate to and 
understand the emotion observed. For example, patients with HD may exhibit deficits 
in the recognition of disgust expressed vocally or in facial expressions (Snowden et 
al., 2008; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997), and the experience of disgust elicited through 
the olfactory and gustatory modalities (Mitchell, Heims, Neville & Rickards, 2005) 
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and in response to pictures (Hayes, Stevenson & Colheart, 2007) and written 
scenarios (Snowden et al., 2008). Deficits in one’s own experience of an emotion 
could therefore be closely associated with difficulties understanding that emotion in 
another. Functional studies of the insula add further weight to this argument. Wicker 
et al (2003) showed that the insula, a region involved in one’s own subjective feelings 
(Craig, 2009) is involved not only in one’s own experience of disgust, but also the 
recognition of this emotion when expressed by another. Jabbi and Keysers (2008) 
showed that the insula may relate the bodily sensations associated with mimcry to an 
internal representation of an emotional state to allow emotional contagion. 
Some of the processes involved in reasoning about a person’s emotions may 
be quite different to those involved in understanding others’ cognitive mental states. 
Beliefs and intentions, for example, may be considered to be more abstract, as they 
are often not accompanied by visual cues such as facial expressions. Reasoning about 
ToM in situations when there may be no observable behaviour indicates a necessary 
role for the application of abstract theoretical knowledge (Olsson & Ochsner, 2007) or 
perspective taking processes. Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz and Perry (2009) 
propose two anatomically dissociable systems involved in understanding the mental 
states of others. The first is a basic emotional contagion system which involves the 
MNS and IFG. The second is a more advanced cognitive perspective taking system 
which recruits VMPFC. This second system could be involved in making judgments 
about a person’s emotions (particularly when facial expressions are not observable) 
and cognitions (which are never directly observable). The recruitment of these 
systems may vary according to whether input stimuli favour reflective reasoning and 
semantic processing, or low level recognition. 
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Higher cognitive abilities such as executive functions may be involved when 
more abstract reasoning processes are required in order to understand a person’s 
mental state. Saxe, Moran, Scholz and Gabrieli (2006) showed that domain general 
executive abilities play a role when adults reason about other’s beliefs. Executive 
functions have also been linked to ToM performance in both children (Carlson, Moses 
& Breton, 2002) and patients with brain damage (Henry, Phillips, Crawford, Ietswaart 
& Summers, 2006). Although executive functions such as WM may have a more 
incidental role on task performance, some of these higher cognitive abilities may play 
a central role in ToM performance. For example, Samson, Apperly, 
Kathirgamanathan and Humphreys (2005) provided evidence that the executive 
function inhibition is particularly important for performance on ToM tasks. These 
authors showed that a patient with deficits in inhibition could pass modified ToM 
tasks that were specially designed to reduce inhibitory demands. It may be that 
inhibition is important for ToM because one must inhibit one’s own perspective of the 
world in order to understand another person’s viewpoint, and so their mental state. 
Executive deficits in patients with disorders of the BG may therefore have the 
potential to affect performance on ToM tasks.  
Executive deficits could affect reasoning about cognitive mental states (e.g. 
beliefs) more than affective mental states. Cognitive mental states are more abstract, 
so may therefore make greater executive demands. In support of this proposal, 
Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon Peretz (2007) showed that difficulties in reasoning about 
cognitive mental states could result from lesions to DLPFC, a region involved in 
many executive tasks. These authors also showed that circumscribed VMPFC 
(including medial OFC) damage can lead to specific deficits in reasoning about 
affective mental states.  
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In summary, particular impairments in ToM may result from specific 
difficulties with simulation, abstract perspective taking, or in executive functions that 
contribute to ToM performance. Dysfunction of the MNS may be associated with 
poor simulation or emotional contagion processes, leading to impaired understanding 
of emotions expressed through facial expressions. However, poor understanding of 
another’s emotions may arise in association with deficits in one’s own emotional 
experience. This may be linked to specific neural substrates for different emotions 
(such as the amygdala, which is linked to fear: Calder et al., 1996; and the insula, 
which is implicated in disgust: Phillips et al., 1997). Abstract perspective taking is 
also involved in some ToM and may involve the OFC (Hynes, Baird & Grafton, 
2006). ToM may also be impaired through executive deficits resulting from DLPFC 
dysfunction. Patients with PD, HD and TS may therefore exhibit different deficits in 
ToM as a result of specific difficulties with simulation, abstract perspective taking or 
executive functioning. 
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1.7: Social Cognition in Disorders of the Basal Ganglia 
 
Prefrontal dysfunction may lead to changes in social cognition in PD, HD and 
TS. In each of these disorders, changes in the functioning of the frontal cortex can 
occur as a result of dysfunction within frontostriatal pathways. In PD, prefrontal 
dysfunction may also arise due to the loss of direct DA input into this region. As the 
pattern of dysfunction within frontostriatal pathways varies in these movement 
disorders, it is likely that these patient groups will exhibit different deficits on social 
cognitive tasks. 
Evidence of DLPFC dysfunction in PD suggests that executive impairments 
could affect patients’ performance on ToM tasks. However, deficits on most 
executive tasks may be more closely associated with poor reasoning about abstract 
cognitive mental states (e.g. beliefs or intentions) in particular. Zelazo, Qu and Müller 
(2005) discuss a controversial, yet potentially useful distinction between executive 
and ToM tasks which can be classified as ‘hot’ or ‘cool’ according to whether the task 
involves an emotional element. ‘Hot’ ToM involves reasoning in relation to affect and 
motivation, while ‘cool’ ToM involves reasoning about more abstract mental states. 
The majority of executive tasks assess ‘cool’ executive functions (planning on the 
Tower of London, or set-shifting on the Wisconsin Card Sort Task). However, ‘hot’ 
executive functioning may be assessed through the use of affective decision making 
tasks, such as the Iowa Gambling Task. Furthermore, these authors suggest that ‘hot’ 
executive and ToM tasks are linked to OFC, while ‘cool’ aspects of these abilities rely 
on DLPFC. Dysfunction of circuitry involving the DLPFC in PD may therefore be 
more likely to affect patients’ performance on ‘cool’ aspects of ToM. 
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The mesolimbic and mesocortical systems originate from the VTA and 
provide dopamine input to the medial prefrontal cortex (Marchese & Pani, 2002). It is 
likely that these inputs remain largely intact in PD (Evans & Lees, 2004). Widespread 
deficits in association with OFC dysfunction may therefore appear unlikely. However, 
some studies (e.g. Ouchi et al., 1999) have provided contrasting evidence that 
indicates the mesocortical dopaminergic input may be dysfunctional in PD. It is also 
possible that if the OFC is intact, dopaminergic medication may over-stimulate these 
regions (Cools et al., 2001a). Dysfunction of OFC could implicate the involvement of 
other CSTCCs (described by Alexander et al., 1986) in PD, such as the anterior 
cingulate and\or lateral OFC CSTCCs. 
In HD, deficits in domain general executive functions could arise through 
DLPFC dysfunction and lead to impairment on ToM tasks. Although the current 
anatomical models and pathological data would not implicate changes within the 
ACC CSTCC (which includes connections to medial OFC) in HD, a study by 
Snowden et al. (2003) found that patients with HD exhibited reduced empathy and 
offered abnormal interpretations of social behaviour. These findings could reflect 
dysfunction within the ACC circuit. The possible dysfunction of both OFC and 
DLPFC in HD could lead to impairments in both ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ aspects of ToM. 
Other difficulties with ToM may occur as a result of dysfunction within the 
lateral OFC CSTCC (as described by Alexander et al., 1986), which could be affected 
by degeneration within ventral regions of the CN. Studies showing that patients with 
HD exhibit difficulties in the recognition of emotional expressions (e.g. Henley et al., 
2008) could implicate dysfunction in the lateral OFC CSTCC (as described by 
Alexander et al., 1986) that includes the IFG (part of the MNS). The neural substrates 
involved in the recognition of an emotion in another could also be involved in one’s 
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own emotional experience (e.g.Wicker et al., 2003). Therefore, patients may also 
experience changes in their own subjective experience of certain emotions.  
In TS, possible dysfunction within the CSTCC involving ventral striatum and 
ACC (outlined by Alexander et al., 1986) could lead to changes in inhibition and 
associated impairments on ToM tasks. As DLPFC dysfunction appears unlikely, 
patients without comorbidities would not be expected to exhibit widespread deficits 
on ToM tasks in association with executive deficits. Dysfunction of the ACC may 
implicate involvement of the amygdala and connections to medial OFC, which could 
result in more fundamental deficits on many tasks involving ToM perspective taking 
processes. The NOSIS exhibited by some patients with TS (Kurlan et al., 1996) could 
be linked to deficits in ToM, as poor consideration of others’ mental states in response 
to one’s own actions could contribute to these symptoms. As patients with TS are 
more likely to exhibit dysfunction within circuitry involving medial OFC than 
DLPFC, this should lead to greater difficulty with aspects of ‘hot’ rather than ‘cool’ 
ToM. 
The following chapters of this thesis describe a series of experiments that 
investigated the performance of patients with BG disorders on a range of social 
cognitive tasks. Throughout chapter 1, HD is discussed directly after PD because 
these two disorders are both neurodegenerative and TS is a neurodevelopmental 
disorder. However, the order of the chapters in this thesis first covers work carried out 
with patients with PD, then TS and then HD, reflecting the chronological order that 
experimental work was carried out. 
Social Cognition in Parkinson’s Disease 
CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL COGNITION IN PARKINSON’S DISEASE 
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2.1: Social Cognition in PD: Introduction 
 
In PD, degeneration of DA neurons in the SN leads to dysfunction within 
frontostriatal pathways. The CSTCCs (Alexander et al., 1986) are formed from 
connections that pass through the thalamus and join the striatum with different regions 
of the frontal cortex. While characteristic motor symptoms arise due to dysfunction of 
motor circuits, cognitive difficulties may result from the dysfunction of circuits with 
non-motor functions. Patients exhibit executive deficits on tasks such as the Tower of 
London test (e.g. Weintraub et al., 2005), Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (e.g. Lees & 
Smith, 1983) and on WM tasks (e.g. Gabrieli et al., 1996). Zgaljardic et al. (2006) 
showed that patients’ greatest deficits were apparent on tasks linked to DLPFC 
functioning.  
Frontal dysfunction can lead to deficits in ToM (see section 1.6). Changes in 
frontal functioning in PD (due to dysfunction within frontostriatal circuitry) could 
therefore lead to deficits in ToM. Studies have therefore investigated ToM ability in 
adults with other neurological conditions. Deficits have been demonstrated by patients 
with schizophrenia (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007), fronto-temporal dementia (Gregory 
et al., 2002; Lough et al., 2006) and traumatic brain injury (Bibby & McDonald, 
2005). Many clinical studies indicate that the medial OFC is important for ToM 
(Blakemore, den Ouden, Choudhury & Frith, 2007; Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et 
al., 2000; Stone et al., 1998). If striatal dysfunction was to extend so far as to affect 
circuitry involving medial OFC, patients with PD could exhibit deficits on ToM tasks. 
Clinical and developmental studies have highlighted relationships between 
ToM and executive functions. Studies of patients with brain injury have shown that 
impairments in ToM can be linked to deficits in inhibition (Samson et al., 2005) or 
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WM (Bibby & McDonald, 2005; Stone et al., 1998). Developmental research has 
highlighted similar associations. For example, Flynn (2007) suggests that the 
development of inhibitory control may underpin the understanding of false belief. 
Similarly, Gordon and Olson (1998) reported correlations between 3-5 year olds’ 
performance on ToM and WM tasks. Although research indicates a link between 
executive functioning and ToM ability, the exact nature of this relationship remains 
unclear. Inhibitory ability could be important for ToM because it may be necessary to 
inhibit one’s own point of view in order to see the world from another person’s 
perspective. In the case of WM it is possible that this executive function provides a 
general contribution to task performance through the maintenance and manipulation 
of task relevant information. WM could therefore have an incidental role in 
performance on ToM tasks. Alternatively, ToM reasoning itself could be carried out 
in a generic WM system, so poor WM could also lead to a ToM deficit through loss of 
competence (see Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2005, pp 573). This possibility is 
open to discussion. 
Relationships could be seen between poor performance on ToM tasks and 
executive tasks assessing WM because domain general WM is likely to contribute to 
ToM performance (see McKinnon and Moscovitch, 2007). Difficulties with WM as a 
result of DLPFC dysfunction are common in PD (e.g. Gilbert, Belleville, Bherer & 
Chouinard, 2005) and could lead to deficits on reasoning tasks. Patients exhibit 
impairments on tasks involving deductive and inductive reasoning (Natsopoulos et al., 
1997), and Monetta, Grindrod and Pell (2008) showed that patients with PD can 
exhibit deficits in inference generation as a result of WM dysfunction. One specific 
link between WM impairment in PD and ToM deficits could therefore be through 
impaired inferential reasoning. 
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A few studies have reported evidence of ToM difficulties in patients with PD. 
Saltzman, Strauss, Hunter and Archibald (2000) showed that PD patients can perform 
more poorly on some ToM tasks in comparison to controls. These impairments were 
related to executive deficits. Another study (Peron et al., 2009) revealed limited 
evidence for ToM impairment in PD. Advanced but non-demented PD patients 
performed poorly on questions relating to a faux pas task, although patients at an 
earlier stage of the disease performed similarly to controls. Patients with PD also did 
not differ from controls on the ‘Eyes Test’ (developed by Baron-Cohen et al., 2001: 
see section 1.6). Patients’ deficits were still apparent when they were taking DA 
medication.  
Peron et al. (2009) suggest that the understanding of cognitive mental states 
(cognitive ToM) such as intentions or beliefs could be more vulnerable in PD than the 
understanding of emotions (affective ToM). Specific difficulties with cognitive ToM 
could occur because PD is associated with executive dysfunction and cognitive ToM 
relies more on executive functioning than affective ToM. One study of patients with 
frontal lesions (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon Peretz, 2007) provided evidence for largely 
separate neuroanatomical substrates for affective and cognitive ToM, and 
impairments in cognitive ToM were more often associated with lesions to the DLPFC.  
Though research investigating ToM in PD is rather scarce, studies have 
indicated that patients with PD demonstrate difficulties on tasks involving related 
aspects of social cognition. For example, patients can exhibit deficits in the 
recognition of emotional facial expressions (Clark, Neargarder & Cronin-Golomb, 
2008; Suzuki, Hoshino, Shigemasu & Kawamura, 2006). Patients with PD can also 
exhibit poor understanding of pragmatic communication (McNamara & Durso, 2003), 
including poor comprehension of metaphor (Monetta & Pell, 2007) and sarcasm 
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(Monetta, Grindrod & Pell, 2009). ToM deficits could underlie impaired 
comprehension of pragmatic language such as metaphors and sarcasm, because the 
accurate interpretation of non-literal language involves appreciation of the speaker’s 
mental state. This proposal is supported by findings reported by Monetta et al. (2009), 
who found that patients with PD performed poorly on first and second-order belief 
questions during a pragmatic comprehension task. These difficulties were related to 
poor performance on measures of WM and verbal fluency, so executive deficits are 
likely to have resulted in the ToM difficulties which in turn led to poor interpretation 
of non-literal language. 
Another ability shown to be impaired in PD that could involve similar 
processes to ToM is counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual reasoning occurs after an 
event when one imagines how things could have turned out differently. McNamara, 
Durso, Brown and Lynch (2003) reported deficits in counterfactual reasoning in PD. 
Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell (1998) found evidence of a relationship 
between children’s performance on ToM and counterfactual reasoning tasks. Both 
counterfactual thinking and ToM involve looking at the world from different 
perspectives. To think counterfactually one must set aside current reality and imagine 
an alternative reality. However, to reason about another person’s mental state, one 
sets aside one’s own personal reality and then attempts to see the world from another 
person’s perspective. Deficits in counterfactual reasoning could indicate that patients 
with PD exhibit general difficulties with perspective taking which could lead to 
impaired performance on ToM tasks. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis describes three experiments that were conducted to 
investigate whether the frontostriatal dysfunction in PD could result in ToM deficits 
and whether any such deficits were related to executive dysfunction. The tasks used 
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involved cognitive ToM because the understanding of cognitive mental states could 
be more vulnerable to PD (Peron et al., 2009). Unlike other studies carried out with 
patients with PD, these experiments used a standard first order false belief task 
involving ‘unexpected transfer’ (see section 1.6). Some tasks were modified to reduce 
WM demands, and tests of non-inferential ToM were included. 
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2.2: PD Experiment 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In experiment 1, the performance of PD patients and neurologically intact 
controls was compared on two ToM tasks. One ToM task consisted of standard 
‘unexpected transfer style’ vignettes (devised by Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino & 
Humphreys, 2004). These vignettes featured the movement of a person or object from 
its original location to a new location, during a story character’s absence. ToM ability 
was assessed by asking participants to identify the absent character’s false belief 
about the object’s location (the object is in the original location). Another question 
assessed counterfactual reasoning, and two questions (‘memory’ and ‘reality’) were 
included to check memory.  
The other ToM task was a faux pas task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), which 
involved understanding that one story character’s remark could have hurt or offended 
another character. The ability to recognise faux pas develops later than the 
understanding of false belief and involves the attribution of cognitive and affective 
mental states: the false belief of the protagonist (what they say or do will not offend) 
and the victim’s feelings of hurt or offence. Peron et al. (2009) found that some 
patients with PD exhibit impairment on a version of this faux pas task. Kawamura and 
Koyama (2007) reported research (Oeda, 2003) indicating that although PD patients 
could recognise faux pas, they performed poorly on related false belief questions. 
These errors were despite intact recall of factual information.  
The FAS test was administered to assess verbal fluency, an aspect of executive 
functioning. Patients were expected to perform more poorly than controls on this 
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word generation task, which has been linked to activity in the DLPFC (Gallard et al, 
2000). Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon Peretz (2007) found that ToM ability correlated 
with performance on verbal fluency tasks in patients with frontal lesions, so a 
correlation between performance on the FAS and ToM vignette task was expected. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
This study and all other experiments contained in this thesis were granted ethical 
approval by South Birmingham NHS Ethics Committee. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thirty outpatients with PD from the Neurosciences Department at the Queen 
Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham, volunteered to take part in this experiment. They 
were invited to participate through their consultant neurologist. This senior clinician 
ensured that all patients selected neither showed frank symptoms of dementia nor 
exhibited motor symptoms rated at greater than stage 3 on the Hoehn and Yahr (1967) 
scale. The Hoehn and Yahr scale is a standard measure of the severity of motor 
symptoms in PD. Stage 3 characterises patients who have mild to moderate disease 
with impaired balance, but are physically independent.  
All patients were taking standardly prescribed DA medications. There were 19 
males and 11 females, of mean age 64.27 years (S.D. 8.80, range 52-82), with mean 
13.30 years (S.D. 2.56, range 9-18) of education. 15 controls (9 males and 6 females) 
were also recruited and matched as closely as possible for age (mean 61.80, S.D. 
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13.14, range 50-87 years) and education (mean 13.87, S.D. 2.59, range 10-18 years). 
A subset of 15 patients (10 males and 5 females) with mean age 65.60 years (S.D. 
9.63, range 54-82) and mean education 13.67 years (S.D. 2.82, range 10-19) and 
another group of 10 controls consisting of 6 males and 4 females, of mean age 60.70 
years (S.D. 9.60, range 50-81), with mean education 13.98 years (S.D. 2.22, range 11-
16) completed the faux pas task. Fewer controls than patients were tested as controls 
performed at or close to ceiling on the social cognitive tasks. 
 
PROCEDURE 
 
All patients and some control participants were tested in a consultation room 
at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital. Occasionally a friend or relative was present, who 
sat silently and did not assist the patient with the tasks. Some control participants 
were tested in a quiet room in their own home. All participants read information 
sheets about the study and gave informed consent. Before the tasks, patients 
completed a short interview about their experience of the disease and the medication 
they took. Testing took approximately thirty minutes and was followed by a full 
debriefing. 
The order of administration of the tasks was counterbalanced across 
participants, though the vignettes within the faux pas and ToM vignette tasks 
remained in a fixed order. Each vignette was read to the participant twice before they 
were asked the corresponding questions.  
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TOM TASKS 
 
ToM vignette test 
 
This test was taken from Apperly et al. (2004). It comprised four ‘unexpected 
transfer’ style vignettes, describing the actions of story characters, and a change in the 
location of a person or object. For example: “Andrew and Susie live in a rural cottage 
outside of the tiny village of Ely. Andrew is in bed suffering with the flu. Susie 
decides to drive into the nearest town to get him some medicine. While she's away, 
the phone in the cottage rings. The burglar alarm is sounding in the village school 
where Andrew works. Reluctantly, Andrew walks to the school in the village.”  
Each vignette was read twice and then four questions were asked. One 
assessed counterfactual reasoning: “Where would Andrew be if he hadn’t gone to the 
school?” Another tested the understanding of a character’s false-belief:  “Where does 
Susie think Andrew is?” Two questions were included to check recall: “Where was 
Andrew at the start?” (memory) and “Where is Andrew now?” (reality: the final 
outcome of the story). There were two forced choice responses, the target’s original 
and current locations. Each question was followed by two forced choice options; the 
original, and final location of the object. The original location was the correct answer 
to all but the reality question. The false belief and counterfactual questions came first 
and second, with the false belief question appearing first in the first and third 
vignettes, and second in the second and fourth vignettes. The memory and reality 
questions were asked third and fourth. They were counterbalanced so memory 
appeared as the third question in the first two vignettes and in fourth position in the 
last two vignettes. 
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Faux Pas test  
 
This task contained eight vignettes that were developed by Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1999) and were originally used to test children with autism. Four control vignettes 
described exchanges between characters involving no faux pas and four test vignettes 
described a character saying something inappropriate to another character without 
realising it is likely to offend them. For example: “Jill had just moved into a new 
apartment. Jill went shopping and bought some new curtains for her bedroom. When 
she had just finished decorating the apartment her best friend Lisa came over.  
Jill gave her a tour of the apartment and asked “How do you like my bedroom?” 
“Those curtains are horrible,” Lisa said, “I hope you’re going to get some new ones.”  
The first question assessed recognition of faux pas: “Did someone say 
something they shouldn’t have?” If participants responded yes, they were then asked 
“Who was it and what did they say?” Participants’ reasoning was questioned through 
the use of two further probes: “Why shouldn’t they have said that?”, and “Why do 
you think they did say it?” Another question checked story recall, “What had Jill just 
bought?” Two other questions were asked about test vignettes. One was a question 
that asked about a characters desire or belief: “Did Lisa like the curtains?” The final 
question always asked about the protagonist’s false belief which contributed to the 
faux pas: “Did Lisa know that Jill had chosen the curtains?” These questions were 
always presented in this fixed order. 
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EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
FAS verbal fluency test 
 
Participants were requested to say as many words as they could think of 
beginning with a letter of the alphabet until asked to stop. They were instructed that 
they could say any words apart from peoples’ proper names. One minute was given 
for each of the letters F, A and S. Scores were calculated by summing the number of 
the words generated across these three trials. Repeats were noted and not counted. If 
participants stopped responding and said they could not think of any more words they 
were asked to continue trying until the minute given for that letter ended. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Analysis indicated that patients (n=30) and controls (n=15) did not 
significantly differ for age, t(21.30)=0.77, p=.499, or years of education, t(43)=-0.70, 
p=.489 overall. There was also no difference in age and education when the subgroup 
of 15 patients who completed the faux pas task were compared to the group of 10 
controls who completed this task (age: t(23)=1.25, p=.225; education: t(21.65)=-0.63, 
p=.538). 
Non-parametric tests were used for the analysis of task performance as data 
were not normally distributed and included outliers. Between comparisons were 
conducted using Mann Whitney U (MWU) tests and Kruskal Wallis tests. Within 
comparisons employed Friedman tests and Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. Relationships 
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were examined using Spearman’s rho (rs) correlation coefficients. These tests were 
used for the majority of analysis reported in results sections throughout this thesis. 
Any exceptions are indicated where they arise. 
 
TOM TASKS 
 
ToM Vignette Test 
 
While controls performed at ceiling, patients answered 9.38% of questions on 
the vignette test incorrectly, a mean of 1.5 errors per patient (S.D. 2.13, median 0, 
range 0-9). This difference was highly significant, MWU=120, p=.002. Patient errors 
were spread across all four question types and there was no significant difference in 
performance according to question type, χ2(3)=5.54, p=.136. Patients who made false 
belief errors also tended to make errors on memory or reality questions. As can be 
seen from Table 1, patients made fewest errors on the counterfactual question. 
 
Table 1. Errors made by patients (n=30) on ToM vignette questions 
 
 
Question type 
 
False belief 
 
Counter-
factual 
 
Memory 
 
Reality 
 
Total 
 
 
 
Total errors/total 
possible 
 
Percentage incorrect 
 
Number of patients 
making errors 
 
 
13/120 
 
 
10.83 
 
11 
 
6/120 
 
 
5 
 
6 
 
10/120 
 
 
8.33 
 
9 
 
16/120 
 
 
13.33 
 
10 
 
45/480 
 
 
9.38 
 
14/30 
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When between comparisons were conducted for errors made on each of the 
four question types, patients with PD performed significantly more poorly than 
controls on false belief, MWU=142.5, p=.008, and reality, MWU=150, p=.013, 
questions. The difference for memory questions just reached significance, 
MWU=172.5, p=.045. There was a trend for poor performance on the counterfactual 
questions, MWU=180, p=.066. 
 
Faux pas test 
 
Although about half of the patients made at least one error when required to 
recognize whether faux pas had occurred, there was no significant difference between 
patients and controls in the recognition of faux pas, MWU=59, p=.313. Patients 
(n=15) made 14 errors in total (mean 0.93, S.D. 1.28, median 0, range 0-4), and 
controls (n=10) made 4 errors (mean 0.4, S.D. 0.70, median 0, range 0-2). As can be 
seen from Table 2, errors were made on both test and control vignettes. 
 
Table 2. Percentage of faux pas recognition errors made by patients and controls 
 
 
 
Group 
 
 
Total errors 
 
Test scenarios 
 
Control scenarios 
 
 
Patients (n=15) 
 
 
11.67 
 
11.67 
 
11.67 
 
 
Controls (n=10) 
 
 
5.00 
 
7.50 
 
2.50 
 
 
Patients performed significantly more poorly than controls on check questions, 
MWU=36.5, p=.029. Both test and control scenarios were followed by a question 
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checking recall of factual information contained in the story. Patients performed 
significantly more poorly than controls on these fact check questions, MWU=37.5, 
p=.027. This finding suggests that patients’ comprehension or memory for the story 
details was poor, though this did not seem to lead to a decline in faux pas recognition. 
 
 
Table 3. Percentage of incorrect responses for patients and controls for faux pas 
check questions 
 
 
 
Question type 
 
Patients (n=15) 
 
Controls (n=10) 
 
 
Total fact check 
 
Test scenario fact check 
 
Control scenario fact check 
 
Desire\belief check 
 
False belief check 
 
 
18.33 
 
8.33 
 
28.33 
 
13.33 
 
28.33 
 
6.25 
 
2.50 
  
10.00 
 
2.50 
 
12.50 
 
 
 
Test scenarios were followed by two more check questions. The first asked 
about the protagonist’s desire or belief, and the second concerned the protagonist’s 
false belief. When these question types were considered separately, patients exhibited 
a trend for poorer performance on the first question (see Table 3), MWU=47, p=.057, 
but didn’t perform significantly more poorly on the false belief check, MWU=53.5, 
p=.186. 
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EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
FAS test 
 
On average patients generated 43.37 words (S.D. 17.69, median 40.5, range 
15-74) over the FAS test. Controls generated mean 54.4 words (S.D. 16, median 47, 
range 30-95). Some patients exhibited very low scores on this test, and the difference 
between patients and controls approached signficance, MWU=144.5, p=.052. 
 
CORRELATIONS 
 
Correlations were conducted to look for relationships between patients’ 
performance on the tasks administered and assess the influence of time since 
medication. A significant negative correlation was found between patient performance 
on the FAS and ToM vignette test (Table 4). Better executive performance as 
measured by high scores on the FAS was associated with fewer errors on ToM 
vignettes. No other significant relationships were found. 
Due to the problems associated with multiple comparisons, a more stringent 
level of significance (such as 0.01) is often used when analysing correlations. 
However, for this experiment, and throughout this thesis, correlations with a p-value 
less than 0.05 were considered. This was for two reasons. Firstly, both non-parametric 
tests and small sample size led to an increased probability of making a type II error. 
Secondly, as some of the research contained in this thesis was exploratory, weaker 
correlations were still of use in indicating areas of further investigation. 
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Table 4. Correlations for patient performance on tasks and time since 
medication 
 
 
 
Measure: 
 
FAS 
(total words 
generated) 
 
 
ToM 
(all errors) 
 
Faux pas 
(recognition 
errors) 
 
Time since  
Medication 
(minutes) 
 
FAS 
(total words 
generated) 
 
 
 
x 
 
-.529 
.043* 
 
-.448 
.094 
 
.164 
.576 
 
ToM 
(all errors) 
 
  
x 
 
.446 
.096 
 
-.375 
.186 
 
Faux pas 
(recognition 
errors) 
 
   
 
x 
 
.229 
.431 
 
 
KEY: 
Upper value = Spearman’s r correlation coefficient, lower value = p-value 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Patients made more errors on the ToM vignette test than controls. The fact that the 
control group performed at ceiling makes the number of errors made by patients 
striking. It should be noted that the forced choice style of questioning used on the 
vignette test could mean that patients answered correctly by chance on many 
occasions. However, another difficulty with interpretation is that on the occasions 
when patients performed well on false belief questions but also made errors on the 
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memory questions (confusing the start and end location of the transferred object), a 
correct false belief response may not reflect the accurate  inference of a false belief 
but rather the incorrect inference of a true belief.   
Although most errors made by patients were on false belief and reality 
questions, errors were also made on memory and counterfactual questions, providing 
no evidence for a selective deficit in the understanding of false-belief. There was 
evidence of a weak relationship between performance on the ToM vignettes and the 
FAS test, which provided some evidence of mild executive impairment in the patient 
group. This link between executive and ToM performance could be explained by an 
executive component directly involved in ToM, or the presence of incidental 
executive demands made by the ToM vignette task.  
Experiment 1 revealed little evidence in support of a counterfactual deficit as 
patients made fewest errors on counterfactual questions. However, one should be 
cautious in interpreting the counterfactual data as patients made a number of errors on 
memory and reality questions. The small number of counterfactual errors that were 
made by patients is in contrast to the finding of McNamara et al. (2003). This 
discrepancy can be explained by task differences. One of the tasks used by McNamara 
et al. was designed to elicit spontaneous generation of counterfactual thoughts: 
patients were required to generate counterfactual thoughts when prompted to think 
about their own previous life experiences. In contrast, the ToM vignette task used in 
the present experiment questioned patients’ counterfactual reasoning more directly. It 
may be that patients can reason counterfactually when explicitly directed to but are 
less likely to do so spontaneously because of the cognitive demands made by the 
inferential reasoning and perspective taking processes involved in counterfactual 
reasoning. 
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Patient performance on the faux pas test provided little evidence for deficits in 
ToM. Although patients performed more poorly on questions assessing recall of 
factual information, they did not perform significantly more poorly on false belief 
questions relating to this measure. This is in contrast to findings reported by another 
Oeda (2003) and Peron et al. (2009). The patients tested by Peron et al. may have 
exhibited deficits on the faux pas task because they were in later stages of the disease. 
This study included patients with symptoms rated at stage 4 on the Hoehn and Yahr 
scale whereas patients tested in the present experiment were judged to be at most 
stage 3. Stage 4 patients are still able to walk or stand unassisted but are more 
severely physically disabled than stage 3 patients, reflecting a greater degree of 
neurodegeneration. 
Recognition of faux pas was not associated with performance on the ToM 
vignette task. This could reflect the fact that performance on the vignette task 
involved counterfactual, reality and memory questions as well as false belief. 
However, it is also the case that the faux pas task involved reasoning about emotions, 
in addition to false belief. This difference could further explain why performance on 
the FAS task was related to performance on the standard false belief vignettes but not 
the faux pas task. The executive skills assessed by the FAS test were perhaps less 
relevant to the understanding of affective mental states (understanding the negative 
emotions experienced by the victim in the faux pas scenario) than cognitive mental 
states (attributing false belief).  
Differences were apparent between patients and controls when they were 
asked to justify their responses to the faux pas identification questions. After 
indicating that faux pas had occurred, participants were asked to explain why the 
protagonist made the remark and why they should not have said what they did. 
53 
 
Social Cognition in Parkinson’s Disease 
Patients were more likely to mention character’s desires or emotions, or simply restate 
the basic facts of the story, rather than focus on the character’s false belief. In fact, 
some patients failed to mention beliefs at all during the test. These findings could 
suggest that patients were more readily able to reason about the emotional response of 
the victim in the faux pas scenarios than the protagonist’s false belief, providing 
possible evidence of a differentiation in performing reasoning about affective and 
cognitive mental states (or ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ ToM: Zelazo, Qu and Müller, 2005). It can 
be speculated that such a differentiation could occur due to a greater reliance on 
cognitive or executive functions when reasoning about more abstract mental states. If 
the executive deficits exhibited by patients with PD make them more likely to exhibit 
impaired reasoning about cognitive rather than affective mental states it would 
explain why executive performance was more closely tied to errors made on the false 
belief vignette task than the faux pas test. 
The false belief errors made by patients on the ToM vignettes are insufficient 
to provide evidence of impairments in ToM per se, due to an association with errors 
on memory and reality questions. The number of errors made on these memory check 
questions was surprising as the vignettes were fairly short and control performance 
was at ceiling. It is quite possible that WM impairments affected basic comprehension 
and recall leading to errors on all question types. False belief errors are perhaps more 
likely to reflect a deficit in WM processes contributing to performance on the ToM 
vignettes, rather than a deficit in ToM per se. Experiment 2 therefore investigated 
patients’ performance on ToM tasks with reduced WM demands. 
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2.3: PD Experiment 2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In experiment 1, PD patients performed poorly on a ToM vignette task. Errors 
were not limited to performance on false belief questions as they were also apparent 
on questions involving memory and counterfactual reasoning. This pattern of errors 
could reflect poor WM. WM deficits are commonly reported in PD (e.g. Gabrieli et 
al., 1996) and may result from DLPFC dysfunction (Aleman & van’t Wout, 2008). 
The deficits in verbal fluency exhibited by patients in experiment 1 would be in 
keeping with this suggestion as fluency tasks have been linked to the DLPFC (Gallard 
et al., 2000). Experiment 2 was designed to investigate whether the errors made by 
patients could indeed be attributed to deficits in WM. New ToM tasks were included 
that were designed to reduce WM demands. Evidence of false belief errors on these 
new tasks would provide stronger evidence for a deficit in ToM per se.  
One way in which WM demands were reduced was by decreasing the amount 
of information contained in the vignettes. The shortest new vignettes were two lines 
long and were of the ‘unexpected transfer’ style used in previous experiments. A 
direct comparison could be made between patients’ performance on longer vignettes 
(6-7 lines long: Apperly et al., 2004 vignettes) and these shorter ‘unexpected transfer’ 
vignettes which involved similar reasoning processes.  
Another way that the potential impact of WM impairment was reduced was 
through the inclusion of non-inferential ToM vignettes. Inferential reasoning involves 
using available information to deduce a likelihood that is not explicitly stated. 
Inferential reasoning deficits have been reported in PD, and were linked to deficits in 
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WM (Monetta et al., 2008). Furthermore, research carried out with patients with 
traumatic brain injury led Dennis and Barnes (1990) to suggest that inference ability 
may be predicted from WM, perhaps because inferential reasoning involves 
considering multiple pieces of information (perspectives) simultaneously. WM ability 
is likely to affect inferential reasoning processes that are relevant to performance on 
some ToM tasks. The ToM vignette task used in PD experiment 1 required good 
comprehension, retention and manipulation of the information given, in order to move 
beyond explicitly stated facts and infer mental states.  
The non-inferential ToM vignettes used in this experiment were ‘deceptive 
box’ style vignettes. These vignettes described one character being deceived by 
another about the true identity of an object. The fact that a mistaken belief was held 
by the deceived character was explicitly stated; participants were told that the 
character in question believed the lie the other character told them. Another advantage 
relating to the inclusion of these deceptive style vignettes was that they assessed ToM 
(false belief) using tasks of an alternative format to ‘unexpected transfer’ style tasks. 
It was hypothesized that patients would exhibit better performance on both types of 
new shorter vignettes in comparison to the longer ‘unexpected transfer’ style vignettes 
(used in experiment 1).  
During experiment 1, PD patients made errors on many question types, 
perhaps indicating they have a general cognitive impairment which could affect 
performance on many different reasoning tasks. To address this possibility, a 
deductive reasoning task which involved counterfactual syllogisms was used in 
experiment 2. These syllogisms described facts that were contrary to reality and made 
few demands on WM as they consisted of a few very short sentences.  
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The patients tested in this experiment also completed the FAS test and a WM 
test (Digit Ordering Test Adapted; Werheid et al., 2002; adapted from Cooper, Sagar, 
Jordan, Harvey & Sullivan, 1991) which provided a meaure of verbal WM 
manipulation span. Patients were expected to exhibit deficits on these executive tests 
and it was predicted that WM scores would be related to performance on the longer 
ToM vignette task. WM was not expected to be as closely related to performance on 
the shorter ‘unexpected transfer’ and ‘deceptive box’ style tasks as these were 
designed to make fewer WM demands, and the ‘deceptive box’ task was non-
inferential. Any false belief errors made on the ‘unexpected transfer’ and ‘deceptive 
box’ style vignettes would provide stronger evidence of deficits in ToM. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Twenty-four volunteers with PD (18 males) participated in this experiment. 
They were selected based on the criteria described in experiment 1 method. Their 
mean age was 66.63 years (S.D. 9.82, range 49-86) and they had mean 12.83 years 
(S.D. 2.01, range 11-19) of education. None of the patients tested took part in 
experiment 1.  
Control data was collected for the WM measure (DOT-A). Twelve controls (6 
males and 6 females) were matched to the patients as closely as possible for age 
(mean 65.33 years, S.D.12.37, range 43-79 years) and education (mean 13.17, S.D. 
2.28, range 11-17 years). Control data was not collected for the ToM tasks or 
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counterfactual syllogisms. This was because controls’ performance on the longer 
ToM vignette task was at ceiling in experiment 1, and the new ToM vignettes were 
shorter and some were non-inferential so should elicit fewer errors. Children between 
2 and 3 years of age can pass counterfactual syllogism tasks (Richards & Sanderson, 
1999) so there was no reason to expect neurologically intact controls would perform 
below ceiling on the deductive reasoning task. 
 
PROCEDURE 
 
Testing was conducted as described in the procedure of Experiment 1. Patients 
first undertook one executive task, then the ToM vignettes as a combined set, then the 
other executive task and finally the counterfactual syllogisms. The position of the two 
executive tasks alternated across participants so as to form two counterbalanced fixed 
orders. 
 
TOM VIGNETTES 
 
These were three types of ToM vignettes presented as a block in a fixed order. 
The order of presentation was counterbalanced by type, so that vignettes of the three 
types were distributed as evenly as possible throughout the fixed order.  
A ‘physical people’ vignette was included at the end of the ToM block as a control for 
basic comprehension, which involved reasoning about people but not ToM. The 
vignette described a change in the physical state of a person, in the style of those used 
by Saxe and Kanwisher (2003): “Rebecca has very long hair that reaches past her 
shoulders. Today she goes to the hairdressers and asks for a new style. Rebecca is 
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really pleased when the hairdresser cuts her hair very short.” Participants were asked 
memory (e.g. What was Rebecca’s hair like before?) and reality (e.g. What is 
Rebecca’s hair like now?) questions.  
 
Short ‘deceptive box’ style vignettes  
 
These vignettes were four sentences long. Each described one character telling 
another character a lie to deceive them about the identity of an item they themselves 
had purchased. In half of the vignettes the deception was for a positive reason (e.g. a 
white lie about surprise present) and in others for a negative reason (e.g. to avoid 
disapproval or cover up mischievousness). For example: “It is Arthur and Beryl’s 
Anniversary. Beryl tells Arthur that she has bought him a CD. In fact, she has bought 
him tickets to a concert. Arthur doesn’t know that Beryl is going to surprise him so he 
believes Beryl”. Unlike both sets of transfer vignettes, these vignettes were non-
inferential, because they explained that one character was unaware of the deception so 
believed the other character’s lie. These vignettes were followed by false belief (e.g. 
What does Arthur think Beryl has bought him for his birthday?) and reality (What has 
Beryl really bought for Arthur?) questions, with two forced choice options. The order 
of presentation of positive and negative vignettes was counterbalanced. 
 
Short ‘unexpected transfer’ vignettes  
 
The ‘unexpected transfer’ vignettes were of the same style as the vignettes 
devised by Apperly et al. (2004), but were shorter, consisting of two sentences 
containing only the necessary information to answer the questions that followed. For 
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example: “Judy leaves some cigarettes on the coffee table. While she is in bed asleep, 
her son takes the cigarettes and puts them in his schoolbag”. Participants were asked 
false belief (e.g. where does Judy think the cigarettes are?) and reality (e.g. where are 
the cigarettes really?) questions, with the correct answer being the object’s original 
and current location, respectively. These two forced choice options were given with 
each question. 
 
Longer ToM vignettes 
 
These vignettes were devised by Apperly et al. (2004) and administered as 
described in experiment 1. 
 
COUNTERFACTUAL SYLLOGISMS 
 
This deductive reasoning task contained four items that were read to patients 
involving counter-to-fact statements, such as “all sheep are green” (see Beck, Riggs & 
Gorniak, in press). Participants were told that they would hear some facts that 
sounded strange, and were instructed to pretend that the statement was true. They 
were asked a question that required acceptance of this counterfactual information in 
order to generate a correct answer e.g. “Sally is a sheep. What colour is Sally?” 
Responses were simply scored correct or incorrect. 
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EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
 
FAS test 
 
As described in experiment 1. 
 
Digit Ordering Test-Adapted  
 
The Digit Ordering Test was originally developed by Cooper et al. (1991) and 
adapted by Werheid et al (2002), resulting in the DOT-A. Participants were asked to 
listen to individual streams of digits, with the length of the stream increasing from 3 
to 8 digits as testing progressed. A pair of streams was presented of each length. 
Participants were asked to remember the digits and say them back in ascending order 
immediately after presentation. They were told that the streams would get longer as 
the test continued and to make sure they recalled a digit twice if it was featured twice 
within a stream. A participant’s maximum span was the longest stream they could 
respond to correctly. When a participant answered two streams of a single length 
incorrectly, the test ended. Participants who only responded correctly to one stream of 
a single length had 0.5 points deducted from their maximum span. To help prevent 
strategy use, the streams sometimes contained one repeated digit. 
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RESULTS 
 
Patients’ age did not differ from that of controls tested in the present 
experiment, t(34)=0.34, p=.735, or experiment 1, t(37)=1.35, p=.186. 
Patients’ years of education also did not to differ from controls tested in the present 
experiment, t(34)=-0.45, p=.657, or experiment 1, t(37)=-1.40, p=.171. 
 
THEORY OF MIND VIGNETTES 
 
‘Deceptive box’ style vignettes 
 
A total of 18 errors were made on the ‘deceptive box’ vignettes, with a mean 
of 0.75 per patient (S.D. 1.07, median 0, range 0-4). As can be seen from Table 5, an 
equal number of false belief and reality errors were evident. A Friedman test showed 
no significant difference in the number of errors made on individual deceptive box 
vignettes, χ2(5)=83.64, p=.124. 
 
 
Table 5. Errors made by patients (n=24) on short unexpected transfer and 
deceptive box vignettes 
 
 
 
Vignette type: 
 
 
‘Unexpected transfer’ 
 
‘Deceptive box’ 
 
 
False belief errors 
 
Reality errors 
 
Number of patients 
making errors 
 
 
6 
 
6 
 
4 
 
9 
 
9 
 
10 
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‘Unexpected transfer’ vignettes 
 
Patients made fewest errors (12) on ‘unexpected transfer’ vignettes, leading to 
a mean of 0.5 errors per patient (S.D. 1.25, median 0, range 0-5). As can be seen from 
Table 5, patients made an equal number of false belief and reality errors on these 
vignettes. Though more errors were made on certain vignettes, Friedman tests showed 
no significant difference in the number of errors made on individual ‘unexpected 
transfer’ vignettes, χ2(5)=9.41, p=.094. 
 
Longer ToM vignettes (devised by Apperly et al., 2004) 
 
Overall, patients made 47 errors on this test, and each patient made an average 
of 1.96 errors (S.D. 2.07, median 1.5, range 0-7), out of a possible 16. The 15 controls 
tested in experiment 1 exhibited scores at ceiling. Table 6 shows that errors made on 
the longer ToM vignettes were spread across question type. The number of 
counterfactual errors was of interest. This differed from Experiment 1, where patients 
made very few. However, a Friedman test indicated no significant difference in 
performance on false belief, counterfactual, memory and reality questions, χ2(3)=1.41, 
p=.703, indicating general impairment on this task. Patients made significantly more 
errors on certain vignettes, χ2(3)=8.85, p=.031. The same number of errors (7) was 
made on each of the first two vignettes. More errors were made by patients on the 
third (13) and final (20) vignettes. This finding is probably more likely to reflect the 
the effects of fatigue than an item effect, as the vignettes were very similar in content 
and format.  
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Table 6. Errors made by patients (n=24) on longer ToM vignettes 
 
 
 
Question type 
 
 
False 
belief 
 
 
Counter-
factual 
 
 
Memory 
 
Reality 
 
Total 
 
Errors/ 
total possible 
 
Percentage 
incorrect 
 
Number of patients 
making errors 
 
 
9/96 
 
 
9.38 
 
 
8 
 
14/96 
 
 
14.58 
 
 
7 
 
11/96 
 
 
11.46 
 
 
11 
 
13/96 
 
 
13.54 
 
 
12 
 
47/384 
 
 
12.24 
 
 
15 
 
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN TOM VIGNETTE TYPES 
 
Because the longer ToM vignettes were followed by a total of 16 questions, 
and the ‘deceptive box’ and ‘unexpected transfer’ vignettes by 12, it was necessary to 
convert error counts into percentages for comparisons. Wilcoxon signed ranks tests  
indicated significant differences between the number of errors made on the longer 
ToM vignettes compared to both the short ‘unexpected transfer’, z=-3.42, p=.001, and 
‘deceptive box’ vignettes, z=-2.16, p=.031. Patients made fewer errors on ‘deceptive 
box’ and ‘unexpected transfer’ vignettes compared to the longer ToM vignettes 
(Table 7). In contrast, the number of errors made on the ‘deceptive box’ and 
‘unexpected transfer’ vignettes did not differ significantly, z=-0.998, p=.318. 
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Table 7. Patients’ errors made on longer ToM vignettes, deceptive box vignettes 
and unexpected transfer vignettes 
 
 
 
ToM vignette 
type: 
 
 
Longer ToM 
vignettes 
 
‘Deceptive box’ 
vignettes  
 
‘Unexpected 
transfer’ vignettes 
 
 
Total errors/total 
possible 
 
Percentage 
 
 
47/384 
 
 
12.24 
 
18/288 
 
 
6.25 
 
12/288 
 
 
4.17 
 
 
 
 
COUNTERFACTUAL SYLLOGISMS 
 
The patient group made just one error on this task. 
 
EXECUTIVE TESTS 
 
FAS Test 
 
The mean number of words generated by patients over the test was 38.83 (S.D. 
17.28, median 40.5, range 14-95), which was significantly lower than the controls 
tested in experiment 1, who achieved a mean score of 54.40 words (S.D. 16, median 
47, range 30-95), MWU=102.5, p=.025. Some patients performed particularly poorly 
on this test, with four patients generating 20 words or fewer, and only 5 patients 
achieved or surpassed the experiment 1 control mean.  
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Digit Ordering Test – Adapted 
 
Patients achieved a mean WM manipulation span of 4.58 digits (S.D. 0.99, 
median 4.5, range 2.5-6.5) on this test. This score was significantly different to that 
obtained by controls who achieved a mean span of 5.58 digits (S.D. 0.733, median 
5.5, range 4.5-7), MWU: 55.5, p=.002. Only a quarter of patients reached or surpassed 
this control mean.  
 
CORRELATIONS 
 
Correlations were conducted to look for relationships between patients’ 
performance on tasks (Table 8).  
A Pearson correlation (rp) was appropriate for analyzing the relationship 
between patients’ performance on the FAS and DOT-A as scores on these measures 
were normally distributed. Performance on the FAS test correlated significantly with 
performance on the DOT-A, indicating that higher verbal fluency scores were 
associated with better WM ability. Non-parametric correlations indicatd that DOT-A 
WM scores correlated significantly with performance on the longer ToM vignettes at 
the 0.05 level, indicating that more errors were made by patients with poorer WM. 
Errors made on the longer ToM vignettes were also positively related to errors made 
on the short ‘unexpected transfer’ vignettes. No other significant correlations were 
evident. 
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Table 8: Correlations between patients’ performance on executive and ToM 
measures 
 
 
 
Measure: 
 
FAS 
(total 
words 
generated) 
 
 
DOT-A 
(max WM 
span) 
 
Longer 
ToM  
vignette 
errors 
 
‘Deceptive 
box’ vignette 
errors 
 
‘Unexpected 
transfer’ 
vignette errors 
 
FAS 
(total words 
generated) 
 
 
 
x 
 
.428† 
.037* 
 
-.207 
.331 
 
-.345 
.099 
 
-.245 
.248 
 
DOT-A 
(max WM 
span) 
 
 
 
x 
 
-.413 
.045* 
 
-.368 
.077 
 
-.309 
.142 
 
Longer ToM 
vignette 
errors 
 
   
 
x 
 
.320 
.128 
 
.569 
.004** 
 
‘Deceptive 
box’ 
vignette 
errors 
 
    
 
x 
 
 
.373 
.072 
 
KEY: 
Upper value = Spearman’s r correlation coefficient, † Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
lower value = p-value 
*     significant at 0.05 level 
**   significant at 0.01 level 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Once again, patients exhibited frontal executive dysfunction as evidenced 
through poorer performance on both executive tasks. In contrast to experiment 1 
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however, performance on the FAS test was not related to performance on the longer 
ToM vignettes from Apperly et al (2004). It may be that the relationship between 
ToM and verbal fluency is generally weak, and the executive functions such as WM 
could be more relevant to performance on the vignette tasks used in the current 
experiment.  
FAS performance was found to correlate positively with scores on the other 
executive measure, the DOT-A. This finding is likely to reflect the involvement of the 
DLPFC in both of these tasks (Aleman & van’t Wout, 2008; Gallard et al., 2000). 
Patients with PD also exhibited WM impairment, further implicating dysfunction of 
the DLPFC (e.g. Owen et al., 1999).  
WM deficits were associated with increased errors on the longer ToM 
vignettes. Because WM scores only correlated with performance on longer vignettes it 
is likely that it was the amount of information, rather than the reasoning processes 
involved in the tasks, that led to errors. This conclusion is further supported by the 
increase in errors made on questions relating to the longer ToM vignettes in 
comparison to the short ‘unexpected transfer’ vignettes. Patients made fewest errors 
on the ‘unexpected transfer’ vignettes, the group of vignettes which contained the 
fewest sentences. As both of these types of vignettes were inferential and involved 
unexpected transfer, this difference is unlikely to be due to the style of ToM reasoning 
involved. The similar content of these two types of vignette is also likely to explain 
the significant correlation found in performance on these two tasks.  
Patients made errors on the non-inferential ‘deceptive box’ vignettes. This 
finding could be considered to provide stronger evidence for a deficit in ToM than the 
errors made on longer ToM vignettes. However, ToM deficits provide a less 
parsimonious explanation for the deficits observed on these tasks than difficulties in 
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WM. WM dysfunction may have led to impairment on ToM tasks in an incidental 
manner, through comprehension difficulties. Studies such as Apperly, Samson, 
Carroll, Hussain and Humphreys (2006) have shown that grammatical difficulties, 
which can lead to poor comprehension, can directly affect ToM performance on a 
false belief task. It could be that poor WM compromised patients’ comprehension in 
experiment 2 leading to the errors made on the ToM vignettes. An alternative 
explanation however, is that executive abilities like WM could have a more direct role 
in ToM processes. For example, Apperly, Samson and Humphreys (2005) suggest that 
ToM reasoning could be carried out in a ‘generic working memory system’ (pp. 573). 
A further point of discussion relating to patients’ performance on the longer 
ToM vignettes is the number of errors made in response to questions assessing 
counterfactual reasoning. McNamara et al. (2003) reported a counterfactual 
impairment in PD. This task required spontaneous generation of counterfactual 
thoughts, and so tested counterfactual reasoning in a less direct way. The 
counterfactual errors made by the patients in experiments 1 and 2 are could be more 
likely to reflect WM impairment rather than a counterfactual deficit. Patients made 
very few counterfactual errors in experiment 1, and overall performance on the 
Apperly et al. (2004) vignettes correlated with WM in the present experiment. The 
possibility that counterfactual errors on the ToM vignette task reflect a true 
counterfactual deficit is further weakened by the finding that patients performed 
almost at ceiling on the counterfactual syllogism task. This task required participants 
to answer a question with a logical answer based on the information contained in two 
short clauses, each consisting of just a few words. Accordingly, performance may 
have been less affected by general executive impairments such as deficits in WM. 
However, it is possible that patients with PD do have difficulties with counterfactual 
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reasoning and the inhibitory demands made by the counterfactual tasks used in this 
experiment were not great enough to elicit evidence of impairment. 
Experiment 2 illustrated that reducing the amount of information contained in 
ToM vignettes (and presumably WM demands) improved performance. However, 
patients still made errors on false belief and memory questions in response to shorter 
vignettes. In experiments 1 and 2, vignettes were read twice to patients before 
questioning, and the information was not represented in a visual form. The WM 
deficits exhibited by patients with PD could have less of an impact on ToM 
performance when information is also presented in the visual modality and is left 
available throughout questioning. This possibility was investigated in Experiment 3.  
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2.4: PD Experiment 3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Experiment 3 involved the investigation of patients’ performance on tasks 
with minimal incidental WM demands. The set of ToM vignettes used were the 
standard (longer) unexpected transfer vignettes (Apperly et al., 2004), as WM was 
found to be related to performance on a selection of these vignettes in experiment 2. 
These vignettes were presented to patients in three different formats with different 
WM demands. Bibby and McDonald (2005) suggest there is evidence that as well as 
reducing WM load, presenting information in written as well as verbal form increases 
participants’ attention and engages them with the task more. Visual presentation could 
aid patients’ encoding and comprehension through the presence of pictures 
accompanying the story, so could lead to enhanced performance.  
Experiment 3 involved 3 conditions. For condition A, false belief vignettes 
were simply read to participants, as in previous studies. For condition B, vignettes 
were also presented in the visual modality, in the form of a flip-book of cartoons, with 
accompanying story text. For condition C, the same cartoons and story text were used 
again, but were presented in the form of a comic strip, which was present throughout 
questioning. This condition was intended to reduce memory demands as much as 
possible. It was hypothesized that patients’ performance would be best in condition 
three. Intact performance on false belief questions in this condition could indicate 
intact ToM.  
Possible associations between performance on the ToM vignette test and three 
different executive tasks was investigated. Once again the FAS phonological fluency 
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test was used along with the DOT-A (Werheid et al., 2002) which was included to 
assess WM. The third executive task was a black and white Stroop test (Beck et al., in 
press). The Stroop tests inhibition, an executive function that has been linked to ToM 
reasoning in studies with children (e.g. Carlson & Moses, 2001) and patients with 
brain damage (e.g. Samson et al., 2005). This task was included in order to assess 
whether difficulties with inhibition, in addition to WM deficits, may contribute to 
impaired ToM performance in PD.  
 
 
METHOD 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Twenty-four outpatients with PD from the Neurosciences Department at the 
Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham, took part in this experiment. They were 
selected based on the criteria described in the procedure of experiment 1. There were 
15 males and 9 females, of mean age 62.45 years (S.D. 9.81, range 41-75), with mean 
13.25 years of education (S.D. 2.23, range 11-17). 10 neurologically intact controls (5 
females) also completed the Stroop test. Their mean age was 56.70 years (S.D. 9.29, 
range 41-71), and mean years of education was 14 years (S.D. 2.22, range 11-16). 
Control data was needed for this new executive test but was not collected for the 
social cognition measures. The controls tested in experiment 1 performed at ceiling on 
a subset of the ToM vignettes used in this experiment. 
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PROCEDURE 
 
Testing was conducted as in Experiment 1. Participants completed three 
executive tasks and undertook three different conditions involving ToM vignettes. 
These three conditions were divided by two executive tasks; the FAS Test and DOT-
A. The order of administration of these two executive tasks was alternated. The black 
and white Stroop task was always given last. The order of the three ToM conditions 
(aural only, with accompanying flip-book and with accompanying cartoon strip) was 
counterbalanced across participants. Counterbalancing produced twelve different 
procedure orders, each undertaken by two participants. 
 
TOM VIGNETTES 
 
A larger set of twelve ToM vignettes was used (taken from Apperly et al., 
2004), as described in experiment 1. These vignettes were presented in the same order 
to all participants. Each participant received four of the twelve vignettes in conditions 
A, B and C. The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants, and 
each vignette appeared equally often in each condition overall. 
In condition A, the vignettes were read out loud twice to each participant, with 
no accompanying visual representation.  
In condition B, the vignettes were read twice with an accompanying flip-book. 
Each flip-book had four pages and featured a cartoon with corresponding story text 
underneath it. The first cartoon illustrated the original state (e.g. object’s starting 
position). The second illustrated the absence of the character holding the false belief. 
The third picture showed an event occurring that lead to the change in location of the 
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object, and the final picture showed the outcome of the transfer (object’s new 
location). The accompanying story text was in Times New Roman font size 18. The 
appropriate flip-book page was displayed as the story was read to the participant, and 
the flip-book was removed before questioning.  
For condition C, a cartoon strip was displayed as the vignette was read twice 
to the participant, and was present throughout questioning. The same pictures and text 
used for flip-books were presented, but this time in the form of a comic strip. Figure 4 
shows an example of a false belief comic strip used in PD experiment 3 (although in 
the experiment the pictures were shown in single row). 
 
EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
FAS test 
 
As described in experiment 1 (section 2.2) 
 
DOT-A 
 
As described in experiment 2 (section 2.3) 
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Figure 4. Example of a false belief vignette comic strip used in PD experiment 3. 
Vignette text from Apperly et al. (2004) 
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Black and white Stroop test 
 
The black and white Stroop (Beck et al., in press) involved responding to two 
visual stimuli using “reverse rules” and is similar to other inhibitory tasks used in 
research with children (see Simpson & Riggs, 2009). Stimuli consisted of a page of 40 
equally sized squares coloured black or white and arranged in a pseudorandom order, 
to form eight rows of five squares. There were two conditions; baseline and test. The 
baseline condition was always presented first. Participants were asked to say the 
colour of each square, going across each row from left to right, and not to correct any 
incorrect answers. The stimuli sheet was covered by a blank sheet of paper and the 
next row of stimuli was revealed by the experimenter on completion of the row above. 
For the test condition, the same stimuli sheet was turned upside-down, and 
participants were told to say black if they saw a white square, and say white for a 
black square. The rest of the procedure was identical to the baseline condition. The 
time taken (in seconds) to say the colour of all of squares on the sheet, and the number 
of errors made was recorded for each participant, for both conditions.  
 
 
RESULTS    
 
Patients did not significantly differ in age or years of education, to controls 
tested in experiment 1 (age: t(37)=0.070, p=.944, education: t(37)=-0.790, p=.435) 
experiment 2 (age: t(34)=-0.760 p=.453; education: t(34)=105, p=.907) or experiment 
3 (age: t(32)=1.583, p=.123; education: t(32)=-0.417, p=.679). 
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 TOM VIGNETTES 
 
ToM false belief vignettes 
 
Nine of the twenty-four patients made at least one error during the vignette 
test. Seven made errors on the verbal condition, while five made errors during the 
flip-book condition, and four made errors when responding to comic strip questions. 
A Friedman test, χ2(2)=1.27, p=.529, indicated no significant difference in the number 
of errors made by patients across presentation conditions. A mean of 0.38 errors were 
made by each patient during the flip-book (S.D. 0.9, median 0, range 0-3) and comic 
strip (S.D. 0.9, median 0, range 0-3) conditions. Slightly more (mean 0.54, S.D. 1.1, 
median 0, range 0-4) errors were made in response to verbal-only presentation, though 
Wilcoxon tests revealed this result was not significantly different to the number of 
errors produced for the flip-book, z=-0.81, p=.417, or comic strip, z=-0.64, p=.522, 
conditions. 
As can be seen from Table 9, there was little difference in the number of false 
belief, counterfactual, memory and reality errors made within each condition. The 
number of errors made in response to each question type was also similar across 
conditions. When the total number of false belief, counterfactual, memory and reality 
errors were compared after being collapsed across conditions, a Friedman test failed 
to reveal any significant differences, χ2(3)=5.59, p=.134. 
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Table 9. Errors made by patients (n=24) on the ToM vignette task across 
presentation conditions 
 
 
 
Presentation condition: 
 
 
Verbal 
 
Flip-book 
 
Comic strip 
 
 
False belief errors 
 
Counterfactual errors 
 
Memory errors 
 
Reality errors 
 
Total 
 
 
3 
 
2 
 
3 
 
5 
 
13 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
4 
 
9 
 
0 
 
4 
 
2 
 
3 
 
9 
 
 
 
Order of conditions 
 
The influence of order of conditions (verbal, flip-book and comic strip) on 
performance was analysed by separating participants into independent groups using 
two different methods. The first method split patients according to which condition 
they undertook first and the second method split the group according to which 
condition they received last. These analyses allow the investigation of interactions 
between fatigue and condition type during testing, as the first condition is least likely 
to be affected by fatigue, whereas the last condition is more likely to be affected by 
fatigue. Overall however, 35.48% of errors were made in the first condition 
undertaken, 16.13% in the second condition, and 48.39% in the last condition 
(regardless of presentation condition type). 
The first method divided patients into three groups of eight based on the 
condition they underwent first. The number of errors made in the first condition 
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undertaken was compared. A Kruskal Wallis test indicated no significant difference in 
the number of errors made in the first condition according to type (i.e. verbal, flip-
book and comic strip),  χ2(2)=3.146, p=.207. 
The second method divided patients into three groups of eight based on the 
condition they underwent last. The number of errors made in the last condition 
undertaken was compared. A Kruskal Wallis test indicated a marginally significant 
difference in the number of errors made in the last condition according to type ( i.e. 
verbal, flip-book and comic strip), χ2(2)=6.193, p=.045. As can be seen from Table 
10, many more errors were made during the verbal condition when verbal 
presentation occurred last.  
 
Table 10. Number of errors made in each condition of the ToM vignette task 
according to conditions undertaken first and last 
 
 
Condition order 
 
Verbal errors 
 
Flip-book 
errors 
 
Comic strip 
errors 
 
 
Verbal  
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
Flip-book  
 
 
10 
 
5 
 
3 
 
 
First 
condition 
 
Comic strip 
  
 
3 
 
3 
 
6 
 
 
Verbal 
 
 
10 
 
6 
 
4 
 
 
Flip-book 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
 
Last 
condition 
 
Comic strip 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
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EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
Patient performance on the two executive tasks was compared to the 
performance of controls tested in experiments 1 and 2. 
 
FAS test 
 
Patients generated a mean of 46.29 (S.D. 15, median 49, range 20-78) words 
on this task. This value was not found to differ significantly from the mean 54.4 
words (S.D. 16, median 47, range 30-95) produced by controls in experiment 1 , 
MWU=146, p=.326.  
 
DOT-A 
 
The mean WM manipulation span for the current patient group was 5.60 digits 
(S.D. 1.2, median 5.5, range 4-8). This did not differ significantly from the control 
mean of 5.58 digits (S.D. 0.73, median 5.5, range 4.58-7) reported in experiment 2, 
MWU=140.5, p=.905. As a group, the patients in the current experiment exhibited 
superior performance on this task to that which was expected; however, some patients 
did only achieve low scores on this task. Due to variation in patient performance, and 
as WM performance was particularly relevant to the current investigation, more 
detailed analysis was conducted on this measure. 
As WM span ranged from 4 to 8 digits across the patient group, the group was 
divided according to scores on this measure. Patients were divided into two groups 
based on comparison of each participant’s span with the group median of 5.5. Two 
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patients had scores equal to this median value, so these patients were excluded.The 
WM+ group and WM- group each contained 11 patients.  
The WM+ and WM- groups differed significantly in mean words generated on 
the FAS test, MWU=28, p=.033. Patients in the WM- group exhibited lower scores on 
the FAS. The mean number of errors made by patients on the Stroop test condition 
also differed significantly according to group, MWU=24, p=.013. Patients in the 
WM+ group exhibited a lower mean number of errors on the black and white Stroop. 
However, there was no significant difference for Stroop times (i.e. the extra time 
needed to complete the inhibition versus baseline condition), MWU=45, p=.309. 
Although the WM- group made more errors on the vignette test overall (Table 
11), this difference was not significant, MWU=41.5, p=.171. When the two groups 
were examined separately to see if more errors occurred in certain conditions (i.e. 
verbal, flip-book or comic strip), there were no significant differences apparent for the 
WM+, χ2(2)=1.4, p=.497, or WM-, χ2(2)=4.52, p=.104, groups. 
 
Table 11. Errors made on the ToM vignette test by patients with higher (WM+) 
and lower (WM-) working memory scores 
 
 
Condition type 
 
 
Group 
 
Verbal 
 
Flip-book 
 
Comic strip 
 
Total 
 
 
Number of errors 
 
WM+ 
 
WM- 
 
 
2 
 
11 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
3 
 
12 
 
19 
 
Number of 
patients making 
errors 
 
WM+ 
 
WM- 
 
 
2 
 
5 
 
2 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
 
7 
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It was not possible to carry out within group comparisons relating to order of 
conditions after either of the two group splits. This was because of uneven distribution 
of condition orders undertaken by patients in the WM + and – groups. All of the 
patients that underwent the verbal condition first achieved high WM scores, and all 
who undertook the flip-book condition first exhibited low WM scores. These findings 
were due to chance. 
 
 
Black and white Stroop test 
 
 
Patients with PD made significantly more errors on the black and white Stroop 
in comparison to controls, MWU=60, p=.014. Patients (n=24) made a total of 44 
errors (mean 1.83 per patient, S.D. 2.35, median 1, range 0-8) and the control group 
performed almost at ceiling (n=10) made just three errors in total (mean 0.3 per 
control, S.D. 0.95, median 0, range 0-3). However, patients did not show a greater 
effect of condition (inhibition versus baseline) during the Stroop in comparison to 
controls in terms of time taken, MWU=85, p=.186. Patients’ mean time difference of 
10.74 seconds (S.D. 8.37, median 9.00, range 0.86-36.29) was not significantly 
greater than controls’ mean time difference of 6.92 seconds (S.D. 3.36, median 6.75, 
range 2.34-13.1). 
 
CORRELATIONS 
 
Analyses were conducted to identify possible relationships between patient 
performance on executive tasks, executive and ToM vignette performance, and time 
since disease onset and task performance (Table 12). Time since disease onset could 
be related to task performance because PD involves progressive neurodegeration. 
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Relationships were found between FAS score and DOT-A span, and between 
the number of errors made on the Stroop test condition and DOT-A score. These 
findings show that patients who performed poorly on one executive measure exhibited 
deficits on other executive tasks. 
No significant correlation between WM performance and vignette errors was 
observed. This was surprising as this relationship was seen in previous experiments. 
Therefore, a further correlation was carried out between DOT-A score and vignette 
errors made only in the verbal condition. This was not significant, rs=-.303, p=.150. 
 
Table 12. Correlations for patient performance on executive and ToM tasks and 
time since onset of PD 
 
 
Measure: 
 
FAS 
Test 
 
DOT-A 
 
Stroop 
errors 
 
 
Stroop 
times 
 
 
ToM 
vignette 
errors 
 
Time since 
disease 
onset 
 
 
FAS Test 
 
 
 
X 
 
.598 
.002** 
 
-.030 
.888 
 
-.143 
.504 
 
-.004 
.984 
 
.008 
.972 
 
 
DOT-A 
 
  
X 
 
-.531 
.008** 
 
 
-.258 
.224 
 
-.286 
.175 
 
-.158 
.460 
 
 
Stroop errors 
   
X 
 
.352 
.092 
 
 
.301 
.153 
 
.358 
.086 
 
 
Stroop times 
    
X 
 
.364 
.081 
 
 
-.135 
.529 
 
 
ToM vignette 
errors 
 
     
X 
 
.073 
. 736 
 
 
KEY:  
Upper value = Spearman’s r correlation coefficient, lower value = p-value 
* Significant at the 0.05 level  ** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Some of the findings in experiment 3 suggest that patients with PD are 
unlikely to exhibit deficits in ToM per se and that errors on the ToM vignette task are 
more likely to reflect executive or cognitive difficulties. For example, throughout the 
whole of experiment 3 patients usually made fewer errors on false belief and 
counterfactual questions than on memory and reality questions. Patients also made 
most errors on the ToM vignettes in the condition involving most WM demands (the 
verbal condition) and no false belief errors were made when WM demands were 
minimal (the comic strip condition). It is also the case that many of the patients tested 
in experiment 3 exhibited less evidence of executive dysfunction than patients tested 
in previous experiments. No overall group deficits in verbal fluency or WM were 
evident, and WM scores appeared higher than the PD patients tested in experiment 2. 
Patients with PD may only exhibit ToM deficits in association with executive 
dysfunction, which would explain why fewer errors were made on the ToM vignettes 
test by the patients tested in experiment 3 in comparison to patients tested in earlier 
experiments. 
One finding that could weaken the above proposal is that performance on the 
ToM vignette task did not appear closely related to executive performance on tasks 
assessing WM, fluency or inhibition. The finding that there was no relationship 
between ToM vignette errors and WM scores was particularly surprising. This could 
have arisen due to the format of presentation of the ToM vignette task used in this 
experiment. It may be that during experiment 3, WM mechanisms were less engaged 
by the ToM vignette task overall due to the presence of the flip-book and comic strip 
during the testing session. The task as a whole should have made fewer demands on 
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WM resources, and patients were perhaps therefore less likely to consider that the task 
was a difficult memory test. This possibility was most likely when the verbal 
condition was given last. Interestingly, and perhaps in support of this idea, an increase 
in errors in the verbal condition was seen when it was given last. It could therefore be 
speculated that patients were less prepared for this more demanding condition when it 
came last, or perhaps expected the task to make fewer cognitive demands, leading to 
reduced activation of WM mechanisms. 
An alternative explanation for the lack of a relationship between WM and 
vignette performance is that not all of the errors made by patients are due to deficits in 
WM.  This proposal is supported by the observation that errors were made on ToM 
vignettes in experiment 3 despite the finding that the patient group did not exhibit 
significant deficits in WM. Furthermore, no significant difference was seen in 
performance on the ToM vignette test when patients were divided into two groups 
containing patients with high or low WM scores. Therefore, the deficits exhibited by 
patients with PD on ToM vignettes cannot completely be explained by the incidental 
WM demands made by the task. However, reducing incidental task demands (e.g. 
making the vignettes shorter) would not affect any WM demands that were integral to 
ToM. 
It could be that patients with PD made errors on the ToM vignettes because 
they were easily cognitively fatigued. That is, they found it more difficult to attend or 
concentrate for shorter periods of time than neurologically intact individuals. 
Fluctuations in attention over time could explain why patients made errors on many 
tasks throughout the testing session, such as the black and white Stroop.  
Counterbalancing for order was implemented. However, it is possible that the 
effects of fatigue could have contributed to impairment on the vignette task. Although 
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patients did not show a consistent pattern of producing more errors as they progressed 
through the testing session, the effect of fatigue may have interacted with condition. 
Significantly more errors were made in the verbal condition when this was given last. 
No such difference was apparent for the flip-book and comic-strip conditions. The 
verbal condition was most likely to be affected by fatigue because it made greater 
WM demands. The effects of fatigue may be increased in patients with PD, and 
particularly under conditions that demand greater attention, concentration and 
memory.  
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2.5: Social Cognition in PD: Discussion 
 
This series of experiments showed that PD patients exhibit deficits on standard 
false belief vignette tasks. These errors could reflect a deficit in ToM per se, the 
impact of WM limitations on task performance, or less specific cognitive difficulties. 
The possibility that deficits were due to difficulties in ToM per se is weakened by the 
fact that errors were not specific to false belief and were also apparent on 
counterfactual and memory check questions. Errors could have resulted from WM 
dysfunction leading to difficulties with inferential reasoning. However, further 
experiments indicated these factors did not fully explain patients’ poor performance. 
For example, in PD experiment 2 patients were shown to make errors on non-
inferential vignettes and when dealing with just two sentences of aurally presented 
information. Similarly, errors continued to be made even when the story text and 
accompanying illustrations were present throughout questioning in PD experiment 3. 
WM deficits are apparent in some patients with PD and could contribute to 
deficits in ToM. One reason why ToM deficits may result from WM dysfunction is 
because information in the story must be remembered in order to infer a character’s 
perspective and make judgments about their mental state. It could also be considered 
that WM plays a more integral role in ToM, by providing the basis for the 
consideration of more than one perspective at the same time (i.e. one’s own 
knowledge about reality and the perspective of the character that holds a false belief). 
This series of experiments could not determine whether false belief errors may have 
occurred due to an incidental role of WM in task performance, or through an integral 
role in ToM. Whatever the case, WM deficits cannot explain all of the errors 
exhibited by patients with PD on these vignettes, as patients made memory errors 
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when the information needed to answer the questions was in front of them and WM 
scores were not related to performance (experiment 3). 
Another explanation for deficits on the ToM vignette test is that patients’ 
cognitive resources are more easily fatigued than neurologically intact participants, so 
patients are more vulnerable to ‘cognitive overload’. These effects may lead to more 
severe impairments under conditions that demand a certain degree of attention and 
concentration. Patients did however make some errors early in testing. Dysfunction of 
the DLPFC has been associated with poor attention and arousal, and may result in 
‘non specific global cognitive impairment’ in PD (Berry, Nicolson, Foster, Behrmann 
& Sagar, 1999). At times when cognitive resources are insufficient, patients show 
blanking and mind wandering (Watts, McLeod & Morris, 1988). Such difficulties 
could affect patients’ performance on both WM and ToM tasks. 
Poor attention and concentration could have ‘knock-on’ effects on memory 
processes. Faglioni, Botti, Scarpa, Ferrari and Saetti (1997) studied learning and 
forgetting of a prose passage in PD and controls. They found patients to be ‘grossly’ 
impaired at story recall, exhibiting poor gist extraction and a peculiar pattern of 
forgetting indicating that retaining processes may be abnormal. These authors suggest 
there is evidence for widespread deficits in PD, affecting acquisition, retention and 
possibly retrieval. More general memory impairments are likely to lead to unspecified 
errors. 
Despite significant deficits in performance on the false belief vignette task that 
required reasoning about cognitive mental states, no differences were found between 
patients and controls on a faux pas task that involved reasoning about both cognitive 
and affective mental states. One reason this was surprising is because this task is 
passed by older children than simpler false belief tasks (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 
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1999). Patients demonstrated good understanding of the victim’s emotional response 
to the protagonist’s offensive remark during this task, although made less reference to 
the protagonist’s mental state (e.g. belief that the remark would not cause) than 
control participants. These findings could imply that patients with PD exhibit specific 
difficulties with ‘cool’ aspects of ToM (reasoning about cognitive mental states). 
However, despite these differences in spontaneous responses during the task, no 
significant deficit was evident on the false belief check question, suggesting that it is 
unlikely that the patients tested exhibited fundamental deficits in reasoning about 
cognitive mental states. The finding that patients with PD performed poorly on the 
false belief vignette task but not on the faux pas task may also be in keeping with the 
proposal that errors reflect executive impairments, rather than a deficit in ToM per se. 
Cognitive ToM could be more vulnerable to executive dysfunction, so patients’ 
executive difficulties could impair reasoning about false belief. However, the key 
question asked during the faux pas task (“did someone say something they shouldn’t 
have?”) involves affective ToM (reasoning about the victim’s feelings of offence), 
which may not rest so heavily on executive functioning (see section 1.6).   
The number of errors made by patients on these ToM vignette tasks was 
surprising as controls performed at ceiling on even the most difficult of the tasks. PD 
patients however, have exhibited impairment on seemingly straightforward tasks in 
other studies, making what appear to be obvious errors. For example, in a study by 
Zalla et al. (1998), PD patients had to order cards relating to predetermined events 
belonging to examples of everyday activity scripts such as making coffee and buying 
a newspaper. Patients made errors involving mixing up the cards for separate 
activities and ordered cards in a way that resulted in physical violations (the sequence 
did not make sense physically e.g. arriving at the destination before getting on the 
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plane). The authors report that in a previous experiment patients could order the 
components of the activity script correctly provided they were self generated. They 
suggest therefore, that script knowledge was intact, and that errors occurred due to 
poor on-line comparison with memory. It is possible that reduced cognitive resources 
in PD leads to poorer self monitoring. Patients seem to lack the automatic feedback 
needed to correct their errors but could realize their mistakes when cued 
appropriately. In relation to the errors made on the vignettes in the current 
experiment, it would be interesting to investigate whether patients would identify their 
mistakes if they were encouraged to evaluate their responses, perhaps after a delay to 
allow more time for memory consolidation. 
Patients in the current experiment were always questioned immediately after 
the vignette was read to them. Some studies suggest that while patients perform 
poorly on memory tasks if tested immediately after presentation, performance can be 
better after a delay. Sagar et al. (1988) administered a recency discrimination task and 
found that non-demented, medicated PD patients exhibited a disproportionately severe 
deficit for shorter delays. These authors further suggest that patients with PD are often 
poor at any memory task soon after registration of information. Such findings could 
be linked to bradyphrenia (i.e. slowing of thought processes) in PD. Resource deficits 
may lead patients to need more time for encoding or consolidation processes. Knoke, 
Taylor and Saint-Cyr (1998) showed that PD patients’ recall of items on the 
California Verbal Learning Test was worse when tested immediately as opposed to 
after a delay. They suggest their findings provide evidence of incomplete encoding of 
items for recall. However, these authors also consider that patients can also show poor 
use of strategies to aid encoding, poor organization of material, and impaired implicit 
organizational strategies. Attentional and organizational strategies for encoding and 
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recollection have been linked to activity in the DLPFC (Vingerhoets, Vermeule & 
Santens, 2005). 
The use of pictures and text could improve performance related to specific 
WM deficits, but would not necessarily aid performance in the face of general 
cognitive resource deficits leading to poor attention and concentration. Maylor, 
Moulson, Muncer & Taylor (2002) used Happé’s Strange Stories Task (1993) with 
groups of healthy young and old participants. The oldest participants were slower and 
performed more poorly on the mental state tasks, and the presence of the story failed 
to enhance their performance. It is possible that patients were distracted by the 
presence of irrelevant details in the pictures during the tasks in the current experiment. 
Attentional deficits could have diverted their attention to inappropriate visual stimuli 
while the story was being read, so performance was not enhanced. Limitations in 
cognitive resources may mean that patients experience greater attentional difficulties 
than neurologically intact individuals if distracted.  
Possible inhibitory deficits are likely to have made it more difficult for 
patients to focus on information only relevant to the task at hand. Other studies have 
found evidence for impaired inhibitory processes in PD. Mari-Betta, Hayes, Machado 
& Hindle (2005) found increased priming effects in PD and suggested these provided 
evidence for poor inhibitory processes when controlling word activation while 
reading. However, this series of experiments found little evidence that the observed 
deficits were related to inhibitory difficulties. The patients tested in experiment 3 
perfomed poorly on the Stroop, providing possible evidence of inhibitory dysfunction, 
but these deficits were not found to be related performance on the ToM vignettes. 
Activity in the DLPFC during the traditional Stroop task has been linked to attentional 
demands (Schroeter, Zysset, Wahl & von Cramon, 2004; Vanderhasselt et al., 2006a). 
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Deficits on the Stroop could therefore be linked to attentional rather than inhibitory 
problems. 
Another possible explanation for the errors observed on false belief vignette 
tasks could be related to attentional set shifting deficits often seen in PD. Some 
studies have shown that poor set-shifting can be related to impairments on reasoning 
and problem solving tasks. For instance, Cronin-Golomb, Corkin and Growdon 
(1994) reported that despite intact logical reasoning, patients exhibited deficits on 
deductive reasoning tasks (intrusive errors and perseveration). Errors correlated with 
poor performance on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test leading these authors to suggest a 
role for set-shifting in reasoning performance. Developmental research has 
highlighted a link between ToM and performance on card sorting tasks. Perner, Lang 
and Kloo (2002) found a robust correlation between 3-6 year olds performance on a 
card task involving switching and ToM ability. It may be that processes involved on 
shifting tasks are linked to ToM because of a role for switching between perspectives 
in order to adopt another person’s point of view and so understand their mental state. 
In summary, this series of experiments has shown that the cognitive 
limitations associated with PD clearly have the potential to affect the ability of some 
patients to reason about false belief. However, the impairments observed on ToM 
tasks in experiments 1 to 3 probably do not reflect deficits in ToM per se. Instead, 
these deficits could arise from an inability to meet the attentional demands associated 
with these tasks. The evidence of possible ToM deficits as reported by other studies 
(Peron et al., 2009; Monetta, Grindrod & Pell, 2009) encourages further research into 
possible social and emotional changes in PD. The findings of experiments 1 to 3 
compel the design of future investigations to take into account the significant 
cognitive restrictions exhibited by even some medicated, early stage patients. 
Social Cognition in Tourette’s Syndrome 
CHAPTER 3. SOCIAL COGNITION IN TOURETTE’S 
SYNDROME 
 
Parts of section 1, 2, 3 and 5 have been submitted as scientific articles for publication. 
TS experiment 1 is an edited version of an article currently in press: 
Eddy, C.M., Mitchell, I.J., Beck, S.R., Cavanna, A.E. & Rickards, H.  Altered 
Attribution of Intention in Tourette’s Syndrome. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and 
Clinical Neurosciences. 
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3.1: Social Cognition in TS: Introduction 
 
TS is a chronic neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by the presence of 
multiple motor tics and one or more phonic tics, which can be defined as sudden, 
semi-voluntary, repetitive, stereotyped movements and vocalizations (DSM-IVTR: 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000). While little is known about the 
pathophysiology of tic expression, converging lines of evidence suggest that tics are 
likely to be associated with striatal dysfunction (Albin & Mink, 2006; Singer, 2005). 
Changes in striatal functioning could affect abilities reliant on the functioning of the 
frontal cortex, such as social cognition, through dysfunction within frontostriatal 
pathways (Alexander et al., 1986; Middleton and Strick, 2000). 
Involuntary tic-related symptoms include uttering offensive language 
(coprolalia) and comorbid psychiatric disorders including OCD and ADHD are 
common (Cavanna et al., 2009; Leckman, 2002; Robertson, 2000). Many patients also 
exhibit non-obscene socially inappropriate symptoms (NOSIS). A study carried out 
by Kurlan et al. (1996) found that some patients with TS experienced urges to act in a 
socially inappropriate way (22%) or make socially inappropriate remarks including 
insults (30%). Failure to suppress these urges sometimes results in major social 
difficulties, including physical confrontation and arrest.  
A number of clinical studies involving other patient groups (Lough et al., 
2006; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger & Aharon-Peretz, 2003) have shown that 
individuals who exhibit problematic social interaction also demonstrate impairment 
on tasks involving ToM. For example, socially inappropriate remarks can be made 
due to a failure to consider the likely emotional response of the listener to such 
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remarks. Therefore, given the social problems associated with TS, it is possible that 
patients have deficits in ToM. 
Impairments in ToM have been linked to deficits in the understanding of non-
literal language such as sarcasm or metaphor (Channon, Pellijeff & Rule, 2005; 
Channon et al., 2007; Dennis, Lazenby & Lockyer, 2001; Happé, 1993; Shamay-
Tsoory, Tomer & Aharon-Peretz, 2002; Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum & Pincus, 
1998). There is also evidence that brain regions linked to ToM, such as the temporal 
poles, superior temporal sulcus, medial prefrontal cortex and IFG, are active in 
neurologically intact participants during sarcasm comprehension (Uchiyama et al., 
2006). These findings are likely to indicate that accurate interpretation of a non-literal 
remark requires an appreciation of the speaker’s mental state. The speaker of a 
sarcastic remark for example, often means the opposite of what they say, and this is 
not directly conveyed through their use of language. One study (Channon et al., 2004) 
involving patients with uncomplicated TS (i.e. motor and phonic tics only, with no 
associated behavioural problems or comorbidities) assessed patients’ performance on 
two tasks involving ToM that contained examples of non-literal language. No deficits 
were evident on these tasks. However, this could reflect either a small sample size or 
lack of sensitivity in the measures used. 
Patients with TS could exhibit poor performance on tasks involving ToM due 
to inhibitory dysfunction. Patients with uncomplicated TS exhibit inhibitory deficits 
on the Hayling task (Burgess & Shallice, 1996), as shown by a number of studies 
(Channon, Pratt & Robertson, 2003; Channon et al., 2004; Channon et al., 2006). 
Evidence of inhibitory dysfunction in TS prompts the investigation of ToM because 
appreciating another’s mental state often requires inhibition of one’s own perspective. 
Developmental and clinical studies have found links between performance on ToM 
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tasks and inhibitory tasks (see section 1.6). There is also evidence that the same 
inhibitory processes recruited during executive tasks contribute to performance on 
ToM tasks (Saxe et al., 2006).  
Taken together, the evidence of inhibitory deficits and social difficulties 
exhibited by patients with TS suggest that patients may exhibit deficits in ToM. The 
experiments contained in this chapter investigated ToM in patients with TS. The 
findings of experiments 1 and 2 led to the administration of a range of reasoning tasks 
in experiment 3 that were linked to a common neurological substrate. Patients with TS 
appear to exhibit changes in ToM processes that lead to performance deficits on a 
variety of tasks, and which could indicate dysfunction within specific CSTCCs 
(described by Alexander et al., 1986). 
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Section 2. TS Experiment 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Experiment 1 involved the investigation of ToM in patients with TS using two 
tasks. One of these was a false belief vignette task which involved ‘unexpected 
transfer’ (section 1.6). This task contained a false belief question, memory questions, 
and a counterfactual question, which required reasoning about where an object would 
be if it had not been moved (see section 2.2, PD experiment 1). This false belief task 
assessed cognitive (or ‘cool’) ToM. The other ToM task administered involved the 
understanding of faux pas (see section 1.6). Understanding faux pas is likely to make 
more complex reasoning demands than a first order false belief task and involves both 
reasoning about cognitive (‘cool’ ToM) and affective (‘hot’ ToM) mental states. In 
addition to understanding the perpetrator’s false belief (the remark is inoffensive), 
understanding faux pas may require an appreciation of the victim’s negative 
emotional response (offence), and comprehension of the perpetrator’s belief about the 
victim’s mental state, which involves second-order ToM. Reasoning about faux pas 
could also involve knowledge about conventionally acceptable social behaviour. This 
kind of task may be particularly sensitive to any changes in ToM in patients with TS 
in light of NOSIS, which often involve the uttering of contextually specific socially 
inappropriate remarks. 
As performance on ToM tasks can be related to executive functioning (e.g. 
Carlson et al., 2002) two executive tasks were administered. These tasks assessed 
WM (Digit Ordering Test-Adapted: Werheid et al., 2002) and inhibition (Hayling test: 
Burgess & Shallice, 1996), as these executive functions are often related to 
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performance on ToM tasks (Gordon & Olson, 1998; Samson et al., 2005). The 
Hayling test may be sensitive to TS because it involves inhibition of a prepotent 
verbal response, and Channon et al. (2004) have suggested that deficits on this task 
could be linked to some patients’ failure to suppress the urge to utter socially 
inappropriate language. 
 
 
METHOD  
 
PARTICIPANTS 
  
Sixteen outpatients with TS (3 females) of mean age 32.06 years (S.D. 13.52, 
range 17-61) and mean education 12.94 (S.D. 3.19, range 10-17) years were recruited 
from the TS clinic, Queen Elizabeth Psychiatric Hospital, Birmingham. Each subject 
was diagnosed with TS according to DSMIVTR criteria.  Four exhibited comorbid 
OCD, two of whom had ADHD, and one an anxiety disorder. Seven patients were 
taking medication for tics (3 Risperidone, 2 Ariprazole, 1 Sulpiride & 1 Pimozide).  
Eight healthy controls (3 females) of mean age 34.25 years (S.D. 10.15, range 24-47) 
with mean education 14.63 years (S.D. 1.85, range 12-17) also participated. 
 
PROCEDURE 
 
All patients were tested in a consultation room after neuropsychiatric 
consultation at the Tourette clinic, Queen Elizabeth Psychiatric Hospital, while 
controls were tested at the University of Birmingham or in their own home. 
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Participants gave informed consent after reading information leaflets about the study. 
They were fully debriefed after testing which usually took between 30 and 40 
minutes.  
Tasks were separated into two blocks containing the executive and ToM tasks. 
The order of tasks was alternated within these two blocks. Executive tasks were 
always presented first. This resulted in four procedure orders.  
 
TOM TASKS 
 
ToM vignettes 
 
Participants were read four ‘unexpected transfer’ style vignettes (see section 
2.2, PD experiment 1 method) devised by Apperly et al. (2004). 
 
Faux Pas task 
 
This task was taken from Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) and is described in PD 
experiment 1 method. 
 
EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
Hayling Sentence Completion Task (adapted) 
 
This test comprised two parts. For each part of the test, ten sentences were 
read one by one to the participant. They were told to complete each sentence with a 
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single word. Some sentences were taken from Burgess and Shallice’s (1996) study 
and some were developed for this experiment. For part A, initiation, participants were 
instructed to complete the sentences with obvious words that fitted the sentence. Part 
B, inhibition, required the suppression of a more obvious word strongly primed by the 
cue sentence (suitable answers to part A). However, for part B, participants were told 
the word should still make sense, but it must not be the most obvious word and 
something more unusual. These modified task instructions prevented participants 
from using a simple strategy (e.g. responding with the names of objects in the test 
room), because their responses needed to remain contextually appropriate, and were 
intended to result in a more sensitive test of inhibitory ability. 
Participants completed two practice sentences before each set of ten test 
sentences to check their understanding of the instructions. The sentences used in each 
part were constant across participants. The time taken to respond to each sentence in 
part B was measured with a stopwatch. Incorrect responses for part A were words that 
did not make sense. Incorrect words for part B were words that made sense but were 
too obvious or conventional (ie. words that would be correct for part A) or words that 
made no sense in relation to the sentence. 
 
DOT-A  
 
This WM task was taken from Werheid et al., 2002, and was administered as 
described in PD experiment 2 (section 2.3). Scores reflected the number of digits 
presented in pseudorandom order that could be correctly recalled in ascending order. 
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RESULTS  
 
Patients and controls did not differ signifcantly for age, t(22)=-0.40, p=.691, 
or years of education, t(22)=-1.38, p=.183. 
 
TOM TASKS 
 
ToM vignettes 
 
Patients with TS made an average of 0.56 errors (S.D. 0.89, median 0, range 0-
2) on the standard false belief vignettes (Table 13). Although controls performed at 
ceiling, this difference was not statistically significant, MWU=44, p=.083. Patients 
only made errors on counterfactual (2), memory (1) and reality (6) questions, 
providing no evidence for a deficit in false-belief. 
 
Faux pas task 
 
Patients were significantly poorer than controls at recognizing faux pas, 
MWU=58, p=.017. Patients made an average of 1.19 (S.D. 1.11, median 1, range 0-4) 
errors in comparison to controls, who made an average of 0.25 (S.D. 0.46, median 0, 
range 0-1) errors on the faux pas recognition question. Patients made nine recognition 
errors on test scenarios (omissions) and ten errors on control scenarios (false alarms). 
However, patients’ recall of factual information contained in the vignettes was not 
significantly different, MWU=61, p=.843. Patients made a mean of 0.88 errors on fact 
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recall checks (S.D. 0.81, median 1, range 0-2) in comparison to controls, who made a 
mean of 0.75 (S.D. 0.71, median 1, range 0-2) errors. 
Patients with TS performed at ceiling on the desire\belief check during the 
faux pas test, and controls made just one error overall. In contrast, significantly more 
errors (see Table 13) were made by patients than controls on faux pas false belief 
questions, MWU=30, p=.021. Patients made mean 1.06 errors (S.D. 1.00, median 1, 
range 0-3) in comparison to controls, who made mean 0.125 (S.D. 0.35, median 0, 
range 0-1) errors. These errors were even made by patients on occasions when they 
identified faux pas. When failing to attribute a false belief to the perpetrator, patients 
often inferred the offensive remark was intentional. In such cases, explanations for the 
faux pas remark included anger or jealousy. Patients also attributed negative 
personality traits to the protagonist and described them as ‘nasty’, ‘mean’, ‘a bitch’, or 
‘sarcastic’.  
 
 
Table 13. Patient and Control Performance on the ToM measures 
 
 
 
Patients with TS (n=16) 
 
 
Controls (n=8) 
 
 
 
ToM measure 
% 
incorrect 
Errors / 
total possible
% 
incorrect 
Errors / 
total possible 
 
 
ToM vignettes 
(all errors) 
 
 
 
7.03 
 
 
9/256 
 
 
0 
 
 
0/128 
 
Faux pas task: 
 
Recognition errors 
 
False belief errors 
 
Fact recall errors 
 
 
 
14.84 
 
26.56 
 
10.94 
 
 
 
19/128 
 
17/64 
 
14/128 
 
 
 
3.13 
 
3.13 
 
9.34 
 
 
 
2/64 
 
1/32 
 
6/64 
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EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
Hayling task 
 
Controls performed at ceiling on the Hayling task while 6 patients made a total 
of 9 errors (mean 0.56, S.D. 0.89, median 0, range 0-3), but this difference did not 
quite reach statistical significance, MWU=40, p=.052. However, patients took 
significantly longer than controls to respond to inhibitory items, MWU=13, p=.005, 
indicating possible inhibitory dysfunction. Patients took a mean of 4.40 seconds per 
item (S.D. 2.60, median 3.93, range 1.9-10.52) whereas controls took mean 2.14 
second (S.D. 0.57, median 1.94, range 1.48-3.15).  
 
DOT-A 
 
There was no significant difference between patients’ and controls’ 
performance on the DOT-A, MWU=54.5, p=.548. Patients’ mean manipulation digit 
span was 6.22 (S.D. 1.02, median 6, range 4.5-8) and controls’ mean span was 6.31 
(S.D. 0.26, median 6.5, range 6-6.5). 
 
COMORBIDITY ANALYSIS 
 
Patients with TS often exhibit comorbid conditions such as ADHD and OCD 
which could be related to impairments in task performance. To investigate whether 
the deficits with TS were associated with comorbid disorders, 4 patients who 
exhibited OCD or OCD and ADHD were removed and analysis of task performance 
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was reconducted. This smaller group of patients performed significantly more poorly 
than controls on the faux pas test, MWU=20, p=0.020, and for times on the Hayling 
task, MWU=10, p=0.012. The difference for Hayling errors, MWU=24, p=0.022, and 
errors on the ToM vignette test also became significant, MWU=28, p=0.041. 
 
CORRELATIONS 
 
No significant correlations were evident for patients’ performance on the 
executive and ToM measures (Table 14).  
 
 
Table 14. Correlations for patient performance on the executive and ToM 
measures 
 
 
 
Measure 
 
Faux pas 
recognition 
errors 
 
 
ToM 
vignette 
errors (all) 
 
DOT-A 
scores 
 
Hayling task 
part B errors 
 
Hayling task 
part B times 
 
Faux pas 
recognition 
errors 
 
 
 
X 
 
.324 
.222 
 
-.132 
.626 
 
.279 
.356 
 
.279 
.356 
 
ToM vignette 
errors (all) 
 
  
X 
 
 
-.117 
.667 
 
.260 
.331 
 
-.156 
.612 
 
DOT-A scores 
   
X 
 
 
.253 
.345 
 
 
-.126 
.681 
 
Hayling task 
part B errors 
 
    
X 
 
 
-.028 
.927 
 
KEY:  
Upper value = Spearman’s r correlation coefficient, lower value = p-value 
* Significant at the 0.05 level  ** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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It may be noted that some of these differences would not be considered 
significant if adjustments for multiple comparisons were applied to the results. 
However, such corrections were considered too stringent, as small sample sizes and 
the use of non-parametric tests would have increased the likelihood of making a Type 
II error. Therefore, throughout this thesis, any findings with a p-value below 0.05 
were considered to be significant. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Patients with TS made errors on ToM tasks despite unimpaired WM and 
accurate recall of factual information contained in the vignettes. Therefore, the errors 
made by patients on ToM questions were not due to poor memory or comprehension 
difficulties (unlike those made by patients with PD reported in chapter 2). Significant 
deficits were apparent during the faux pas task. Patients often failed to recognize the 
protagonist’s false belief (the remark was not offensive) and so inappropriately 
assumed the faux pas was intentional. Similar deficits are exhibited by patients with 
frontal-variant frontotemporal dementia (Gregory et al., 2002). This pattern of deficits 
was not associated with the presence of OCD or inhibitory problems as shown by the 
Hayling task. The latter finding could indicate that patients with TS exhibit deficits in 
ToM that are independent of executive difficulties. However, further research should 
investigate this possibility using different inhibitory tasks.  
Patients performed more normally on the false belief task that involved 
cognitive (‘cool’) ToM, despite deficits on the faux pas task which involved affective 
(‘hot’) and cognitive ToM. However, patients did not exhibit a straightforward 
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specific deficit with affective ToM. For example, belief (cognitive ToM) errors were 
apparent on the faux pas task. It may be that patients failed to understand the false 
belief of the protagonist on the faux pas task because it involved the attribution of 
intentions to the protagonist. Thus, patients’ difficulties may not reflect a deficit in 
ToM competence, but rather a difference in application, whereby patients are capable 
of understanding other’s beliefs but apply ToM reasoning differently in certain social 
situations. Developmental research shows that when belief and outcome information 
conflict adults’ judgments are determined primarily by the belief. By contrast, young 
children often fail to integrate beliefs and intentions and make judgments based on 
outcome alone (Young & Saxe, 2008). Negative consequences therefore lead to 
negative attributions about the actor, regardless of whether the outcome was intended. 
Patients with TS could therefore have reasoned differently about the protagonist’s 
belief during the faux pas task because it was in conflict with the consequences of the 
inappropriate remark. Reasoning about beliefs may be more cognitively demanding in 
comparison to reasoning based on consequences, as the former involves inferential 
reasoning. As discussed in chapter 2, inferential reasoning appears to draw on 
cognitive resources including executive functions (e.g. Monetta, Grindrod & Pell, 
2008). It could be that frontostriatal dysfunction in TS reduces patients’ cognitive 
resources, leading to difficulties with the cognitively demanding task of reasoning 
about beliefs relative to reasoning based on consequences. 
Future research should aim to further specify the nature and basis of patients’ 
differences in social reasoning. Orbitofrontal, medial prefrontal and anterior 
paracingulate activity has been linked to reasoning about other’s intentions during 
social interactions (Blakemore et al., 2007; Rushworth, Behrens, Rudebeck & Walton, 
2007). These regions are also active when processing first/third person perspective 
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and transgressions of social norms, along with the ACC,temporal poles and precuneus 
(Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Activity in these regions varies depending on whether 
transgressions are considered intentional or unintentional (Berthoz, Armony, Blair & 
Dolan, 2002). Changes in these brain regions could be associated with alterations in 
the attribution of intentions in TS. 
Overall, these findings suggest that social difficulties could arise in TS from a 
lack of understanding of the intentionality of social actions. The possibility that 
patients with TS may exhibit poor performance on other tasks involving ToM and 
reasoning about social intentions was investigated in experiment 2. 
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3.3: TS Experiment 2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In experiment 1, patients with TS performed poorly on a faux pas task. This 
task required the identification of a remark made by one story character that could 
cause offense to another character. Errors made by patients included failure to 
recognize faux pas, mistakenly inferring faux pas had occurred when this was not the 
case and incorrect inferences that an offensive remark was made intentionally. These 
deficits are likely to reflect changes in ToM. 
It is possible that patients with TS find other aspects of ToM difficult. For 
example, difficulty reasoning about social intentions could be related to poor 
comprehension of non-literal language, because understanding a speaker’s 
communicative intention may be important for the interpretation of their non-literal 
remark. Deficits in ToM have been associated with poor comprehension of non-literal 
language in patients with brain damage (e.g. Channon et al., 2005) and the brain 
regions activated during ToM tasks are also active during the processing of sarcasm 
(Uchiyama et al., 2006).  
Accurate interpretation of the meaning of non-literal language requires 
consideration of the speaker’s belief or emotion, or intent to communicate in a non-
literal way. These factors are not directly expressed by the words contained in their 
remark. ToM can aid the comprehension of sarcasm through an understanding of the 
negative affective state of the speaker, as this kind of non-literal utterance often 
expresses criticism or disapproval. Consideration of this affective state should aid 
rejection of the literal interpretation of the utterance which is the opposite of that 
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which the speaker believes or intends to convey. The interpretation of metaphor could 
be aided by appreciation of the speaker’s intent to use language in a symbolic manner 
to represent a belief or emotion, while the understanding the meaning of an indirect 
request also requires the listener to infer the speaker’s true desire or intention. Non-
literal remarks occur frequently during everyday social interaction, so poor 
comprehension of non-literal language could have a significant impact on patients’ 
social functioning. 
Only one previous study of patients with TS included tasks featuring non-
literal language. Channon and colleagues (2004) assessed the performance of fifteen 
patients with uncomplicated TS on tasks that included some stories containing 
examples of sarcasm and lies. No impairments were reported on these two short tasks, 
though it may be premature to conclude that patients have no difficulties in processing 
non-literal language in light of other evidence indicating changes in ToM in TS 
(experiment 1). 
Evidence of possible inhibitory dysfunction in TS in experiment 1 (and in 
other studies: Channon et al., 2004; Channon et al., 2006; Crawford et al., 2005) 
further prompts the investigation of the comprehension of non-literal language in TS. 
Inhibitory dysfunction can impair the understanding of non-literal language either 
directly, through a failure to inhibit automatically activated literal meanings (see 
Grice, 1975; 1978), or indirectly, through deficits in ToM, because appreciation of 
another’s mental state may involve the inhibition of one’s own perspective of the 
world (Samson et al., 2005). Other patient groups who exhibit executive impairment 
as a result of frontostriatal dysfunction (patients with HD or PD) perform poorly on 
tasks involving non-literal language (Chenery, Copland & Murdoch, 2002; Monnetta 
& Pell, 2007). 
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In experiment 2, the comprehension of non-literal language was investigated 
in patients with TS using tasks featuring sarcastic and metaphorical remarks (Langdon 
and Coltheart, 2004) and indirect requests (Cocoron, Mercer and Frith, 1995). Patients 
also completed the faux pas test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) that had previously 
indicated impairment in TS (experiment 1) in order to investigate possible 
relationships between the understanding of non-literal language and ToM. Two 
inhibitory measures were administered: a black and white Stroop (Beck et al., in 
press) and the Hayling task (Burgess and Shallice, 1996). The inclusion of these tasks 
allowed relationships between inhibition and ToM to be investigated. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
15 participants (8 females) with TS were recruited as described in experiment 
1. Patients with TS were of mean age 25.67 (S.D. 11.71, range 17-54) years, and they 
had an average of 13 (S.D. 1, range 12-15) years of education. Six exhibited comorbid 
OCD, and one of these also had ADHD. Another patient exhibited TS and comorbid 
ADHD without OCD. 5 patients were taking medication for tics (4 Risperidone, 1 
Haloperidol). 10 healthy controls (3 females), matched as a group for age (mean 
24.70, S.D. 7.60, range 17-41) and years of education (mean 13.4, S.D. 1.78, range 
11-16) also took part. None of the participants tested took part in experiment 1. 
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PROCEDURE 
 
Testing was conducted as described in the procedure of TS experiment 1. All 
participants undertook 5 tasks in the following order; Hayling task, faux pas task, 
black and white Stroop and then alternating vignettes from the Hinting task (which 
featured indirect requests) and Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task (which included 
sarcastic and metaphorical remarks). These tasks were administered in a set order 
because this experiment investigated differences in performance between the patient 
groups rather than across the tasks. 
 
NON-LITERAL LANGUAGE TASKS 
 
All vignettes were presented on paper in black ink, font Size 18. Participants 
were asked to read each vignette carefully and indicate when they had done so. They 
were then questioned by the experimenter who recorded their responses. The 
appropriate vignette remained in view during questioning. The order of presentation 
of vignettes within each task was in a fixed order. 
 
The Hinting Task 
 
This task consisted of four vignettes which described short social scenarios 
involving two characters (developed by Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995). Each 
vignette ended with a remark made by one of the two characters, which should be 
correctly interpreted as an indirect request. For example: “Melissa goes to the 
bathroom for a shower. Anne has just had a bath. Melissa notices the bath is dirty. She 
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calls downstairs to Anne “Couldn’t you find the bleach Anne?” Participants were first 
asked what the character meant by his or her remark, and then what that character 
wanted the other character to do. Correct responses required an inferential and 
appropriate non-literal interpretation identifying the speaker’s hint (e.g. Melissa 
wanted Anne to clean the bath). 
 
The Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task 
 
This task contained four vignettes taken from Langdon and Coltheart (2004). 
They describe social scenarios involving two characters, and end with a list of four 
possible remarks that could be spoken by one of the characters in response to a 
behaviour exhibited by the other character. The questions used in this experiment 
asked the participant to decide which of these remarks would make sense; what the 
character would mean if they said them, and if there were any remarks that did not 
make sense. Three of the remarks made sense relating to the story context: one was 
literally appropriate, one was appropriate if interpreted as sarcasm and another was an 
appropriate use of figurative language (metaphorical). The remaining statement did 
not make sense. For example: “Mr. Jones is a very generous man. He has donated 
$10,000 to the local hospital. When he tells his friend Peter what he had done, Peter 
says... 1. “How generous!” [literal] 2. “What a miser!” [sarcastic] 3. “You’ve got big 
pockets!” [metaphorical] 4. “You keep pulling the shutters down” [nonsense]. 
The four remarks were presented in a counterbalanced order across the stories. 
The vignettes consisted of two pairs. Within these two pairs two of the four possible 
remarks were the same; however, depending on the story they could be interpreted 
appropriately as literal or sarcastic (i.e. the appropriate literal and sarcastic remarks 
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were reversed). The vignettes appeared in a fixed order for each participant. 
Presentation of these vignettes alternated with presentation of the four vignettes from 
the Hinting task. 
 
TOM: FAUX PAS TASK 
 
As described in section 2.2 (PD experiment 1 method). 
 
INHIBITORY MEASURES 
 
Hayling Sentence Completion Test - adapted 
 
As described in TS experiment 1. 
 
Black and white Stroop test 
 
As described in section 2.4 (PD experiment 3). 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Patients with TS and controls did not differ in age, t(23)=0.23, p=.820, or 
years of education, t(23)=-0.72, p=.478. One patient with TS did not complete the 
faux pas and Hayling tasks. 
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NON-LITERAL LANGUAGE TASKS 
 
Controls performed at ceiling on the Hinting task while the patient group made 
three errors (mean 0.2, S.D. 4.14, median 0, range 0-1), a difference that was not 
significant, MWU=60, p=.140. Patients appeared to exhibit little difficulty in the 
understanding of indirect requests. 
In contrast, patients (n=15) demonstrated a significant impairment on the 
Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task, MWU=12.5, p<.001. Patients made a total of 
thirty-six errors (mean 2.4, S.D. 1.72, median 2, range 0-6) while controls (n=10) 
made just one error (mean 0.1, S.D. 0.32, median 0, range 0-1) overall. Errors were 
made by patients for all trial types, indicating errors in judging the appropriateness of 
sarcastic, metaphorical, literal and nonsense remarks. When comparing the number of 
errors made by patients in response to the four remark types, pair-wise comparisons 
indicated that patients exhibited a significant deficit in the detection of appropriate use 
of sarcasm, MWU=20, p=.001. Patients also made considerably more errors than 
controls in detecting the appropriate use of metaphor (Table 15), and this difference 
reached borderline significance, MWU=46, p=.051. Patients were not significantly 
poorer at detecting appropriate literal remarks, MWU=55, p=.082, or rejecting 
inappropriate nonsense statements, MWU=55, p=.082. It was also noted that while 
control participants always correctly described the speaker’s intended meaning in 
their own words, when patients with TS had correctly identified a contextually 
appropriate remark they sometimes gave a poor explanation of its meaning. 
Misinterpretations included the classification of literal and metaphorical remarks as 
sarcastic, as well as literal interpretations of non-literal language. 
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Table 15. Errors made by patients (n=15) on different trial types during the 
Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task 
 
 
 
Trial type: 
 
Sarcasm 
detection 
 
 
Metaphor 
detection 
 
Literal 
detection 
 
Inappropriate 
rejection 
 
 
Total errors 
 
Number of 
patients who made 
errors 
 
%  incorrect 
responses 
 
 
15 
 
 
11 
 
 
25 
 
11 
 
 
7 
 
 
18.33 
 
5 
 
 
4 
 
 
8.33 
 
5 
 
 
4 
 
 
8.33 
 
 
TOM: FAUX PAS TASK 
 
As can be seen from Table 16, the control group made only one error when 
detecting whether faux pas had occurred (mean 0.1, S.D. 0, median 0, range 0-1). 
Patients’ total of 16 errors, a mean of 1.07 (S.D. 1.17, median 1, range 0-4), was 
significantly greater, MWU=29.5, p=.008. When test and control scenarios were 
considered separately, patients made mean 0.6 errors (S.D. 1.08, median 0, range 0-4) 
and were found to perform significantly more poorly than controls on test vignettes, 
MWU=40, p=.020. Patients made more errors (mean 0.47, S.D. 0.65, median 0, range 
0-2) on control vignettes than control participants (mean 0.1, S.D. 0.32, median 0, 
range 0-1 errors), but this difference was not significant, MWU=46.5, p=.083.  
Controls performed at ceiling and patients (mean 0.13, S.D. 0.35, median 0, 
range 0-1 errors) almost performed at ceiling for story recall checks. No difference in 
performance was evident, MWU=58, p=.265. Patients made four errors (mean 0.27, 
S.D. 0.70, median 0, range 0-2) in total on desire\belief checks, while controls 
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performed at ceiling. This difference was not significant, MWU=65, p=.238). Patients 
(mean 0.33, S.D. 0.62, median 0, range 0-2 errors) did not perform more poorly than 
controls (mean 0.6, S.D. 0.699, median 0, range 0-2 errors) on belief check questions, 
MWU=65, p=.238. 
 
Table 16. Errors made by patients and controls on the faux pas task 
 
  
Patients with TS (n=15) 
 
 
Controls (n=10) 
 
 
 
Error type 
% 
incorrect 
Errors / 
total possible
% 
incorrect 
Errors / 
total possible 
 
Recognition errors: 
 
All 
 
Test vignettes 
(omissions) 
 
Control vignettes 
(false alarms) 
 
 
 
 
14.55 
 
 
15 
 
 
11.67 
 
 
 
16/110 
 
 
9/60 
 
 
7/60 
 
 
 
 
1.25 
 
 
0 
 
 
2.5 
 
 
 
1/80 
 
 
0/40 
 
 
1/40 
 
False belief errors: 
 
 
8.33 
 
 
5/60 
 
15 
 
 
6/40 
 
 
Fact recall errors: 
 
 
1.82 
 
2/110 
 
0 
 
0/80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INHIBITORY MEASURES 
 
Hayling task 
 
The control group performed at ceiling on the Hayling task while patients 
made a total of three errors (mean 0.2, S.D. 0.43, median 0, range 0-1), a difference 
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that was not significant, MWU=55, p=.126. On average, patients (mean 1.84 seconds, 
S.D. 3.57, median 1.64, range 0.79-3.91), exhibited a greater increase in response 
latency for each inhibition trial in relation to baseline when compared to controls 
(mean 1.13 seconds, S.D. 0.5, median 1.07, range 0.53-2.10). This marginally 
significant difference, MWU=36, p=.046, may indicate evidence of mild inhibitory 
dysfunction. 
 
Black and white Stroop 
 
Patients with TS made 30 errors (mean 2, S.D. 2.67, median 0, range 1-8) on 
the black and white Stroop interference condition in comparison to controls who made 
6 (mean 0.6, S.D. 0.84, median 0, range 0-2). This difference was not significant 
MWU=55, p=.229. Patients showed a greater increase in response latency (mean 7.33 
seconds, S.D. 0.92, median 6.84, range 1.2-16.03) from baseline to the interference 
condition in comparison to controls (mean 5.13 seconds, S.D. 1.05, median 5.36, 
range 3.2-6.7). This difference only approached significance, MWU=40.5, p=.056. 
 
COMORBIDITY ANALYSIS 
 
It is possible that deficits in task performance exhibited by patients with TS 
reflect the influence of comorbid disorders. Because six of the patients tested in this 
study exhibited comorbid OCD, further analysis addressed this possibility by 
separately comparing the performance of patients with TS and OCD, and TS without 
OCD, to that of controls. These comparisons were carried out for the measures that 
elicited evidence of impairment in the patient group as a whole. 
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When patients with TS and no OCD (n=9) were compared to controls, the 
differences in performance found for the patient group as a whole remained 
significant. Patients without OCD made significantly more errors than controls on the 
Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task, MWU=6.5, p=.001, and the faux pas task, 
MWU=12, p=.004, and showed an increased effect of inhibition in comparison to 
baseline as reflected in time differences on the Hayling task, MWU=p=12, p=.013.  
The performance of patients with TS and comorbid OCD (n=6) was also 
compared to the control group. Despite the fact that power was low due to the small 
number of patients exhibiting comorbid OCD, this group performed significantly 
more poorly on the Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task in comparison to controls, 
MWU=6, p=.003. These patients did not perform more poorly on the faux pas task, 
MWU=17.5, p=.073, but no significant difference for Hayling times, MWU=24, 
p=.515.  
 
CORRELATIONS 
 
Correlations were conducted to identify relationships between patients’ 
performance on the tasks administered (Table 17). Calculations did not include errors 
made on the Hayling task or Hinting task as there were so few. A significant positive 
relationship was seen between errors and time differences on the black and white 
Stroop, indicating that patients who made more errors took more additional time to 
complete the inhibition condition (in comparison to baseline). A significant negative 
relationship was also present between time differences on the Hayling test and black 
and white Stroop. Patients who responded more slowly to inhibitory items on the 
Hayling test (i.e. showed a greater increase in time for the inhibitory condition to 
  118 
Social Cognition in Tourette’s Syndrome 
baseline) took less time to complete the inhibitory condition of the black and white 
Stroop. This unexpected negative relationship may reflect differences between the 
tasks. The Stroop involved two possible responses, whereas the Hayling involved 
generation of a contextually appropriate word that was not the obvious word cued by 
the sentence. Therefore, patients with inhibitory difficulties appear to respond more 
quickly on the Stroop (and give inaccurate prepotent responses) and more slowly on 
the Hayling test because they found it difficult to inhibit the word cued by the 
sentence. 
 
 
Table 17. Correlations for patient performance on executive and ToM measures 
 
 
 
Measure: 
 
Faux pas 
recognition 
errors 
 
 
Pragmatic 
story 
comprehension 
task errors 
 
 
Stroop 
errors 
 
Stroop 
time 
difference 
 
Hayling 
task time 
difference 
 
Faux pas 
recognition 
errors 
 
 
 
X 
 
.182 
.533 
 
.221 
.447 
 
-.041 
.888 
 
.228 
.433 
 
Pragmatic story 
comprehension 
task errors 
 
  
 
X 
 
.169 
.547 
 
-.102 
.718 
 
.117 
.691 
 
Stroop errors 
   
X 
 
 
.537 
.039* 
 
-.251 
.388 
 
 
Stroop time 
difference 
 
    
X 
 
 
-.657 
.011* 
 
KEY:  
Upper value = Spearman’s r correlation coefficient, lower value = p-value 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
  119 
Social Cognition in Tourette’s Syndrome 
DISCUSSION 
 
Performance on the Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task indicated a 
profound deficit in the comprehension of non-literal language in patients with TS. On 
many occasions when patients read non-literal remarks they decided that the 
statements did not make sense. Patients failed to detect the use of appropriate 
metaphorical remarks on quite a few occasions. Their greatest impairment, however, 
was in the detection of the contextually appropriate use of sarcasm. This deficit was 
despite accurate comprehension of indirect requests, as revealed by intact 
performance on the Hinting test. The Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task may have 
been a more sensitive test than the Hinting test, which simply required patients to 
interpret non-literal utterances. During the Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task, 
patients had to first recognize and select sarcastic and metaphorical remarks that 
would make sense based on the story context before justifying their selection. The 
difference in performance on these two tasks could reflect the questioning procedure. 
That is, there is likely to have been a greater margin for error on the Pragmatic 
Comprehension Story Task where patients were free to decide that the remarks did 
not make sense.  
Changes in ToM are exhibited by patients with TS as indicated by impaired 
performance on the faux pas task (as seen in experiment 1). Errors included both 
failures to detect faux pas and occasions where patients suggested that an 
inappropriate remark had been made in control vignettes containing no faux pas. This 
pattern of impairment has been previously reported in patients with frontal-variant 
frontotemporal dementia (Gregory et al., 2002) in addition to experiment 1. While 
failure to detect faux pas could indicate reduced sensitivity to socially inappropriate 
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behavior in TS, such impairments do not adequately explain instances where patients 
thought an offensive remark had been made when this was not the case. This kind of 
error suggests that while patients are mindful of the fact that inappropriate social 
behaviour can occur, their judgment of what is socially appropriate differs to that of 
controls. Other changes in reasoning about social exchanges may have contributed to 
patients’ unconventional interpretations of characters behaviour in control scenarios. 
For example, patients could have a tendency to assume that behaviours that result in 
negative consequences are always made with negative intent. 
Patients with TS exhibited a mild deficit in the inhibition of prepotent verbal 
responses during the Hayling task (as found by Channon et al., 2004; Channon et al., 
2006) which could indicate dysfunction of the ACC (Nathaniel-James et al., 1997; 
Rubia et al., 2001). Difficulties in inhibition could lead to poor performance on the 
Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task, through poor inhibition of the literal meaning 
of non-literal remarks. It is also possible that inhibitory deficits led to impairments on 
both the Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task and faux pas task through difficulties 
with ToM. Failure to inhibit one’s own perspective may impair ToM (Samson et al., 
2005), which in turn could have led to difficulties understanding the speaker’s intent 
to use non-literal language during the Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task and the 
victim’s feelings of offense during the faux pas task. However, the present study 
found no evidence that inhibitory performance was related to patients’ impairments 
on these tasks. Although some of the patients’ errors on the Pragmatic Story 
Comprehension Task were associated with literal interpretations which could be 
related to a failure to inhibit literal meanings, other errors were not, such as instances 
when patients described metaphorical remarks as sarcastic. 
  121 
Social Cognition in Tourette’s Syndrome 
One possible explanation for patients’ deficits on the Pragmatic Story 
Comprehension Task and faux pas task could be the involvement of both cognitive 
and affective mental states (i.e. ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ ToM). Difficulties dealing with 
conflicting cognitive (e.g. beliefs) and affective (e.g. emotions) mental states could 
also contribute to poor comprehension of non-literal language. For example, a speaker 
can make a remark which has a literal meaning that is in direct conflict with their 
feeling, as often in the case of sarcasm. The faux pas task involves consideration of 
both the victim’s emotional reaction (affective mental state) and the protagonist’s 
belief and lack of intent to offend (cognitive mental states). Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, 
Yaniv and Aharon-Peretz (2002) reported deficits on a faux pas task in people with 
Asperger syndrome and suggested these impairments reflected poor integration of 
cognitive and affective mental states. This is likely to reflect dysfunction of right 
VMPFC (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003). Some errors made by patients with TS, such 
as failure to recognize faux pas, may simply reflect poor consideration of the victim’s 
likely emotional response to the protagonist’s remark. However, reasoning about both 
cognitive and affective mental states, particularly when these are in conflict (i.e. the 
protagonist’s lack of intent to offend versus the victim’s feeling of offence) should 
make greater cognitive demands and so is more likely to have elicited impairment.  
Despite the possibility that changes in ToM in TS could contribute to patients’ 
poor comprehension of non-literal language, no correlation was apparent between 
patients’ performance on the faux pas task and Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task. 
Relationships between performance on ToM and non-literal language measures could 
be stronger if the non-literal language task administered is richer in ToM cues. For 
example, auditory cues such as vocal tone may aid the understanding of the affective 
mental state of the speaker. The task used in the present study did not involve such 
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cues and interpretation of the speaker’s mental state relied upon situational context. 
However, while these cues tend to enhance appreciation of speaker attitude, they may 
not be sufficient to lead to the successful comprehension of non-literal language. 
Demorest, Meyer, Phelps, Gardner and Winner (1984) suggest that an understanding 
of the speaker’s desire or intent to play with language is most critical. McDonald 
(1999) however, suggests processes such as counterfactual reasoning are needed in 
order to reconcile the facts about the situation with the mental state of the speaker, as 
sarcasm involves an appreciation that the speaker’s remark can be counter to what 
they actually feel or think. Future research could investigate patients’ performance on 
standard counterfactual reasoning tasks (e.g. Mandel, 2003). 
Some of the errors made by patients with TS on the faux pas task indicated 
changes in ToM, whereby patients reasoned about mental states differently to 
controls. Therefore, some errors did not demonstrate a deficit in terms of an inability 
to consider a character’s mental state. However, other errors on the faux pas task and 
Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task did reflect poor consideration of mental states. 
On some occasions when patients failed to infer a character’s mental state they based 
their interpretation of a character’s communicative intentions on the literal outcome of 
that character’s behaviour. Although poor consideration of mental states could 
indicate specific changes to ToM, it is possible that the superficial literal 
interpretations made by patients reflect a more general impairment in inferential 
reasoning. Further research should investigate whether patients with TS only exhibit 
deficits on tasks that require drawing inferences that involve mental states. 
The observed difficulties in understanding faux pas and non-literal language in 
TS are likely to result from frontostriatal dysfunction. Deficits in ToM and the 
comprehension of non-literal language have been seen in schizophrenia (Corcoran et 
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al., 1995; Drury, Robinson & Birchwood, 1998), bipolar disorder (Bora et al., 2005), 
and autism (Happé, 1993; Wang, Lee, Signman & Dapretto, 2006). These changes 
could be associated with hypo or hyperactivity within the prefrontal cortex 
(Hadjikhani et al., 2007; Kanahara et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2008; Taylor, Welsh, 
Chen, Velander & Liberzon, 2007; Wang et al., 2006). Damage to the VMPFC can 
lead to poor performance on tasks involving sarcasm and faux pas (Shamay-Tsoory et 
al., 2003; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, & Aharon-Peretz, 2005), so dysfunction of the 
CSTCC involving this region (the ACC CSTCC described by Alexander et al., 1986) 
could contribute to the deficits in the understanding of both faux pas and non-literal 
language exhibited by the TS patients in the current study. However, other brain 
regions are also implicated. Amygdala dysfunction can impair performance on the 
faux pas task (Stone, Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane & Young, 2003) and studies have 
also indicated volumetric abnormalities of the amygdala in TS (Ludolph et al., 2008; 
Peterson et al. 2007). Patients may also exhibit dysfunction of the IFG (Baym, 
Corbett, Wright & Bunge, 2008), which is involved in the comprehension of non-
literal language (Kircher, Leube, Erb, Wolfgang & Rapp, 2007; Uchiyama et al., 
2006).  
There is evidence that TS in association with obsessive compulsive symptoms 
is associated with altered activity in corticolimbic pathways involving orbitofrontal 
and amygdala regions (Braun et al., 1995; Kurlan, Kersun, Ballantine & Caine, 1990; 
Nordstrom & Burton, 2002), raising the important issue of comorbidity. Although the 
present study included just two patients with ADHD, six of the fifteen patients 
exhibited comorbid OCD, and this latter factor could have contributed to impairments 
in task performance. However, when the performance of patients and controls was 
compared after patients with comorbid OCD were removed from analysis, significant 
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group differences in performance on the faux pas task and Pragmatic Story 
Comprehension Task were still evident. This finding indicated that deficits in ToM 
and the comprehension of non-literal language appeared to result from TS rather than 
comorbid OCD. 
In summary, patients with TS exhibited a highly significant deficit in the 
comprehension of non-literal language. Furthermore, the present study replicates 
findings of poor understanding of faux pas in TS (experiment 1). These deficits were 
apparent despite evidence of only mild inhibitory dysfunction. Patients’ difficulties 
indicate changes in ToM in TS. Further research should seek to determine whether the 
observed impairments reflect changes in specific aspects of ToM and specify the 
precise neural substrates and functional changes involved. 
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3.4: TS Experiment 3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Patients with TS have been shown to exhibit deficits on two tasks involving 
social cognition (TS experiment 1 & 2), indicating changes in ToM. Similar tasks 
involving ToM are problematic for patients with VMPFC damage (Lough, Gregory & 
Hodges, 2001; Shamay et al., 2003; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer & Aharon-Peretz, 2005), 
so dysfunction of frontostriatal pathways involving this region is likely to be 
implicated in TS. This study aimed to investigate whether patients with TS exhibit 
impairment on other tasks linked to the VMPFC. These additional tasks involved 
reasoning about mental states, humour, and economic decision making.  
Research by Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues suggests that the recognition of 
certain emotions may be vulnerable to VMPFC dysfunction. Patients with damage to 
this region performed poorly on a task featuring faces with emotional expressions, 
which required the understanding of envy and gloating (Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-
Elhanany & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). Poor performance on items involving recognition 
of these ‘socially competitive emotions’ contrasted with good performance on items 
that required patients to judge which character the central character felt the same as or 
identified with. The recognition of ‘socially competitive emotions’ involves reasoning 
about conflicting mental states. In the case of gloating, the subject experiences 
pleasure in light of another’s displeasure. Envy involves feeling displeased in light of 
someone else’s pleasure.  Shamay-Tsoory (2008) gave a version of the ‘socially 
competitive emotions’ task to people with Asperger’s syndrome and high-functioning 
autism. This mixed group of patients performed poorly on this task in comparison to 
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controls, while exhibiting intact performance on matched tasks that involved 
reasoning about characters’ cognitive and affective mental states e.g. what a character 
was thinking about or what a character loved. A short version of the ‘socially 
competitive emotions’ task used by Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2007) was used in 
experiment 3. Reasoning that requires the understanding of conflicting emotional 
mental states could pose a particularly complex task, so tasks assessing the 
understanding of ‘socially competitive emotions’ may reveal more subtle deficits, and 
could therefore be more sensitive to changes in ToM in patients with TS. 
Torralva et al. (2007) found that patients with frontal-variant frontotemporal 
dementia (which involves degeneration of VMPFC including OFC) performed poorly 
on the ‘Eyes Test’ (Baron-Cohen, Joliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997). This task 
involves making judgments about the emotional state of a person based on a picture of 
the eyes alone. Poor performance on the ‘Eyes Test’ was related to poor performance 
on a faux pas task, which has also been shown to elicit impairment in patients with TS 
(TS experiments 1 & 2). The amygdala, which has inputs to the VMPFC, is also likely 
to be involved in the ‘Eyes Test’ (Adolphs, Baron-Cohen & Tranel, 2002). One study 
assessed the performance of ten patients with TS on a version of this task and failed to 
find a deficit (Baron-Cohen, Joliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997). However, the 
study used an early version of the test which may not have been as sensitive enough to 
detect a deficit, particularly in a small sample of patients. Experiment 3 included a 
more recent version of the ‘Eyes Test’ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) which contained 
more items, more forced choice options and involved complex mental state terms. 
Performance on this task could be impaired if patients with TS exhibit dysfunction 
within circuitry involving the ACC and medial OFC as hypothesized. 
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Activation in the VMPFC and amygdala has been linked to humour 
appreciation and funniness ratings (Goel & Dolan, 2001). For this reason, experiment 
3 investigated the comprehension and appreciation of humour in TS.  
Samson, Zysset and Huber (2008) reported more activity in VMPFC (as well 
as the IFG, temporo-parietal junction and supramarginal gyrus) in response to funny 
cartoons in comparison to baseline materials. The amygdala was implicated in 
humour appreciation by Bartolo, Benuzzi, Nocetti, Baraldi & Nicelli (2006), who 
presented humourous cartoons to healthy adult participants and found that activity in 
the amygdala correlated with reported ratings of amusement. 
Humour is thought to rely on the detection and then resolution of incongruity, 
such as that between an expectation and reality, or when a prediction is not confirmed 
(Bartolo et al., 2006). Moran, Wig, Adams, Janata & Kelley (2004) suggest that 
detecting incongruity in humour activates left inferior frontal and posterior middle 
temporal regions, while solving the incongruity involves activity in bilateral insula 
and amygdala. Bartolo et al. (2006) showed that regions activated by humourous 
cartoons included left superior temporal gyrus, left middle temporal gyrus and 
cerebellum. They also note that these regions were activated by a non-verbal task 
involving the attribution of intentions in a study by Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle & 
Decety (2000). This led them to suggest that ToM is one mechanism that can be used 
to resolve a detected incongruity in order to understand a joke. Some studies (e.g. 
Gallagher et al., 2000) have shown that cartoons involving ToM activates regions 
such as VMPFC, temporo-parietal junction and temporal poles more than cartoons not 
involving ToM related humour (e.g. slapstick). However, other evidence suggests that 
there is no qualitative difference in the network of brain regions activated by semantic 
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cartoons that do not involve reasoning about mental states and those that do (Samson 
et al., 2008). 
Humourous materials involving sarcasm could be poorly understood by TS 
patients due to impairments in ToM. Deficits in ToM may lead to poor resolution of 
the incongruity present in a joke involving sarcasm because the humour in sarcasm 
derives from an incongruity between the speaker’s remark and their mental state. 
Nonetheless, there are other kinds of humour that do not rely on ToM. For example, 
humour involving irony perhaps simply requires the appreciation of an incongruity 
between what is expected and what has occurred. Similarly, jokes that rely on simple 
visual ‘slapstick’ style humour (e.g. violence) are also unlikely to be affected by 
deficits in ToM. ‘Slapstick’ style humour tends to be understood by children as young 
as 3 years of age (e.g. Schultz, 1972) and may be based on simply detecting an 
incongruity (an unexpected physical event) without resolving why it occurred 
(Samson et al., 2008). It is therefore less likely to make considerable cognitive 
demands reliant on frontal functioning. 
In experiment 3, participants’ understanding and appreciation of humour was 
assessed using cartoons involving sarcasm or irony, in comparison to cartoons 
involving other kinds of humour such as ‘slapstick’ style comedy. Patients were 
expected to show difficulties understanding humour based on sarcasm because 
previous experiments revealed impairments in ToM (experiments 1 & 2) and the 
understanding of sarcasm in TS (experiment 2). Cartoons featuring irony were 
included because this kind of humour involves understanding an indirect 
communication but does not necessarily require ToM. It was expected that patients 
would be less likely to exhibit poor understanding of a selection of humourous 
cartoons that included ‘slapstick’ style humour. 
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The hypothesized dysfunction of frontostriatal pathways involving VMPFC in 
TS could cause the patients to show deficits in economic reasoning. Koenigs and 
Tranel (2007) showed that patients with VMPFC damage exhibit poor economic 
decision making during the Ultimatum Game (UG). During this task, a sum of money 
must be split between two players who act as proposer and responder. The proposer 
offers a proportion of the money to the responder and will keep the remainder. If the 
responder accepts this single offer, the money is split as proposed. If the responder 
rejects the offer, both players receive nothing. The conventional response is to accept 
any offer, as any personal gain should be preferable to no gain. However, if the 
proposer’s offer is low, the responder may reject it due to feelings of unfairness or 
anger (Pilutla & Murnighan, 1996). Some estimates suggest neurologically intact 
individuals acting as responders reject about half of offers below twenty percent of 
the total (Nowak, Page & Sigmund, 2000). Koenigs and Tranel (2007), found that 
rejection rates for very unfair offers (eg. the proposer keeps $8 or $9 from $10)  were 
significantly greater in patients with VMPFC damage in comparison to healthy 
controls and patients with damage outside VMPFC (such as lateral temporal or 
dorsolateral damage). Koenigs and Tranel (2007) suggest that one explanation for 
“irrational” rejections is poor regulation of negative emotional responses which leads 
to impulsive rejections. 
Increased acceptance of unfair UG offers has been reported in patients with 
autism (Sally & Hill, 2006). This could reflect the well established deficits in ToM in 
autism as decision making during the UG often involves reasoning about the mental 
state of the proposer (Polezzi et al., 2008).  For example, some rejections may be 
associated with feelings of envy, due to feelings of negative emotion which contrast 
with attributions of positive emotion to the proposer. Previous research indicating 
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possible changes in ToM in TS (experiments 1 & 2) therefore further prompted the 
assessment of patients’ performance on the UG.  
During experiment 3, participants played a short version of the UG where they 
always acted as the responder. Participants also completed other tasks that were 
sensitive to the functioning of the VMPFC. These were the ‘Eyes Test’ (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001), a task involving reasoning about ‘socially competitive emotions’ 
(including stimuli from Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007) and tasks assessing appreciation 
and comprehension of humour in cartoons. Executive functioning was also assessed 
through the use of two tasks that provided measures of verbal fluency, and inhibition, 
which is most likely to be impaired in TS (see Channon, Crawford, Vakili & 
Robertson, 2003; Channon et al., 2006) and could be related to ToM performance 
(Samson et al., 2005). 
 
 
METHOD 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Sixteen patients with TS (6 females) were recruited as outlined in TS 
experiment 1.  The mean age of the sample was 26.31 years (S.D. 9.80, range 16-47), 
with an average of 13.25 (S.D. 2.27, range 11-18) years of education. Five exhibited 
comorbid OCD, and one had comorbid ADHD. Four were taking medication for tics 
(2 Clonidine, 1 Risperidone & 1 Aripriprazole). Three patients were taking 
Fluoxetine, and two Sertraline. 20 healthy controls (11 females) of mean age 21.50 
years (S.D. 4.43, range 18-37) with mean 13.80 years (S.D. 1.20, range 11-16) of 
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education also participated. Patients who had participated in earlier experiments were 
not excluded from participation as the tasks used in this experiment were not used in 
earlier experiments. The only exception was the black and white Stroop, but previous 
exposure to this task would not lead to a long term practice effect. 
 
PROCEDURE 
 
Testing was conducted as described in the procedure of TS experiment 1. All 
participants undertook two executive tasks, the Ultimatum Game (UG), the 
recognition of ‘socially competitive emotions’ task, the humourous cartoons task and 
the ‘Eyes Test’. The order of administration of the tasks was counterbalanced. Half of 
the participants received the tasks in the following order: black and white Stroop, 
cartoons, ‘socially competitive emotions’ task, UG, ‘Eyes Test’, FAS. The other half 
of the two groups received the tasks in reverse of order: FAS, ‘Eyes Test’, UG, 
‘socially competitive emotions’ task, cartoons, black and white Stroop. 
 
THE ‘SOCIALLY COMPETITIVE EMOTIONS’ TASK 
  
The stimuli used in this task were taken from Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2007). 
There were sixteen items (see Figure 5 for an example). Each item featured a cartoon 
face (that was originally called ‘Yoni’ and was re-named ‘Harry’), surrounded by four 
other faces, which were arranged above and below ‘Harry’, on the left and right sides. 
For half of the items these other faces were also cartoon style, for the other eight 
items they were photographs of male and female faces taken from Ekman and Friesen 
(1976). Both ‘Harry’ and the other four faces exhibited emotional expressions. 
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‘Harry’ had either a happy or sad face, while the other faces depicted a range of 
expressions that included happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust or a neutral 
expression. There were four conditions. Participants had to select the face that ‘Harry’ 
either 1. felt the same as, 2. identified with, 3. was gloating over or 4. was envious of. 
Condition 1 required a simple match from the expression on Harry’s cartoon face to 
another character. For condition 2 participants were told that when you identify with 
someone you have things in common with them. This condition also required 
participants to select the character with the same expression as ‘Harry’. Conditions 3 
and 4 involved the understanding of ‘socially competitive emotions’. For condition 3, 
gloating was defined as a “positive experience in the face of another’s misfortune” 
and envy as a “negative experience in the face of another’s fortune” (as Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2007). For condition 3, ‘Harry’ showed a happy expression, and the 
correct response was to pick the character with a sad expression. For condition 4, 
‘Harry’ had a sad face, and the correct response was to select the character with a 
happy expression. The definitions were given to all participants and avoided any 
explicit reference to emotions. Responses were simply scored as correct or incorrect 
for each item. 
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Figure 5. Example of stimuli used in the ‘socially competitive emotions’ task 
modified from Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2007). The facial photographs are from Ekman 
& Friesen (1974) 
 
 
ULTIMATUM GAME 
 
The experimenter told participants they had to imagine a hypothetical 
situation, but respond as if the circumstances were real life. In the version of the UG 
used in this experiment participants were always responders, and a story character 
‘Sam’ was the proposer. Participants were told to imagine that a banker had given 
‘Sam’ money on the condition that ‘Sam’ gave some of this money to them. ‘Sam’ 
would make a single offer of how much money they could have. If they accepted 
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‘Sam’s offer, the money would be split between the two of them as ‘Sam’ proposed. 
If they did not accept the offer, neither they nor ‘Sam’ would get any money. Three 
individual trials were presented. In each case the banker gave ‘Sam’ ten pounds. All 
participants received the trials in the same order. The first trial featured an offer to the 
participant of four pounds, the second offer was one pound, and the final offer was 
two pounds fifty. For each trial, participants were asked whether they would accept or 
reject the offer. The ‘logical’ response in every case would be to accept the offer, no 
matter how small, because any gain is better than nothing. 
 
HUMOUROUS CARTOONS 
 
This task involved 16 cartoons, printed in black and white, taken from an 
online database (www.CartoonStock.com). There were four conditions, each 
containing four items. The baseline condition featured cartoons that had been 
modified to obscure the intended joke (e.g. the punchline had been removed). Test 
cartoons all contained jokes that could be understood through the picture and 
language presented either as a caption or within the picture itself.  
Test cartoons formed three conditions, which involved sarcasm, irony, or other 
kinds of simple humour such as ‘slapstick’ style comedy (comparison condition). 
There were four cartoons in each of these three conditions. The sarcastic condition 
included a cartoon of a man sitting at an office desk making paper aeroplanes, who 
was being asked by a man in a suit if he could “have a moment of his precious time”. 
In one cartoon from the ironic condition, the first picture featured a man saying he 
would like to come back (to earth) as a bird, and be free as a bird. The second picture 
was of a caged bird. The comparison cartoons did not involve sarcasm or irony, and 
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included ‘slapstick style’ comedy. Such cartoons contained a visual representation of 
an unfortunate incident, for example, one cartoon featured a lady whose knickers had 
fallen down.  
 The first part of the task required participants to rate each item based on how 
amusing they felt them to be, on a scale from 0 to 9. They were told to use a rating of 
0 if they could not see that any joke was present in the cartoon, and that higher scores 
should be given to more amusing jokes, so that a rating of 9 indicated the joke was 
hilarious. Participants were told that they should find some of the cartoons amusing, 
but there should be some stimuli that they did not find funny. Participants were also 
told that in order to rate a cartoon as amusing, they should have a particular reason or 
justification for why it was funny.  
The second part of the task involved a multiple choice test for the test stimuli. 
Participants were shown the test items again, and asked to select the main reason why 
they thought the cartoon was meant to be funny, or how it was designed to be funny, 
from four options. One option for each item represented the most appropriate answer, 
involving appreciation of the sarcasm, irony, or slapstick element of humour. A 
correct answer therefore constituted selection of this option. Another option provided 
a concrete literal interpretation of the cartoon elements. This option could be selected 
if a participant could not infer beyond the material presented. A further option simply 
concerned a possible contradiction to the cartoon picture or statement. This option 
comprised a plausible answer if participants understood the incongruity or 
surprise\unexpected element of humour, but incorrectly inferred the cartoonist’s 
intention. The last option was based on a random inference that could be made 
relating to a feature of the cartoon. All of the forced choice options contained 
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explanations that were contextually appropriate at face value. They were presented in 
a fixed pseudorandom order for each cartoon. 
 
THE ‘EYES TEST’ 
 
This task was taken from Baron-Cohen et al. (2001). It contained 36 
photographs of pairs of eyes. The expression associated with each set of eyes was 
considered to reflect a particular complex mental state. Each photograph was 
surrounded by four complex mental state terms that appeared above and below on the 
left and right sides of the photograph. A glossary of these terms was provided. 
Participants were given standardised instructions as laid out by Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001). They were told to look carefully at each picture and select the word they felt 
best expressed what the person in the picture was thinking or feeling. They were 
encouraged to refer to the glossary definitions if any of the words required 
clarification. Participants were given as long as they wanted to complete the test. 
Responses were scored according to Baron-Cohen et al. (2001). 
 
EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
FAS word fluency test 
 
As described in PD experiment 1 (section 2.2). 
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Black and White Stroop Test 
 
As described in PD experiment 3 (section 2.4). 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Patients and controls did not differ significantly for years of age, 
t(19.88)=1.82, p=.084, or education, t(21.59)=-0.88, p=.390. 
 
‘SOCIALLY COMPETITIVE EMOTIONS’ TASK 
 
One of the patients did not complete this task. Controls performed almost at 
ceiling (mean 0.05 errors, S.D. 0.31, median 0, range 0-1). Patients however, made a 
total of 12 errors (mean 0.8, S.D. 1.01, median 0, range 0-3). This difference was 
significant, MWU=91, p=.01. Seven of the patients made at least one error on this 
task. The majority of errors (8) were made in the condition where participants had to 
pick the face that Harry was gloating over. The two errors made by controls were also 
made during this condition. Patients also made a few errors over the other three 
conditions (same = 1, identify = 2, envy = 1) but the number of errors made in 
different conditions were considered too small for comparing conditions. Errors were 
made for both cartoon and photograph stimuli. 
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ULTIMATUM GAME 
 
Patients with TS made many more rejections (mean 1.56 overall, S.D. 1.21, 
median 2, range 0-3) than controls (mean 0.5, S.D. 0.61, median 0, range 0-2) during 
the UG, and this difference was significant, MWU=80.5, p=.007. As can be seen from 
Table 18, patients made more rejections than controls on each of the three trials. 
Eleven of the sixteen patients rejected the lowest offer of ₤1 from ₤10, and nine of the 
twenty controls rejected this amount. Ten patients rejected the offer of ₤2.50, while 
just one control did so. Four patients rejected the highest offer of ₤4, which was 
unanimously accepted across control group. 
 
Table 18. Rejections made by patients and controls during the Ultimatum Game 
 
 
Group: 
 
 
Measure: 
 
₤1 from ₤10 
 
₤2.50 from ₤10 
 
₤4 from ₤10 
 
 
Patients with 
TS 
(n=16) 
 
 
Total number of 
rejections 
 
% of group rejecting 
 
 
11 
 
 
69 
 
10 
 
 
63 
 
4 
 
 
25 
 
 
Controls 
(n=20) 
 
 
Total number of 
rejections 
 
% of group rejecting 
 
 
9 
 
 
45 
 
1 
 
 
5 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
HUMOUROUS CARTOONS 
One of the cartoons from the comparison condition (including ‘slapstick’ style 
comedy) was removed from analysis because half of the control group made an error 
on this item in the comprehension task.  
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Subjective amusement ratings 
 
Amusement ratings are shown below in Table 19. There was no difference in 
mean subjective amusement ratings given by patients and controls overall for test 
(humourous) cartoons, MWU=128, p=.308, and baseline cartoons (that were not 
humourous), MWU=116.5, p=.159. There was also no significant difference in ratings 
for cartoons featuring irony, MWU=148, p=.701, sarcasm, MWU=151.5, p=.786, or 
for the comparison cartoons, MWU=104.5, p=.076, when these were analysed 
separately. 
 
Table 19. Amusement ratings given by patients and controls in response to 
stimuli to baseline (non-humourous) and test (humourous) cartoons (rating scale 
from 0-9) 
 
 
Cartoon type: 
 
 
Baseline 
 
Sarcastic 
 
Ironic 
 
Comparison 
 
All test 
 
 
Patients 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Median 
 
Range 
 
 
1.41 
 
1.56 
 
0.75 
 
0-7 
 
4.45 
 
1.73 
 
4.88 
 
0-9 
 
5.20 
 
1.86 
 
5.38 
 
0-9 
 
5.04 
 
1.45 
 
5.33 
 
0-9 
 
4.89 
 
1.41 
 
5.14 
 
0-9 
 
 
Controls 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Median 
 
Range 
 
 
0.53 
 
0.51 
 
0.5 
 
0-4 
 
4.63 
 
1.67 
 
5 
 
0-9 
 
5.48 
 
1.50 
 
5.75 
 
0-9 
 
5.77 
 
1.50 
 
5.75 
 
1-9 
 
5.29 
 
1.51 
 
5.68 
 
0-9 
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Patients with TS (n=16) gave thirteen zero ratings in total in response to test 
jokes, while only four zero ratings were given by controls (n=20). Most zero ratings 
(7) were given by patients for cartoons in the sarcasm condition. This suggests that 
patients were more likely to fail to recognize when humour was present in a cartoon, 
especially if the cartoon involved sarcasm. However, patients were also more likely 
than controls to provide ratings of nine (maximum) when considering their 
amusement level. It was also noted that some of these high ratings were given by 
patients who provided zero ratings. 
 
Humourous cartoons comprehension task 
 
Error totals for each group in each condition are shown in Table 20. When 
asked to identify the main reason why the humourous (test) cartoons were meant to be 
funny, a significant difference was apparent between patients and controls, 
MWU=41.5, p<.001. Patients made a mean of 2.75 errors (S.D. 2.66, median 1, range 
0-9) on this task, in comparison to controls, who made mean 0.9 errors (S.D. 0.91, 
median 1, range 0-3).  
Errors for the three test conditions were analysed separately. Patients gave 
fourteen unconventional responses for sarcastic cartoons, while controls gave four. 
This difference was significant, MWU=74, p=.004. Patients also made more 
selections (11) of less appropriate explanations for cartoons involving irony than 
controls (2), MWU=92, p=.012. Patients made 9 unconventional selections in 
response to comparison cartoons in comparison to the control group, who made 2.  
This difference did not reach significance, MWU=93.5, p=.088. 
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Table 20. Unconventional responses given by patients and controls during the 
humourous cartoons comprehension task 
 
 
 
Unconventional 
response type 
 
Group 
 
Literal 
 
Random 
 
Contradiction 
 
 
 
 
Sarcasm 
 
Patients 
 
Controls 
 
 
8 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4 
 
1 
 
 
Irony 
 
Patients 
 
Controls 
 
 
9 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Comparison 
(inc. ‘slapstick’) 
 
Patients 
 
Controls 
 
 
4 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
3 
 
0 
 
 
Performance was also analysed according to the response selected. Over all 
conditions, patients with TS selected more erroneous literal interpretations, 
MWU=66, p<.001, than controls. Patients were also significantly more likely to select 
unconventional explanations based on a contradiction than controls, MWU=107.5, 
p=.015, which led to the opposite interpretation to that which should be inferred. 
However, patients were not significantly more likely than controls to select incorrect 
answers from the random category, MWU=127.5, p=.085, which contained 
explanations based on simple observations or inferences that were not prompted by 
the information provided in the cartoon. 
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THE ‘EYES TEST’ 
 
The patient group (n=16) made a total of 155 errors on this task (mean 9.68 
per patient, S.D. 4.64, median 10, range 2-21), while controls (n=20) made 117 errors 
(mean 5.85 per control, S.D. 2.96, median 5.5, range 0-14). A significant difference 
between the groups indicated that patients selected more unconventional answers 
when asked to describe the mental state of the person in the photograph, MWU=79.5, 
p=.01.  
 
EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
FAS test 
 
Patients with TS (mean 42.63, S.D. 14.72, median 41, range 24-70) tended to 
generate fewer words than controls (mean 49.95, S.D. 11.4, median 50, range 32-79) 
during the FAS test, although this difference was not significant, MWU=103.5, 
p=.072.  
 
Black and white Stroop 
 
Patients’ performance on the black and white Stroop yielded no evidence of 
inhibitory dysfunction. Patients (n=16) made 11 errors (mean 0.69, SD. 1.01, median 
0, range 0-3) on the inhibitory condition, while the control group (n=20) made a total 
of 20 (mean 1, S.D. 1.08, median 0.5, range 0-3), a difference that was not significant, 
MWU=127, p=.256. On average, each patient took an additional 6.18 (S.D. 2.93, 
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median 6.09, range 0.1-13.71) seconds to complete the inhibition condition in 
comparison to baseline, which was very similar to the extra 6.05 (S.D. 2.44, median 
5.83, range 1.93-10.84) seconds taken by each control, MWU=159, p=.975. 
 
COMORBIDITY ANALYSIS 
 
Because comorbid OCD could lead to impaired task performance, the four 
patients with this diagnosis were removed from the patient group and analysis 
compared the performance of the remaining patients with TS who had no OCD 
(n=11) to the control group. Analysis was re-conducted for overall error totals on 
tasks that elicited evidence of impairment in the patient group as a whole. All 
significant differences in errors on the ‘socially competitive emotions’ task, 
MWU=57, p=.011, rejections on the UG, MWU=59.5, p=.025, errors on the ‘Eyes 
Test’, MWU=43.5, p=.006, and errors on the humourous cartoons comprehension 
task, MWU=34.5, p=.001, were still evident. 
 
CORRELATIONS 
 
Correlations were conducted to investigate relationships in patients’ 
performance on executive measures, total errors made on the ‘socially competitive 
emotions task’, the ‘Eyes test’ and the humourous cartoons comprehension task, and 
total rejections made during the UG (Table 21). Significant correlations were found 
between the number of errors made on the humourous cartoon comprehension task 
and errors made on the ‘Eyes Test’ and the socially competitive emotions task. The 
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relationship between number of errors made on the humourous cartoons 
comprehension test and number of UG rejections approached significance. 
 
Table 21. Correlations for patient performance on executive measures, the 
socially competitive emotions task, the UG, the ‘Eyes Test’ and the humourous 
cartoons comprehension task 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  
FAS 
scores 
 
2. 
Stroop 
errors 
 
3.  
Stroop 
time 
difference 
 
4.  
UG 
rejections 
 
5. 
‘Socially 
competitive 
emotions’ task 
errors 
 
 
6. 
‘Eyes 
Test’ 
errors 
 
7. 
Humourous 
cartoons 
comprehen-
sion test 
errors 
 
 
1.  
 
 
X 
 
-.074 
.669 
 
-.090 
.600 
 
-.217 
.203 
 
-.105 
.550 
 
-.303 
.073 
 
-.262 
.123 
 
 
2.  
 
 
  
X 
 
.220 
.196 
 
-.025 
.884 
 
.162 
.352 
 
.005 
.977 
 
-.137 
.427 
 
3.  
 
   
X 
 
.096 
.576 
 
.136 
.471 
 
.002 
.990 
 
.069 
.689 
 
 
4.  
 
 
    
X 
 
 .243 
.168 
 
.229 
.178 
 
.315 
.061 
 
5.  
 
     
X 
 
.293 
.087 
 
.445 
.007** 
 
 
6.  
 
      
X 
 
.662 
<.001*** 
 
KEY:  
 
Upper value = Spearman’s r correlation coefficient, lower value = p-value 
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Patients with TS exhibited significant deficits on a range of tasks involving 
social and economic reasoning that are linked to VMPFC. These deficits were 
apparent despite little evidence of executive impairment on tasks assessing fluency or 
inhibition. Many studies have failed to reveal evidence of significant deficits in verbal 
fluency in TS (Channon, Pratt & Robertson, 2003; Goudriaan et al., 2006; Stebbins et 
al., 1995; Watkins et al., 2005). However, inhibitory impairments are commonly 
reported on the Hayling task (Channon et al., 2006; Crawford et al., 2005). Inhibitory 
deficits were also observed on the Hayling task during TS experiments 1 and 2. This 
implies that the Hayling task is more sensitive than the Stroop used in the present 
study. The higher sensitivity of the Hayling task may be related to its reliance on the 
functioning of the ACC (Nathaniel-James et al., 1997). The ACC forms part of a 
CSTCC described by Alexander et al. (1986). This circuit involves projections from 
ventromedial prefrontal regions (such as medial OFC) and from the amygdala to the 
ventral striatum. The deficits reported on the Hayling task (e.g. TS experiment 1) are 
therefore likely to have resulted from dysfunction within the same CSTCC linked to 
the impairments noted on the social and economic reasoning tasks administered in 
experiment 3.  
Patients made significantly more errors than controls on the ‘socially 
competitive emotions’ task, which required the participant to judge which face the 
central character felt the same as, identified with, was envious of, or was gloating 
over. Patients found the gloating condition most difficult, which required the selection 
of a face showing the opposite emotion to the central character. All participants were 
given definitions of the above terms, and understood the task before testing 
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commenced. Errors should therefore indicate that patients found it difficult to reason 
about interactions involving the contrasting emotions of two characters (i.e. when one 
character was happy and the other sad). Previous research (TS experiments 1 & 2) has 
highlighted difficulties on a faux pas task that also involved contrasts between the 
mental state of two characters (the protagonist’s lack of awareness of the effect of 
their offensive remark, and the protagonist’s feeling of offence). Perhaps this element 
of conflict is particularly related to the demonstrated role of VMPFC in understanding 
‘socially competitive emotions’ (e.g. Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). 
The conflicting interests of two people are also present in the UG, during 
which, patients with TS rejected significantly more offers overall in comparison to 
controls. Some patients even rejected the fairest split offered (four pounds out of ten) 
while no controls rejected this split. Koenigs and Tranel (2007) reported a similar 
increase in ‘irrational’ rejections during the UG by patients with VMPFC damage. 
They suggested that one explanation for this phenomenon is poor emotional 
regulation. It could be that patients with TS were less able than controls to suppress 
the emotional frustration felt in response to unfair UG offers, in order to reason in an 
economically advantageous manner. Reports of increased aggression (Cavanna et al., 
2009) and explosive disorder (Budman, Rockmore, Stokes & Sossin, 2003) in some 
patients with TS could also be related to emotional dysregulation. If increased 
rejections during the UG reflect poor impulse control, it may be expected that 
rejecting behaviour could be related to inhibitory performance on executive tasks. The 
present study provided no evidence for such a link. However, it can be speculated that 
patients with TS experience greater difficulty inhibiting behaviour that is associated 
with an affective component. This could explain why many studies involving standard 
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inhibitory tasks have failed to elicit evidence of impairment (e.g. Brand et al., 2002; 
Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999).  
Increased rejections on the UG are likely to implicate a role for the insula in 
the pathophysiology of TS. Rejection of unfair offers has been associated with 
increased activation of the anterior insula (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom & 
Cohen, 2003), a brain region associated with the experience of disgust (e.g. Wicker et 
al., 2003). Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure and Cohen (2006) also reported higher 
anterior insula activity for unfair offers that were rejected, but showed that when 
unfair offers were accepted, insula activity was always below that of the DLPFC. It 
may be that the neural basis of competition between higher level reasoning over 
emotional responses during the UG involves 
top-down control exerted by the DLPFC over limbic activity. Increased rejecting 
behaviour in TS could imply reduced DLPFC input during decision making. 
However, there is little evidence to support DLPFC dysfunction in TS, as studies 
provide limited evidence of deficits in executive abilities that are linked to this region. 
For example, experiment 1 showed that patients with TS do not exhibit deficits in 
WM, an executive function linked to the DLPFC (Curtis, Zald & Pardo, 2000). Future 
research could investigate the possibility of increased autonomic responsiveness 
during the UG in patients with TS, as neurologically intact participants exhibit higher 
skin conductance responses (SCRs) for unfair UG offers (van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, 
& Aleman, 2006).  
More reasoned rejections could be motivated by a desire to punish the 
proposer for being selfish or greedy, and deferring from the social norms of fairness 
and cooperation. In this way, a norm can substitute for mentalising (Pillutla & 
Murnighan, 1996). Rejections can therefore be seen as a form of altruistic 
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punishment, because the proposer is punished for their own bad behaviour at the 
responder’s own cost. Such behaviour encourages the maintenance of social norms, 
and though it does not benefit the individual at the time, altruistic punishment does 
benefit a social group or society in the long term and consequently leads to 
evolutionary adaptiveness (Fehr & Fischbacker, 2003). In support of the fact that 
altruistic punishment motivated some of the observed rejections, patients sometimes 
stated that the responder should have offered an even split because that was the fair or 
right thing to do. A strong desire to punish a proposer is associated with increased 
activity in the thalamus, VMPFC and OFC (de Quervain et al., 2004). Further 
research could investigate whether patients with TS do exhibit a strong desire for 
fairness and the upholding of social norms through the use of tasks involving moral 
judgement.  
ToM can play a role in decision making during the UG. Pillutla and 
Murnighan (1996) showed that participants in their study who knew that an offer was 
low and that the proposer knew it was low were far angrier than those who understood 
the proposer was unaware of the fairness of their offer. This anger resulted in a greater 
frequency of rejection and was more predictive of the likelihood of rejection than was 
the actual degree of unfairness alone. These authors suggest that a responder might 
reject a small offer because they imagine that the proposer believes them to be 
unworthy, gullible, or dim-witted. Children with autism, who exhibit deficits in the 
understanding of mental states, are more likely to accept small offers (Sally & Hill, 
2006), perhaps because they are less likely to make negative inferences about the 
proposer’s intentions. This pattern of increased acceptance of more unfair UG offers 
is the opposite of that exhibited by patients with TS in the present study, who rejected 
these offers more often than controls. However, changes in reasoning about mental 
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states could still have influenced patients’ performance. TS experiments 1 and 2 
highlighted errors on ToM tasks that were associated with a negative bias when 
drawing inferences about a story character’s communicative intentions, rather than a 
simple failure to consider mental states. Negative inferences about mental states were 
evident during the faux pas task used in experiments 1 and 2, when some patients 
thought that the protagonist’s offensive remark was deliberate. It may be that  in 
experiment 3, patients were more likely than controls to reject UG offers because they 
were more likely to make negative inferences about the mental state of the proposer.  
 Performance on the ‘Eyes Test’ provided further evidence for changes in 
social cognition in TS. This task included making judgments about epistemic mental 
states (e.g. interested), cognitive mental states (e.g. thoughtful) and affective mental 
states (e.g. worried) based on a photograph of a person’s eyes. Although one study 
reported intact performance on an earlier, less complex version of the task (Baron-
Cohen Joliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997), this experiment may be the first to test 
patients with TS using the more recent and arguably more sensitive version. Other 
patient groups including those with Huntington’s disease (Havet-Thomassin, Verny, 
Bonneau, Dubas & Le Gall, 2008) and traumatic brain injury involving prefrontal 
regions such as OFC (Havet-Thomassin et al., 2006) have been shown to perform 
poorly on this task. One brain region likely to be particularly crucial for performance 
is the amygdala, which is important for tasks involving eye gaze, facial expressions 
and reasoning about social emotions (Adolphs, 2002; Adolphs et al., 2002). There is 
some, albeit limited, evidence for amygdala involvement in TS (Ludolph et al., 2008; 
Peterson et al., 2007), so further research should investigate the possible involvement 
of this structure. The amygdala has inputs into the VMPFC (including medial OFC 
and ACC), and both the amygdala and VMPFC project to the ventral striatum 
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(Alexander et al., 1986). Possible amygdala dysfunction could therefore implicate the 
ACC CSTCC. 
ToM difficulties could be linked to the problems understanding jokes based on 
sarcasm exhibited by patients in experiment 3. Patients may have failed to infer the 
mental state of the relevant character in the cartoon or had difficulty inferring the 
cartoonist’s intentions. However, patients’ difficulties understanding ironic cartoons 
may not have resulted from poor consideration of mental states. Sarcasm and irony 
are indirect forms of communication. However, irony involves a kind of exaggerated 
appropriateness or connectivity and requires inferences to be drawn about what is 
commonly expected in contrast to what is depicted in the cartoon.  
Patients with TS performed comparatively well on cartoons that relied less on 
inferential reasoning. These included cartoons in the comparison condition featuring 
‘slapstick style’ humour that was conveyed through obvious visual elements. For 
example, patients performed almost at ceiling on one cartoon that showed a character 
with a custard pie splattered in their face. Children from the age of three who do not 
yet have a fully mature frontal cortex often find this kind of humour amusing 
(Schultz, 1972). It could be that patients made fewer errors on these items because 
these jokes could be understood on a more superficial level. Deficits in inferential 
reasoning were particularly apparent in patients’ tendency towards more obvious 
misinterpretations of the cartoons across all test conditions. Poor inferential reasoning 
led patients to select more unconventional explanations in the form of literal 
interpretations and ‘contradiction’ explanations that described the opposite to what 
should be inferred based on the information contained within the cartoon. Further 
research should investigate whether patients’ difficulties in understanding irony 
reflect more general underlying difficulties with inferential reasoning. 
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The patient group responded differently to controls when asked to explain why 
the cartoons were meant to be humourous. However, the overall mean ratings of 
subjective amusement for the patients on both baseline and test cartoons were not 
significantly different to those given by controls. This could suggest that while 
patients could detect an incongruity in the humourous cartoons (stage one of humour 
comprehension) and so appreciated a joke was present, they failed to accurately 
resolve this incongruity (stage two), so were drawn towards erroneous explanations 
for their subjective amusement. Studies implicate the right frontal regions in humour 
comprehension (Shammi & Stuss, 1999). Moran et al. (2004) specify that detecting 
incongruity in humour activates left inferior frontal and posterior middle temporal 
regions, while solving the incongruity involves activity in bilateral insula and 
amygdala.  
If deficits on the humourous cartoons comprehension task were related to 
dysfunction of pathways involving VMPFC in TS, it would also help to explain 
correlations in patients’ performance on the humour comprehension task and other 
measures. Performance on the ‘Eyes Test’ and ‘socially competitive emotions’ task 
may have been strongly related to performance on the humourous cartoon 
comprehension task because humour comprehension required ToM related inferences 
about the mental state or intention of the cartoonist and\or the characters featured in 
some of the cartoons. Performance on the UG is likely to have been less strongly 
related to performance on the humourous cartoons comprehension task because 
factors other than ToM (such as financial considerations) also contributed to 
performance.  
In conclusion, patients with TS exhibited significant deficits on a range of 
tasks linked to the VMPFC. These tasks involved ToM, humour and economic 
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decision making. The findings of this experiment provide evidence of changes in 
social and emotion related reasoning processes in TS, which are likely to be linked to 
dysfunction within frontostriatal pathways involving VMPFC and the amygdala. 
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3.5: Social Cognition in TS: Discussion 
 
Patients with TS exhibited changes in reasoning processes leading to deficits 
on a range of social cognitive tasks. These deficits were apparent despite limited 
evidence of executive dysfunction. Although patients exhibited evidence of inhibitory 
impairment on the Hayling task (experiments 1 and 2), significant deficits were not 
evident on the Stroop (experiments 2 and 3) or on verbal fluency or WM measures 
(experiment 1). Furthermore, there was no evidence that difficulties with inhibition 
were linked to the changes in performance exhibited by patients on tasks involving 
social cognition.  
Patients with TS were impaired on tasks involving ToM, such as the faux pas 
task, ‘socially competitive emotions’ test, and the ‘Eyes Test’. Deficits that could at 
least partly depend on ToM were also apparent on reasoning tasks that involved the 
understanding of non-literal language. However, the difficulties exhibited by patients 
on one of these tasks (that featured humourous cartoons involving irony) indicated 
deficits in inferential reasoning that could be less closely related to ToM. Reasoning 
deficits were also apparent on an economic decision making task. While changes to 
ToM may have influenced patients’ unconventional behaviour during this task, further 
research is necessary to rule out the contribution other factors, such as alterations in 
emotional regulation. 
The changes in reasoning exhibited by patients with TS on these tasks can be 
classified into two categories. The first category includes instances when patients 
failed to draw inferences about mental states. The second category includes errors that 
were not characterised by a failure to infer mental states, but rather unconventional 
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interpretations of social interactions that could be linked to increased sensitivity to 
negative affect. 
The first category of errors was associated with a superficial level of reasoning 
and an acceptance of information at face value resulting in a ‘literal bias’. This kind of 
error would account for patients’ difficulties in inferring mental states on many of the 
tasks administered, including failure to recognise faux pas and poor understanding of 
non-literal language. Patients’ errors in reasoning beyond the information initially 
available appeared similar to errors that would be seen as a result of inhibitory 
dysfunction, which prevented the consideration of an alternative perspective. Deficits 
of this nature could reflect a reduction in cognitive resources, which may lead to poor 
inferential reasoning in general, leading to difficulties on tasks not so closely linked to 
ToM (e.g. in reasoning about irony). Inferential reasoning is likely to rely heavily on 
cognitive resources such as executive functions. Although these experiments have 
shown that patients with TS only exhibit mild inhibitory dysfunction, patients could 
have a tendency to adopt reasoning strategies that are less cognitively demanding due 
to the effort involved in tic suppression.  
The second category of errors made by patients on these tasks was associated 
with a tendency towards unconventional, negative interpretations of social 
interactions, and perhaps increased sensitivity to negative emotion. Errors that reflect 
this difference in reasoning include errors on the faux pas task, where patients 
signalled faux pas had occurred when it had not, or inferred that the protagonist’s 
offensive remark was deliberate. This kind of reasoning may also have contributed to 
increased rejections during the UG, due to attributions of negative intention to the 
proposer and overwhelming feelings of offense or anger on the part of the patient 
acting as responder. It could be that patients with TS exhibit increased emotional 
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reactivity which is most evident on tasks that highlight conflict within social 
interaction, such as situations where one person may be negatively affected by 
another person’s actions. These kind of situations were evident during the faux pas 
task (where the protagonist’s remark could offend another person), the ‘socially 
competitive emotions’ task (where the gloating of a central character may lead to 
upset for the subject of the gloating) and the UG (where the proposer would profit 
more when a responder accepted a lower offer despite feelings of unfairness). 
Increased emotional reactivity in response to stimuli associated with negative emotion 
could lead to reduced ‘logical’ control over decision making, with significant 
implications for patients’ social and emotional functioning.  
Although patients with TS exhibit differences on tasks involving social 
cognition, many of these changes do not reflect a simple failure to reason about 
mental states. Differences are apparent in the way that patients reason about social 
interaction and make attributions about the motives and intentions behind social 
behaviour. Although comorbid OCD was not related to the observed deficits, it would 
be useful to investigate whether the two different kinds of changes in reasoning 
outlined above could be exhibited by different subgroups of patients (e.g. patients 
with or without NOSIS). Further research should investigate larger samples of 
patients to identify whether any relationship between these two differences in 
reasoning style may be associated with other disease characteristics. 
These experiments show that patients with TS exhibit deficits on a range of 
tasks linked to VMPFC, implicating a role for frontostriatal circuitry involving this 
region in TS. This ACC CSTCC (as described by Alexander et al., 1986) originates 
from the medial OFC (VMPFC) and amygdala, which project to the ventral striatum. 
VMPFC appears to be important for both reasoning tasks that involve empathy 
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(Young & Koenigs, 2007) and decision making that involves an affective component 
(Tranel, Bechara & Denberg, 2002). The medial OFC in particular has been linked to 
ToM abilities based on abstract perspective taking (Hynes et al., 2006). However, the 
lateral OFC, which forms part of a separate CSTCC, is involved in processing affect 
related negative feedback. The amount of activity in lateral OFC correlates with 
amount of money just lost during a gambling game (O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, 
Hornak & Andrews, 2001) which is likely to be related to the finding that this region 
is specifically active during the effortful control of negative emotions (Ochsner, 
Bunge, Gross & Gabrieli, 2002). 
The pattern of impairment demonstrated by patients with TS can also be 
discussed in terms of ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ aspects of ToM and executive functioning. 
Although the use of these terms is controversial they could help highlight a useful 
distinction in the performance of patients with TS. ‘Hot’ aspects of these abilities 
relate to affect, whereas ‘cool’ aspects are more abstract (Zelazo et al., 2005). The 
majority of difficulties exhibited by patients with TS involved aspects of ‘hot’ ToM. 
Patients with TS exhibited less difficulty on tasks involving purely ‘cool’ ToM (the 
false belief vignette task used in experiment 1), although ‘cool’ ToM was more 
impaired when the task also included elements of ‘hot’ ToM (e.g. the faux pas task: 
experiment 1). Patients also exhibited deficits on the UG, which involves affect 
related decision making, so may involve ‘hot’ aspects of executive functioning. 
Patients with TS did not exhibit deficits on certain executive tasks that involved ‘cool’ 
executive functions (the FAS test, DOT-A test).  One possible discrepancy is that 
patients exhibited deficits on the Hayling task which may involve ‘cool’ executive 
functioning. However, this task activates the ACC (Nathaniel-James et al, 1997) 
which is part of the same CSTCC circuit (Alexander et al., 1986) as medial OFC. 
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Medial OFC is implicated in ‘hot’ ToM and executive functions, while ‘cool’ ToM 
and executive functions (used for the FAS test and DOT-A) are linked to the DLPFC 
(Zelazo et al., 2005). In summary, patients with TS are more likely to exhibit deficits 
on tasks involving ‘hot’ aspects of ToM or executive functioning, due to greater 
involvement of the ACC CSTCC in TS than the DLPFC CSTCC. 
Social Cognition in Huntington’s Disease 
CHAPTER 4. SOCIAL COGNITION IN HUNTINGTON’S 
DISEASE 
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4.1: HD Experiment 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
HD is an inherited neurodegenerative disorder associated with a selective 
pattern of degeneration that begins in the CN, and progresses from dorsal to ventral 
regions of the striatum. The characteristic involuntary choreiform movements of HD 
occur as a result of frontostriatal dysfunction. HD is often accompanied by obsessive 
compulsive or psychotic behaviour and dementia in later stages of the disease 
(Lauterbach et al., 1998). Executive dysfunction is common, and patients exhibit 
deficits in memory, attention, cognitive flexibility, fluency, inhibition and decision 
making (Campbell, Stout & Finn, 2004; Butters et al., 1986; Snowden et al., 2008). 
These deficits implicate dysfunction within frontostriatal pathways involving ACC 
and DLPFC (Aleman & van’t Wout, 2008; Peterson et al., 1999; Vanderhasselt et al., 
2006a,b).  
Patients can also show increased irritability and aggression (Calder et al., 
2004) and reduced empathy for others (Snowden et al., 2003). These changes could 
contribute to the breakdown of interpersonal relationships (Snowden et al., 2003), and 
increases in criminal behaviour. Jensen, Fenger, Bolwig and Sorensen (1998) reported 
that patients with HD were almost three times as likely as controls to be listed on the 
Danish National Central Criminal Register for crimes such as drink driving, assault, 
molestation and robbery. A lack of empathy for others could contribute to such 
instances of poor social conduct. Changes in emotional and social behaviour in HD 
are likely to reflect dysfunction of frontostriatal pathways involving the OFC, as 
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damage to this region can lead to loss of empathy and sociopathic behaviour (Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000).  
Some studies have also indicated that HD can be associated with deficits in 
ToM. Patients have been found to display abnormal interpretations of real-life social 
situations (Naarding, Kremer & Titman, 2001) and Snowden et al. (2003) showed that 
patients made faulty inferences in response to tasks involving social interactions. 
Patients can also exhibit deficits on tasks of social cognition that involve faux pas, 
and judging mental states based on photographs of people’s eyes on the ‘Eyes Test’ 
(Havet-Thomassin et al., 2008). Similar tasks elicit impairment in patients with 
damage to VMPFC (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003) and the amygdala (Stone et al., 
2003), respectively. These findings could indicate dysfunction within the CSTCC 
involving the ventral striatum (described by Alexander et al., 1986) in HD.  
There is evidence that the understanding of emotions in others appears to be 
impaired in HD, as many studies have revealed deficits in the recognition of 
emotional facial expressions. While patients could exhibit significant difficulty with a 
range of negative emotions (e.g. Henley et al., 2008), some authors have provided 
evidence for greater deficits in the recognition of disgust. Sprengelmeyer et al. (1997) 
found mild impairments in the recognition of a number of emotional expressions in 
HD, but patients exhibited a more severe deficit for disgusted faces. Gray, Young, 
Barker, Curtis & Gibson (1997) found that this specific deficit extended to huntingtin 
gene carriers. Further support was provided by Wang, Hoosain, Yang, Meng & Wang 
(2003), who reported a similar ‘differentially severe impairment’ for disgust 
expressions in both Chinese patients with HD and patients with Wilson’s disease 
(another disorder associated with BG dysfunction). However, other reports have 
indicated that patients sometimes exhibit most impairment in the recognition of facial 
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expressions of fear (Milders, Crawford, Lamb & Simpson, 2003) or anger (Henley et 
al., 2008; Snowden et al., 2008). The expression recognition deficits exhibited by 
gene carriers can also extend to anger, fear and sadness (Johnson et al., 2007).  
It is possible that patients with HD exhibit a general impairment in facial 
emotion recognition and greater impairments are found for certain emotions because 
they are more difficult to recognize. This suggestion is supported by evidence of mild 
deficits on more general face perception measures in HD (e.g. Wang et al., 2003). 
However, another study that used a wide range of tasks reported no effect of item 
difficulty (Snowden et al., 2008).  
The inconsistency of impairments reported across studies could reflect the 
involvement of different subsets of patients, with greater degeneration in neural 
substrates involved in recognising particular negative emotions. There is evidence that 
the ventral striatum could play a central role in the recognition of angry faces (Calder, 
et al., 2004). The amygdala however, is activated during the recognition of fearful 
expressions (Adolphs et al., 2002). Selective deficits with disgust in HD patients and 
gene carriers have been linked to a reduced response in left dorsal anterior insula 
(Hennenlotter et al., 2004). However, Henley et al. (2008) found that impaired 
recognition of angry, disgusted, surprised and fearful faces were all associated with 
striatal volume loss. These authors also reported that deficits in the recognition of 
fear, but not disgust, were also related to right insula degeneration. 
Reports indicate that brain regions associated with recognizing a particular 
emotion in another are likely to be involved in the direct experience of that emotion 
(Adolphs, 2002). Despite these findings, research investigating patients’ own 
emotional responses to emotion-provoking stimuli is limited in HD. One study 
(Snowden et al., 2008) showed that deficits in the recognition of emotional facial 
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expressions in HD could indeed be associated with changes in emotional responses to 
affect provoking stimuli. In addition to poor recognition of disgust and other negative 
emotions from face and voice, HD patients exhibited a reduced disgust response to 
written scenarios that elicited this emotion in control participants. A few other studies 
have indicated disgust deficits in HD can also be observed in response to pictures, 
olfactory and gustatory stimuli (Hayes et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2005). This 
experiment aimed to extend research in this area, by assessing HD patients’ subjective 
emotional responses to stimuli selected to elicit emotions including core and moral 
disgust. 
Core disgust may be best defined through its common elicitors, which include 
body products, death and corpses, threat of contamination (or infection) and violation 
of the body exterior (Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 2000). Core disgust can serve an 
adaptive function, by helping one to avoid contact with potentially harmful stimuli. 
Disgust can also be elicited by some moral offences (Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 
2000).  It may be speculated that moral disgust may serve a more social function, 
through discouraging uncivilized behaviour, and so be more vulnerable to individual 
differences and cultural values. Perhaps these differences explain why core and moral 
disgust have been shown to activate different neural substrates. Moll et al. (2002) 
investigated the brain activity of healthy adults in response to unpleasant pictures 
linked to core disgust (e.g. dirty toilet, mangled face) and emotionally charged moral 
pictures (e.g. war, abandoned children). The amygdala, thalamus and upper midbrain 
were active when viewing both sets of images. However, stimuli likely to be most 
closely associated with core disgust elicited specific activity in right middle frontal 
gyrus and right anterior insula, while moral stimuli led to additional increased 
activation in the OFC, medial prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus.  
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The brain regions that Moll et al. (2002) showed were more activated in 
response to moral stimuli (e.g. OFC) have been linked to ToM (Lough et al., 2006; 
Moriguchi, Ohnishi, Mori, Matsuda & Komaki, 2007) which as noted earlier, could 
be compromised in HD (see Havet-Thomassin et al., 2008; Snowden et al., 2003). 
Moral disgust may occur in association with empathy for victims of an act judged to 
be immoral, so ToM deficits in HD could impair feelings of moral disgust through 
poor consideration of mental states. 
This experiment involved the assessment of subjective emotional responses in 
HD using pictures from the International Affective Picture System database (IAPS: 
Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1995) and written scenarios. Participants provided fear, 
happiness, sadness, surprise, anger and disgust ratings in response to four sets of 
pictures and four sets of scenarios selected to primarily elicit either happiness, fear, 
core disgust or moral disgust. It was expected that patients would respond normally to 
the stimuli selected to elicit happiness, but would exhibit deficits in response to fear 
and core disgust stimuli due to reports of poor recognition of these emotions in facial 
expressions in HD (e.g. Henley et al., 2008). It was also expected that patients could 
differ in their response to moral disgust items in light of the evidence of possible ToM 
impairment in HD. Executive tasks were included to determine whether any 
differences in performance on the emotive stimuli tasks were associated with 
executive dysfunction. 
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METHOD 
 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thirteen outpatients (8 males) with HD were recruited from the Queen 
Elizabeth Psychiatric Hospital, Birmingham. They were selected by their senior 
clinical consultant who ensured participants exhibited no frank signs of dementia nor 
suffered from overt cognitive difficulties. Patients mean age was 53.07 years (S.D. 
10.3, range 37-73) and mean years of education was 13.31 (S.D. 2.39, range 11-17) 
years. Twelve neurologically intact controls (6 males) were also enrolled. Their mean 
age was 53.08 (S.D. 12.1, range 30-71) years and mean years of education was 14.00 
(S.D. 2.22, range 11-16) years. Two patients were taking Risperidone, one 
Carbermazepine and one Citalopram. No patients were formally diagnosed with OCD 
but three patients self-reported sub-threshold symptoms. One patient did not complete 
the emotive scenarios task. 
 
PROCEDURE 
 
Patients were approached through their consultant, and received information 
leaflets about the study before they decided whether to take part. Participants were 
advised that they may find some of the stimuli they would see and read about during 
the study emotionally striking, and that the emotional responses they had may at times 
be negative. All participants gave informed consent and were fully debriefed after 
participation.  
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The five tasks were ordered so that the three executive tasks were 
administered separately and the emotive stimuli tasks were completed independently 
in between. Each executive task was featured in the first, third and fifth position 
equally often and the emotive stimuli tasks came in the second and fourth position 
equally often, resulting in 12 different task orders.  
 
EMOTIVE STIMULI TASKS 
 
The emotional categorization of the stimuli (fear, happiness, core disgust and 
moral disgust) was validated using the emotional ratings provided by control 
participants (see Tables 22 and 23 in the results section). Moral disgust stimuli were 
carefully selected so that they did not directly or explicitly feature stimuli that were 
likely to elicit core disgust, such as injury or mutilation.  
 
Emotive Pictures 
 
These twenty pictures were taken from the IAPS database (Lang, Bradley & 
Cuthbert, 1995). There were four sets of five, each set selected to elicit predominantly 
emotional responses of happiness, fear, core disgust or moral disgust. The pictures 
intended to elicit fear (numbers 1525, 1932, 6300, 8179, 8485) featured threatening 
stimuli such as dangerous animals and fire. The pictures selected for the happiness 
category (numbers 2303, 2345, 2530, 4626, 8380) included scenes of a couple on 
their wedding day and some Olympic athletes celebrating winning medals. The 
pictures chosen for core disgust (numbers 1111, 3250, 7380, 9042, 9300) included a 
dirty toilet and an open chest cavity. Moral disgust stimuli (numbers 2710, 2745.2, 
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2751, 3500, 6312) included an image of a drug addict and a shoplifter in action. The 
pictures in this category did not feature stimuli overtly associated with core disgust, 
such as blood as a result of violence. 
Participants were instructed to look at each picture and rate their emotional 
response to the events described in terms of six basic emotions; anger, sadness, 
surprise, fear, happiness and disgust. Ratings were on a scale of 0-9, where a score of 
0 indicated the participant felt the emotion was not relevant to their response to the 
vignette and a score of 9 indicated that emotion was completely relevant.  
 
 
Emotive Scenarios 
 
This task featured twenty short vignettes. Each vignette consisted of two 
sentences that were intended to elicit an emotional response. There were five 
scenarios designed to predominantly elicit each of the following four emotions; 
happiness, fear, core disgust and moral disgust. The fear, happiness and core disgust 
scenarios were written so that the reader was the subject of the experience. The 
scenarios designed to elicit fear responses described threatening experiences such as 
hearing an intruder while home alone and coming face to face with a ferocious dog. 
The vignettes involving situations that should result in happiness included 
experiencing a lottery win and getting a short story published. Core disgust scenarios 
included descriptions of finding a slug in a salad while eating at a café and being 
vomited on by a drunk. For the moral disgust scenarios, the reader was a witness to 
the experience of another. This was done for three reasons. Firstly, had the participant 
been the subject of vignettes featuring violence or assault, fear was likely to have 
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been the primary emotion elicited. Secondly, moral disgust stimuli included examples 
of shop-lifting and drug taking, and it was felt that participants could find it difficult 
to think about themselves in these situations. Thirdly, the use of other people as 
victims in some stimuli allowed for the potential influence of empathy on emotional 
ratings, which may comprise an important aspect of reasoning about moral disgust 
stimuli. Moral disgust scenarios included witnessing violence against a frail old 
woman and being aware of a toddler being left home alone while his father went out 
drinking. These vignettes were adapted from scenarios used in an imaging study 
carried out by Moll et al. (2007). 
Participants were told to read each vignette and think about their emotional 
response to it. They received the same instructions and used exactly the same rating 
system and scale as described above for the emotive pictures. 
 
EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
FAS test 
 
As described in PD experiment 1(section 2.2). 
 
Digit Ordering Test-Adapted (Werheid et al, 2002; Cooper et al, 1991) 
 
As described in PD experiment 2 (section 2.3). 
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Black and White Stroop Task 
 
As described in PD experiment 3 (section 2.4). 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
One patient did not complete the emotive scenarios task, so comparisons 
involving this task were between the remaining twelve patients and twelve controls. 
There was no significant difference between patients and controls for age, t(23)=-
0.001, p=.999, or education, t(23)=-0.75, p=.462. 
 
EMOTIVE STIMULI TASKS 
 
Emotive pictures 
 
Table 22 shows the mean and standard deviation of the six emotions (anger, 
sadness, surprise, fear, happiness and disgust) rated by patients and controls for 
stimuli within each emotional category (fear, happiness, core disgust and moral 
disgust). Although differences were not tested statistically (due to concerns about 
multiple comparisons), the target emotion for each of the four categories (fear, 
happiness, core disgust, moral disgust) was the emotion given the highest mean rating 
by control participants. Patients with HD showed more variation in emotional ratings 
for fear, core disgust and moral disgust stimuli than the control group, as reflected in 
higher standard deviations. Ratings of zero were most commonly given by patients 
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when rating fear in response to pictures and stimuli selected to elicit this emotion, and 
such ratings were given by the majority of patients. Only one zero rating for fear in 
response to fear stimuli was provided by the control group, while 29 ratings of zero 
were provided by patients. 
 
Table 22. Mean and standard deviation of emotional ratings given by patients 
and controls in response to pictures within the four emotional categories 
 
 
Category (pictures 
chosen to elicit): 
 
Fear 
 
Happiness 
 
Core disgust 
 
Moral disgust 
 
 
 P C P C P C P C 
 
 
Happiness 
 
1.49 
(1.11) 
 
 
0.35 
(0.53)
 
8.62 
(0.88)
 
8.17 
(1.14)
 
0.51 
(0.80)
 
0.05 
(1.73) 
 
0.14 
(0.24) 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
 
Sadness 
 
1.00 
(1.57) 
 
 
1.45 
(1.13)
 
0.32 
(0.64)
 
0.12 
(0.28)
 
1.62 
(2.25)
 
1.15 
(0.96) 
 
3.69 
(2.67) 
 
4.67 
(2.54) 
 
 
Surprise 
 
4.26 
(2.71) 
 
 
4.08 
(3.00)
 
1.43 
(2.35)
 
0.50 
(1.01)
 
4.18 
(2.96)
 
4.55 
(2.78) 
 
3.95 
(2.92) 
 
3.72 
(2.41) 
 
 
Fear 
 
5.51 
(3.06) 
 
 
8.00 
(0.84)
 
0.46 
(0.89)
 
0.13 
(0.46)
 
4.85 
(5.67)
 
2.98 
(1.53) 
 
3.95 
(2.73) 
 
3.77 
(1.72) 
 
 
Disgust 
 
2.69 
(2.32) 
 
 
1.62 
(1.10)
 
0.28 
(0.83)
 
0.00 
(0.00)
 
5.51 
(2.44)
 
6.52 
(1.13) 
 
6.11 
(2.31) 
 
7.07 
(1.42)
 
 
Anger 
 
3.77 
(2.94) 
 
 
1.00 
(1.14)
 
0.26 
(0.68)
 
0.00 
(0.00)
 
2.95 
(3.54)
 
1.48 
(1.16) 
 
5.48 
(2.71) 
 
5.83 
(1.73) 
 
 
KEY:  
Upper value = mean, lower value = S.D. 
Target emotions for each category are shown in bold 
P = patients 
C = controls 
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Split plot ANOVAs were conducted for each of the four emotional categories 
that contained pictures selected to elicit fear, happiness, core disgust and moral 
disgust. Group was the between participants variable and emotion was the within 
participants variable. Emotion had six levels. These were the six emotions that 
participants gave ratings for in response to each picture (anger, sadness, surprise, fear, 
happiness, disgust). Analysis involved Greenhouse-Geiser correction to control for 
the possibility of breaking the assumption of sphericity.  
For pictures chosen to elicit fear, there was a main effect of emotion, F(3.52, 
23)=40.65, p<.001, with fear being the emotion rated most highly on average by both 
patients and controls. There was no main effect of group on emotional ratings, F(1, 
23)=0.80, p=.381, but there was a significant interaction, F(3.52, 23)=6.64, p<.001, 
suggesting that emotional ratings differed according to group in relation to certain 
target emotions. Pairwise comparisons indicated that patients and controls differed in 
their ratings for fear and anger. Patients’ fear ratings were significantly lower for fear 
pictures than controls’, t(13.95=-2.82, p=.014, while their anger ratings were 
significantly higher than controls’, t(15.78)=3.15, p=.006. No other comparisons were 
significant. 
For pictures selected to elicit happiness, there was a significant effect of 
emotion, F(1.49, 23)=324.00, p<.001. Overall, happiness ratings were the highest 
ratings given by patients and controls. There was no significant effect of group, F(1, 
23)=2.65, p=.117, or interaction, F(1.49, 23)=0.68, p=.472. 
For pictures chosen to elicit core disgust, there was a significant main effect of 
emotion, F(2.91, 23)=25.18, p<.001. Overall, disgust was the emotion rated most 
highly by both patients and controls. There was no significant main effect of group, 
F(1, 23)=0.47, p=.498, or interaction, F(2.91, 23)=1.64, p=.191. 
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For pictures selected to elicit moral disgust, there was a significant main effect 
of emotion, F(3.49, 23)=59.42, p<.001. Disgust was the emotion rated most highly 
overall by both patients and controls, although mean ratings for anger were also high 
for both groups. There was no significant effect of group, F(1, 23)=0.08, p=.78, or 
interaction, F(3.49, 23)=0.59, p=.649. 
 
Emotive scenarios 
 
Table 23 shows the mean and standard deviation of the six emotions (anger, 
sadness, surprise, fear, happiness and disgust) rated by patients and controls for 
stimuli within each emotional category (fear, happiness, core disgust, moral disgust).  
Although differences were not tested statistically, the target emotion for 
stimuli selected to elicit fear, happiness and core disgust was the emotion given the 
highest mean rating by control participants. For moral disgust scenarios, the emotion 
rated most highly on average by patients and controls was anger, but this value was 
only very slightly higher than the mean rating for the target emotion disgust. 
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Table 23. Mean and standard deviation of emotional ratings given by patients 
and controls in response to scenarios within the four emotional categories 
 
 
Category 
(scenarios chosen 
to elicit): 
 
Fear 
 
Happiness 
 
Core disgust 
 
Moral disgust 
 
 
 P C P C P C P C 
 
 
Happiness 
 
0.12 
(0.35) 
 
 
0.00 
(0.00)
 
8.25 
(1.25)
 
8.60 
(0.52)
 
0.05 
(0.17)
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
 
Sadness 
 
1.47 
(2.27) 
 
 
1.17 
(1.56)
 
0.10 
(0.35)
 
0.05 
(0.17)
 
1.93 
(2.40)
 
1.67 
(2.27) 
 
2.85 
(2.90) 
 
4.80 
(2.55) 
 
 
Surprise 
 
4.75 
(2.43) 
 
 
6.45 
(2.40)
 
4.45 
(2.37)
 
6.72 
(1.33)
 
4.03 
(2.94)
 
4.38 
(2.84) 
 
3.75 
(2.77) 
 
4.63 
(2.69) 
 
 
Fear 
 
6.50 
(2.70) 
 
 
8.57 
(0.64)
 
1.17 
(0.42)
 
0.70 
(1.71)
 
2.33 
(2.98)
 
1.22 
(1.42) 
 
3.12 
(3.87) 
 
3.00 
(2.29) 
 
 
Disgust 
 
2.75 
(3.17) 
 
 
1.13 
(1.65)
 
0.07 
(0.23)
 
0.00 
(0.00)
 
6.80 
(2.12)
 
7.63 
(1.05) 
 
6.42 
(2.15) 
 
7.87 
(1.04)
 
 
Anger 
 
4.43 
(3.41) 
 
 
2.25 
(2.33)
 
0.05 
(0.17)
 
0.08 
(0.29)
 
5.00 
(2.27)
 
4.38 
(2.05) 
 
7.23 
(2.00) 
 
7.95 
(1.23) 
 
 
KEY:  
Upper value = mean, lower value = S.D. 
Target emotions for each category are shown in bold 
P = patients 
C = controls 
 
For scenarios selected to elicit fear, there was a significant main effect of 
emotion, F(3.03, 22)=64.08, p<.001. Fear was the emotion rated highest on average, 
by both patients and controls. There was not a significant main effect of group, 
F(1,22)=0.02, p=.904, but there was a significant interaction, F(3.03, 22)=5.93, 
p=.001. Pair-wise comparisons indicated that patients’ ratings for fear were 
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significantly lower than controls’, t(12.22)=-2.58, p=.024. No other comparisons were 
significant. 
For scenarios chosen to elicit happiness, there was a significant main effect of 
emotion, F(2.17, 22)=330.27, p<.001. Mean ratings for happiness were highest for 
both groups. A significant effect of group was evident, F(1, 22)=6.34, p=.020, 
showing that controls gave higher ratings overall. A significant interaction, F(2.174, 
22)=4.93, p=.010 was also evident. Pair-wise comparisons indicated a significant 
difference for surprise ratings, t(22)=-2.89, p=.009. Patients gave lower surprise 
ratings (mean 4.45) in comparison to controls (mean 6.72). No other comparisons 
were significant. 
For scenarios selected to elicit core disgust, there was a significant main effect 
of emotion, F(3.23, 22)=56.44, p<.001. Disgust was the emotion rated most highly by 
both patients and controls. There was no significant main effect of group, F(1, 
22)=0.06, p=.809 and no significant interaction, F(3.23, 22)=1.01, p=.397. 
For scenarios selected to elicit moral disgust, there was a significant main 
effect of emotion, F(3.50, 22)=49.15, p<.001. The highest ratings given by patients 
and controls were for anger, and mean disgust ratings were next highest (Table 22). 
This finding indicates that the stimuli associated with moral disgust are likely to elicit 
other strong negative emotions, as also indicated by mean emotional ratings given by 
controls for moral disgust pictures. There was no significant main effect of group, 
F(1, 22)=2.16, p=.155 or interaction, F(3.50, 22)=0.96, p=.425. 
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EXECUTIVE TASKS 
 
FAS test 
 
Patients exhibited a highly significant deficit in verbal fluency, MWU=15.5, 
p=.001, generating just 25.31 words on average (S.D.16.47, median 18, range 10-66) 
over the FAS test, in comparison to controls’ mean of 55.33 words (S.D. 18.72, 
median 51, range 31-92). 
 
DOT-A 
 
Performance on the DOT-A indicated profound impairments in WM in the 
patient group, MWU=1.5, p<.001. Patients exhibited a mean manipulation span of 
just 4.04 digits (S.D. 0.75, median 4, range 3.5-6) in comparison to controls, who 
demonstrated intact recall for mean 6.67 digits (S.D. 0.72, median 6.5, range 5.5-8). 
 
Black and white Stroop test 
 
Patients with HD made significantly more errors than controls on the black 
and white Stroop test, MWU=38.5, p=.020. On average, patients made 3.15 (S.D. 
3.08, median 2, range 0-9) errors on the inhibition condition of the Stroop, in 
comparison to controls’ 0.67 (S.D. 0.23, median 0, range 0-3) errors. However, 
patients did not show a significantly greater difference in time taken to complete the 
inhibition condition to the baseline condition, when compared to controls, MWU=49, 
p=.115. Patients took a mean extra 15.70 (S.D. 16.82, median 10.97, range 3.31-55.6) 
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seconds to complete the inhibition condition in comparison to baseline, in comparison 
to mean extra 7.42 (S.D. 3.28, median 7.49, range 2.34-13.1) seconds for controls. 
 
CORRELATIONS 
 
Correlational analysis examined relationships between patients’ target emotion 
ratings and executive performance (Table 24). Relationships were found between 
executive measures and target emotional ratings. The number of errors made on the 
Stroop was negatively related to FAS and DOT-A scores. This suggests that patients 
who performed poorly on the Stroop performed poorly on other executive measures, 
as would be expected. Happiness ratings on happy scenarios were negatively 
correlated with FAS scores, suggesting that patients who were less cognitively intact 
exhibited greater happiness in response to happy scenarios. Fear ratings on fear 
scenarios were positively related to FAS scores and negatively related to errors made 
on the Stroop. This suggests that patients who performed more poorly on the 
executive tests linked to the DLPFC and ACC gave lower fear ratings in response to 
fear stimuli. However, similar relationships were not apparent between executive 
performance and emotional ratings for other emotion stimuli, including fear pictures.  
There were also correlations between target emotional ratings for stimuli 
selected to elicit different target emotions. There was a positive relationship between 
disgust ratings in response to moral disgust scenarios and fear ratings for fear 
scenarios. This is likely to indicate that patients who felt more fear in response to fear 
scenarios also felt more disgust in response to moral disgust scenarios. Disgust ratings 
for core disgust pictures were positively related to disgust ratings for moral disgust 
scenarios, perhaps indicating that disgust felt in response to moral stimuli could 
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indeed be related to core disgust. Happiness ratings on happy scenarios were 
positively related to fear ratings on fear scenarios. There is no obvious interpretation 
for this unexpected correlation.  
The correlations reported in this results section are not discussed further. They 
were intended to be exploratory, but are often not easy to interpret.  
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Table 24. Correlations between patients’ performance on executive tasks and 
target emotional ratings for picture and scenarios selected to elicit fear, 
happiness, core disgust and moral disgust  
 
  
1. 
FAS 
 
2. 
DOT-
A 
 
 
3. 
Stroop 
errors 
 
4. 
Stroop 
times 
 
5. 
Fear 
P 
 
6. 
Fear S 
 
 
7. 
Happy 
P 
 
 
8. 
Happy 
S 
 
 
9. 
Core 
disgust 
P 
 
10. 
Core 
disgust 
S 
 
11. 
Moral 
disgust 
P 
 
 
12. 
Moral 
disgust 
S 
 
1. 
 
 
X 
 
.696 
<.001 
 
 
-.293 
.155 
 
-.437 
.029* 
 
.067 
.750 
 
.323 
.124 
 
-.144 
.491 
 
-.450 
.027* 
 
.309 
.133 
 
.095 
.659 
 
-.062 
.770 
 
.295 
.162 
 
2. 
 
  
X 
 
-.47 
.021* 
 
 
-.244 
.240 
 
.178 
.396 
 
.413 
.045* 
 
-.161 
.443 
 
-.247 
.245 
 
.162 
.439 
 
.058 
.789 
 
.068 
.747 
 
.237 
.266 
 
3. 
 
   
X 
 
.162 
.440 
 
-
.363 
.074 
 
-.574 
.003** 
 
-.323 
.115 
 
-.353 
.091 
 
-.215 
.301 
 
-.154 
.473 
 
.006 
.976 
 
 
-.061 
.777 
 
4. 
 
    
X 
 
-
.110 
.601 
 
-.259 
.222 
 
-.128 
.541 
 
.317 
.131 
 
.053 
.802 
 
.117 
.585 
 
.173 
.408 
 
 
-.139 
.516 
 
5. 
 
 
 
    
X 
 
.410 
.052 
 
.022 
.918 
 
.423 
.039* 
 
.253 
.223 
 
.300 
.154 
 
-.002 
.994 
 
.391 
.059 
 
 
6. 
 
      
X 
 
.307 
.145 
 
 
.251 
.237 
 
.530 
.008 
 
.464 
.023 
 
.196 
.360 
 
.556 
.005** 
 
7. 
 
       
X 
 
.383 
.065 
 
 
-.120 
.566 
 
.162 
.449 
 
-.234 
.260 
 
-.059 
.783 
 
8. 
 
        
X 
 
.242 
.255 
 
 
.467 
.021 
 
.196 
.358 
 
.289 
.171 
 
9. 
 
         
X 
 
.714 
<.001 
 
.248 
.231 
 
.511 
.011* 
 
 
10. 
 
          
X 
 
.037 
.863 
 
 
.457 
.025* 
 
11. 
 
           
X 
 
.490 
.015 
 
 
Key:  upper value = Spearman’s correlation coefficient, lower = p-value 
P = picture stimuli S = scenarios 
* = significant at the 0.05 level ** = significant at the 0.01 level 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Patients’ mean fear ratings were significantly lower than controls’ across 
pictures and stories selected to elicit this emotion. Patients’ highest ratings in response 
to these stimuli were for fear, but these responses were muted in comparison to 
controls’. Similar findings were reported by Sprengelmeyer, Schroeder, Young and 
Epplem (2006), who showed that patients with HD can exhibit a steady decline in fear 
ratings in response to fear eliciting scenarios (Wolpe & Lang, 1964).  
Changes in patients’ emotional responses to fear eliciting stimuli also included 
increased anger in comparison to controls. This finding was significant for the 
pictures but not significant for the scenarios. This may be because the picture task 
elicited a more automatic response as it required less conscious perspective taking or 
semantic reasoning than the scenario task. The reasoning processes associated with 
scenarios perhaps prompt greater access to semantic information about what emotions 
are relevant to particular situations. 
 It may be speculated that at times, patients confuse feelings of fear and anger. 
Sprengelmeyer et al. (1997) showed that patients with HD can confuse negative 
emotions. The two patients in Sprengelmeyer et al.’s study misreported disgusted 
facial expressions as depicting anger, and sometimes transposed the correct reponses 
for faces showing fear and disgust. These patients also completed self assessment 
scales of emotional experience. Both patients rated their fear experience below that of 
controls, although Sprengelmeyer et al. caution that these scales do not directly 
measure patient’s current real life experience and can be influenced by past events or 
world knowledge. It is possible that patients exhibit a “devil may care” attitude, and 
are less concerned about danger due to knowledge of the fact that they have a terminal 
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illness. However, evidence of other emotional changes in HD support the idea that 
patients are likely to exhibit a genuine deficit in emotional experience with a 
neurological rather than psychological basis. 
Changes in fear response in HD could have the potential to lead to subtle 
alterations in emotional responses to stimuli that elicit a range of negative emotions. 
For example, the experience of fear could be linked to disgust, as many core disgust 
elicitors also tend to signal potential threat in the form of contamination. However, 
this experiment found no evidence of reduced disgust responses towards stimuli 
chosen to elicit core disgust. The lack of a difference in core disgust responses 
between patients and controls was unexpected. It is possible that the patients tested in 
the present study exhibited no disgust differences due to limited dysfunction of brain 
regions linked to disgust, such as the anterior insula (Wicker et al., 2003).  
The patients tested in the current study exhibited no deficits in moral disgust. 
However, it is possible that this is related to the finding that patients did not exhibit 
significant deficits in core disgust. In other words, deficits in moral disgust may be 
more likely in patients with HD who exhibit deficits in core disgust. The possibility of 
changes in moral disgust in HD has so far received little attention. This is despite 
evidence of altered social conduct, including increased criminal behaviour (Jensen et 
al., 1998), and possible changes to social cognition in HD (Havet-Thomassin et al., 
2008; Snowden et al., 2003) which could be related to deficits in moral disgust. In the 
present study, stimuli selected to elicit moral disgust elicited strong feelings of anger 
in both controls and patients with HD. The investigation of moral disgust is therefore 
likely to prove complex, due to the fact that stimuli associated with this emotion tend 
to provoke other negative emotions.  
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The present study found no evidence that patients with HD show changes in 
target emotional responses to stimuli selected to elicit happiness. However, patients 
with HD did exhibit reduced surprise in comparison to controls in response to 
happiness eliciting scenarios, although not in response to the happiness eliciting 
pictures. The greatest differences between patients and controls were for scenarios 
that described lucky events that they had no influence over (a lottery win and a 
surprise holiday), indicating that patients were less surprised by fortunate events that 
occurred by chance. This unexpected difference is particularly difficult to explain 
because decreased surprise was not evident in response to other kinds of stimuli. It 
could be that patients with HD are more fatalistic. However, this seems unlikely as 
patients only exhibited this difference on happiness eliciting scenarios. 
Patients with HD exhibited significant difficulty on all three executive tasks. 
The most striking executive deficits were evident in verbal fluency and in WM. Errors 
on the Stroop provided some evidence of inhibitory difficulty. These findings are in 
agreement with those reported by other studies of executive functioning in HD (see 
Montoya et al., 2006). Executive tasks involving fluency, WM and inhibition have 
been linked to activation within DLPFC and ACC (Aleman & van’t Wout, 2008; 
Peterson et al., 1999; Schroeter et al., 2004; Szatkowska, Grabowska & Szymanska, 
2000), so executive deficits in HD probably reflect dysfunction within frontostriatal 
pathways involving these regions. 
The neural basis for reduced fear responses in HD could lie in amygdala 
dysfunction. Reports have indicated structural changes to the amygdala in HD (Mann, 
Oliver & Snowden, 1993; Rosas et al., 2001) although alterations in functioning could 
occur as a result of dysfunction within frontostriatal pathways. This region has been 
shown to be involved in many fear related processes. These include the experience of 
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fear and fear conditioning (Le Doux, 1995). Lesions to the amygdala reduce fear in 
primates (Kalin, Shelton, Davidson & Kelley, 2001) and even cognitive 
representations (e.g. imagined fear eliciting stimuli) that elicit changes in SCRs are 
associated with amygdala activity (Adolphs, Russell & Tranel, 1999). Damage to 
amygdala affects generation of SCRs in response to pictures from IAPS selected to 
elicit fear (Gläscher & Adolphs, 2003), so further research could measure SCRs in 
response to these stimuli in patients with HD. 
Amygdala dysfunction can also impair the recognition of fear expressed by 
others vocally (Phillips et al., 1997) and through facial expressions (Calder et al., 
1996). One limitation of this experiment was that tasks assessing the recognition of 
fear in others were not included. Imaging studies have shown an increased amygdala 
response to fearful faces in comparison to facial expressions of anger (Whalen et al., 
2001) and disgust (Phillips et al., 1997). The intensity of fear in facial expressions has 
also been found to be positively coupled with regional cerebral blood flow changes in 
the left amygdala (Morris et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1998). Schienle et al. (2002) 
suggest that the insula can also be activated by fear eliciting stimuli. However, this 
insula activation may reflect its strong interconnections with the amygdala. It is also 
true that a number of studies (e.g. Phillips et al., 2004) report a dissociation between 
regions involved in the recognition of disgusted (insula) and fearful expressions 
(amygdala), and the present study found no evidence of reduced disgust in response to 
core and moral disgust eliciting stimuli. 
Dysfunction within frontostriatal pathways could implicate a role for the STN 
in alterations in fear response in HD. Vicente et al. (2009) found that patients with PD 
who had undergone deep brain stimulation of the STN exhibited reduced fear and 
lower differentiation between fear and other emotions, in response to films selected to 
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elicit fear. Other studies involving patients with PD who have undergone DBS of the 
STN have reported deficits in the recognition of emotional facial expressions, 
including fearful expressions. Le Jeune et al. (2008) showed that these deficits were 
linked to decreased glucose metabolism in orbitofrontal regions and suggest that the 
STN can modulate amygdala activity, via the OFC. There is also some evidence for 
mood changes and increased anger after DBS of STN in patients with PD (Okun et 
al., 2009). It is likely that dysfunction of frontostriatal circuitry involving the STN 
and\or OFC (Haegelen, Rouaud, Darnault & Morandi, 2009) and the amygdala could 
contribute to the observed fear deficits in patients with HD. The emotional scenarios 
task used in the present study is likely to be associated with cortical activation due to 
the use of perspective taking processes that would allow participants to judge their 
likely emotional responses to the scenarios described.  
If amygdala dysfunction is present in patients with HD it could lead to 
significant personal and social consequences. Reduced fear in response to a range of 
stimuli or situations could lead to poor decision making and increased risk-taking 
behaviour in HD. Dysfunction within a frontostriatal circuit involving the amygdala 
could be related to a range of behavioural changes, ranging from poor decision 
making on gambling tasks (Campbell et al., 2004; Stout, Rodawalt & Siemens, 2001) 
to the increased prevalence of drink driving in HD (Jensen et al., 1998). Amygdala 
dysfunction has also been associated with deficits in ToM. Stone et al. (2003) 
reported that patients with bilateral amygdala damage exhibited significant deficits on 
two ToM tasks (a version of the ‘Eyes test’ and a faux pas task) that were very similar 
to those shown to elicit impairment in patients with HD (Havet-Thomassin et al., 
2008). Changes in reasoning about other’s mental states could account for reports of 
reduced empathy in HD (Snowden et al., 2003) and some of the social consequences 
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of amygdala dysfunction may result from failure to appreciate fear expressed by 
others. When Preston et al. (2007) asked participants to imagine fear provoking 
situations they found no difference in the brain regions activated for personal and 
non-personal (other centred) imagery. In addition, Sprengelmeyer et al. (2006) found 
that reduced fear in response to fear eliciting scenarios was correlated with a decline 
in the recognition of fearful facial expressions in patients with HD. Reduced feelings 
of fear, and poor appreciation of fear expressed by others could affect social conduct. 
This could help explain the increased incidence of aggression, anti-social or criminal 
behaviour in HD (Fenger, Bolwig & Sorensen, 1998). 
 
General Discussion 
CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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5.1: Social Cognition in Disorders of the Basal ganglia 
 
The series of experiments described in this thesis indicated that patients with 
movement disorders resulting from BG dysfunction exhibit deficits on tasks involving 
social cognition. Different patterns of impairment were exhibited by patients with PD, 
HD and TS, as summarised in Table 25. Patients with PD and HD exhibited 
significant deficits on executive tasks assessing verbal fluency and WM. In contrast, 
patients with TS only exhibited mild inhibitory deficits. The social cognitive 
difficulties exhibited by patients with PD were likely to be related to executive 
dysfunction, whereas the deficits exhibited by patients with HD and TS appeared 
more independent of such difficulties. The executive and social cognitive deficits 
reported in this thesis are likely to reflect aberrant processing within cortical regions 
that result from striatal dysfunction. The precise nature of striatal dysfunction within 
these BG disorders varies and will result in specific patterns of cortical dysfunction. 
That is, patients with PD, HD and TS are likely to exhibit different patterns of 
dysfunction within the ACC, lateral OFC and DLPFC CSTCCs described by 
Alexander et al. (1986). 
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Table 25. The deficits on social cognitive and executive tasks exhibited by 
patients with basal ganglia disorders documented in this thesis  
 
 
Patient group 
 
 
PD (mild to moderate: 
up to Hoehn & Yahr 
(1967) stage 3). 
 
TS HD (early stage patients) 
 
Known 
pathology 
 
 
 
SNc degeneration 
Primary effect: dorsal 
striatum 
Secondary effect: 
DLPFC CSTCC 
 
Assumed ventral 
striatum (NA) 
dysfunction which 
implicates ACC 
CSTCC 
 
Dorsal caudate  
degeneration implicates 
1. DLPFC CSTCC 
2. Lateral OFC CSTCC? 
Significant 
deficits not 
apparent: 
1. Faux pas task 
2. Counterfactual 
syllogisms 
1. WM manipulation 
span task (DOT-A) 
2. FAS verbal fluency 
3. Standard false belief 
vignettes 
Target emotion ratings for 
stimuli selected to elicit 
1. Happiness 
2. Core disgust 
3. Moral disgust 
 
Significant 
executive 
deficits 
 
 
 
1. FAS verbal fluency 
2. WM manipulation 
span task (DOT-A) 
manipulation span 
3. Stroop 
(inhibition\attention) 
 
The Hayling task 
(inhibition) 
1. FAS verbal fluency 
2. WM manipulation span 
task (DOT-A) 
3. Stroop 
(inhibition\attention) 
Significant 
social 
cognitive 
deficits 
Standard false belief 
vignettes 
1. Faux pas task 
2. Non-literal language 
task 
3. Humourous cartoons 
comprehension task 
(cartoons involving 
sarcasm and irony) 
4. UG decisions 
5. Socially competitive 
emotions task 
6. The ‘Eyes Task’ 
1. Target emotion ratings 
for stimuli selected to 
elicit fear 
2. Anger ratings 
(increased) for pictures 
selected to elicit fear 
Neural regions 
likely to be 
intact 
 
ACC CSTCC DLPFC CSTCC ACC CSTCC? 
Neural regions 
likely to be 
dysfunctional 
based on 
behavioural 
findings 
DLPFC CSTCC ACC CSTCC 
Amygdala 
Insula 
Lateral OFC CSTCC? 
DLPFC CSTCC 
Lateral OFC CSTCC? 
Amygdala 
 
  187 
General Discussion 
Three experiments demonstrated that patients with PD can perform poorly on 
tasks involving false belief. These impairments were not always due to poor 
inferential reasoning, as errors were even apparent on non-inferential ToM vignettes 
(PD experiment 2). However, poor performance could have arisen as a result of 
deficits in executive function rather than deficits in ToM per se. For example, the 
WM deficits exhibited by patients with PD in experiments 1 and 2 could have made it 
difficult for them to remember the story information in order to make inferences about 
mental states. In experiment 3 a group of PD patients who exhibited less significant 
WM deficits made fewer ToM errors, particularly during conditions where WM 
demands were reduced.  In fact, no false belief errors were made in the condition with 
least WM demands (when vignettes were presented as a comic strip and left in view 
throughout testing). Evidence of deficits in ToM per se in PD was further weakened 
by the finding that patients performed normally on the faux pas task during PD 
experiment 1. However, clinicians and carers should be made aware that patients’ 
executive deficits could lead to difficulties in reasoning about mental states. Patients 
with PD could exhibit difficulties with social cognition in everyday life, perhaps 
leading to social communication difficulties and relationship problems. 
Patients with PD made more errors on the false belief task than faux pas task. 
This is perhaps surprising, as the latter is thought to be a more difficult test of ToM 
and is mastered later in development (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). This unexpected 
finding may have occurred because understanding faux pas involves both affective 
ToM (consideration of the victim’s offence in response to the inappropriate remark) 
and cognitive ToM (the protagonist’s belief that the remark is offensive). Patients 
with PD could have greater difficulties with cognitive ToM, which would affect 
performance on the false belief questions asked during the standard false belief 
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vignette task. However, performance on the key question asked during the faux pas 
task (“did someone say something they shouldn’t have?”) would not have been 
affected, as this question could be answered correctly by reasoning about the victim’s 
affective mental state without recourse to reasoning about cognitive mental states. 
One difficulty with this explanation is that patients did not make significantly more 
errors than controls on the belief check (that assessed the understanding of a cognitive 
mental state) during the faux pas task. 
Perhaps a more parsimonious explanation for the discrepancy between 
performance on the standard false belief vignettes and faux pas task is that the faux 
pas task illustrates a fairly common occurrence in social interaction which can be 
understood through recognition of the violation of a social norm. That is, a decision 
that the remark is inappropriate could arise from a judgment that the remark is 
negative and therefore does not sound like something that would commonly be said in 
that social context. Such reasoning does not involve true consideration of the 
characters’ mental states and this task may therefore not always test ToM. The false 
belief tasks used in this series of experiments tended to involve descriptions of more 
arbitrary associations and the questions could not be answered through an 
understanding of social norms. Patients’ performance could have suffered more on the 
standard false belief vignette task because it relied more heavily on memory and 
attentional processes that are necessary for ToM rather than semantic knowledge 
about socially acceptable behaviour. 
Patients with TS showed a pattern of performance on the faux pas task and 
false belief vignettes that contrasted with the performance of PD patients. That is, 
patients with PD performed normally on the faux pas task and exhibited deficits on 
the false belief vignettes, whereas patients with TS exhibited the converse pattern of 
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performance. One way of describing this difference is that patients with PD can 
exhibit difficulty on tasks that require just cognitive (‘cool’) ToM, whereas patients 
with TS exhibit deficits on tasks that involve aspects of affective (‘hot’) ToM. This 
complementary pattern of deficits could be related to executive function. Patients with 
PD did not exhibit fundamental changes in ToM per se. Their deficits on the standard 
false belief vignette tasks, which consisted of arbitrary associations, rather reflected 
executive problems including compromised WM. The poor performance exhibited by 
patients with TS on a range of social cognitive tasks implies that they exhibit changes 
in ToM per se. These deficits, however, are likely to apply to certain aspects of ToM 
which do not encompass deficits in reasoning about first order cognitive mental states, 
as patients performed well on standard false belief vignettes in TS experiment 1.  
Patients with TS exhibited deficits on a range of social cognitive tasks. On 
some occasions, deficits in ToM appeared to result from poor (or a lack of) inferential 
reasoning. For example, failures to infer mental states could have led to the errors 
observed on the faux pas and non-literal language task. The inferential reasoning 
processes involved in ToM are likely to make considerable cognitive demands. This is 
illustrated by the finding that cognitive limitations such as executive deficits can 
impair inferential reasoning (Monetta, Grindrod & Pell, 2008). Although patients with 
TS exhibited limited evidence of executive dysfunction, the inhibitory deficits 
observed on the Hayling task suggest that patients’ executive functioning is impaired 
in the context of certain demands. Patients with TS may allocate a considerable 
amount of cognitive resources (e.g. attention or concentration) to the effort involved 
in suppressing tics. This could lead to cognitive resource saving strategies that are 
biased against voluntary higher level reasoning. The use of such strategies could 
result in superficial interpretations of social interaction and deficits in understanding 
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indirect communication and mental states (as reported in chapter 3). It may be that 
greater cognitive resources (e.g. increased attention) are available at a cost (i.e. poorer 
tic suppression). This could further explain why patients perform better on questions 
that explicitly demand higher level reasoning (e.g. the Hinting Task: what does this 
indirect request really mean?) in comparison to tasks that do not force this level of 
reasoning directly (e.g. the Pragmatic Story Comprehension Task: which of these 
remarks would make sense?). That is, patients could be more likely to engage the 
cognitive resources required by a ToM task when questioned more explicitly. 
Other unconventional responses given by patients with TS on social cognitive 
tasks were associated with a tendency towards negative or cynical interpretations of 
social situations. This kind of error indicated that while some patients are clearly 
capable of reasoning about mental states, they nonetheless demonstrate a tendency to 
unconventional interpretations about communicative intention and social interaction. 
These unconventional interpretations could reflect poor emotional regulation in 
response to stimuli containing negative affect, which could consequently affect 
patients’ reasoning. Increased sensitivity to stimuli associated with negative affect in 
TS would contrast with the decreased sensitivity to negative emotions exhibited by 
patients with HD (i.e. the reduced fear ratings reported in chapter 4).  
The pictures selected to elicit fear resulted in reduced fear ratings in HD 
patients but higher anger ratings. This finding is in keeping with the problems with 
anger that are associated with HD patients including irritability, aggression and 
explosive disorder (Folstein, 1989). The current findings offer greater insights into the 
possible basis of some of the behavioural problems associated with HD. Changes in 
the subjective experience of fear and anger may be linked to difficulties understanding 
fear in others, which could contribute to the anti-social symptoms noted above. 
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Reduced fear responses also have the potential to contribute to risk taking behaviour 
and could therefore pose a threat to patients’ safety. 
 
THE NEURAL BASES OF SOCIAL COGNITIVE DEFICITS IN DISORDERS OF 
THE BASAL GANGLIA 
 
The basal ganglia are able to affect both motor control and cognition by virtue 
of its extensive influence over the whole of the frontal lobe. The neural bases of the 
motor deficits associated with PD, HD and TS are well described (chapter 1). Many 
patients with these disorders take medication that is specifically prescribed to affect 
the functioning of motor circuitry. These pharmacological treatments have the 
potential to also alter the functioning of parallel neural circuits that subserve cognitive 
or emotional functions. The possibility that some of the deficits reported in this thesis 
could have been influenced by patients’ medications is therefore worthy of 
consideration. A medication related factor (time since medication had been taken) was 
investigated in patients with PD in experiment 1 (although not in further experiments) 
and was not found to have a significant influence. Although some of the patients with 
TS tested were taking medications, many patients who exhibited deficits on tasks 
were not under pharmacological treatment. Few of the patients with HD were taking 
any medication. In conclusion, it may be considered that there is no convincing 
evidence to suggest that the influence of medication made a considerable contribution 
to the social cognitive (or executive) deficits recorded in this series of experiments, so 
the observed deficits reflect neuropathological changes. However, the possibility that 
the presence or absence of medication could have affected certain patients’ task 
performance cannot be entirely ruled out. 
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In PD, degeneration of dopaminergic cells in the SNc initially results in 
dopaminergic denervation within the dorsal striatum (e.g. Tedroff, Ekesbo, Rydin, 
Longstrom & Hagberg, 1999). The resultant dysfunction of the dorsal striatum could 
lead to changes in the functioning of the DLPFC as well as the supplementary motor 
area. The findings reported in section 2 are in accordance with these 
pathophysiological events. Dyfunction within the DLPFC CSTCC (as described by 
Alexander et al., 1986) would explain why the early stage patients tested 
demonstrated significant executive deficits in both this series of PD experiments and 
in other studies (e.g. Gabrieli et al., 1996; Lees & Smith, 1983; Zgaljardic et al., 
2006). These executive deficits included deficits in verbal fluency, WM and perhaps 
more general attentional dysfunction (which is likely to have contributed to poor 
performance on the Stroop). Dysfunction of the DLPFC CSTCC is also likely to have 
led to the executive deficits exhibited by patients with HD reported in chapter 4. This 
circuitry was not implicated in the abnormal responses made by patients with TS, who 
did not exhibit significant deficits on fluency and WM measures (chapter 3). 
PD experiments 1-3 provide no evidence of ToM deficits that are clearly 
independent of executive impairment. Dysfunction within medial OFC (that is, part of 
the ACC CSTCC as described by Alexander et al., 1986) is likely to lead to more 
general and consistent difficulties on ToM tasks than those reported in chapter 2. The 
suggestion that the neuropsychological functioning of the ACC CSTCC (which 
includes the ventral striatum) is intact in PD would be in accordance with the 
assumption that dopamine inputs into the ventral striatum from the VTA are intact. 
However, Peron et al. (2009) reported impairments on the faux pas task in patients 
with later stage PD. Faux pas deficits could implicate medial OFC (e.g. Stone et al., 
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1998). This implies that the ACC circuit may be affected in patients in a more 
advanced stage of the disease than those tested in this series of experiments. 
There was greater evidence that the ACC CSTCC (as described by Alexander 
et al., 1986) is dysfunctional in TS and HD than PD. Patients with TS or HD exhibited 
deficits on social cognitive tasks that appeared less related to executive dysfunction. 
Patients with TS exhibited impairment on a range of tasks that have been linked to the 
functioning of regions such as the VMPFC, which forms part of the ACC CSTCC. 
Patients with HD exhibited deficits in subjective fear in response to verbal and visual 
stimuli (similar emotional deficits were reported by Sprengelmeyer et al., 2006) that 
could specifically implicate the amygdala. This structure has connections to many 
parts of the OFC (Barbas, 1995). Dysfunction of the amygdala could therefore be 
related to changes in the functioning of the ACC (which includes medial OFC) and/or 
lateral OFC CSTCCs (as described by Alexander et al., 1986). 
In HD, alterations in fear response could reflect a reduction in fear per se, as a 
result of amygdala dysfunction. Alternatively, these changes could result from a 
reduced awareness of patients’ understanding of their own emotional responses, 
which could implicate cortical regions. Personal experience of fear is likely to be 
closely related to activity in the amygdala. Activity in this structure increases in 
response to fear eliciting stimuli presented in visual (Anderson & Phelps, 2001) and 
auditory modalities (Scott et al., 1997). It has also been shown that electrical 
stimulation of the amygdala in humans elicits autonomic reactions associated with 
feelings of fear (Gloor, 1992). Difficulties in understanding one’s own emotions could 
involve dysfunction of the paracingulate gyrus. This structure, which borders rostral 
ACC and the medial prefrontal cortex, is active during self-reflective thought 
(Johnson et al. 2002) and more specifically, when representing one’s own mental 
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states (Frith & Frith, 1999). However, dysfunction in cortical regions could be 
expected to lead to general deficits in the understanding of emotions whereas patients 
exhibited a selective deficit with fear. Reduced subjective fear ratings in HD could 
result from dysfunction within connections between the amygdala and ACC or medial 
OFC within the ACC CSTCC.  
Dysfunction within the ACC CSTCC, which involves the medial OFC and 
ventral striatum (described by Alexander et al., 1986) is likely to have led to the 
differences in performance on ToM tasks that were demonstrated by patients with TS. 
The suggestion that the ACC is likely to be dysfunctional in TS is supported by 
imaging and behavioural evidence. Patient exhibit mild deficits on the Hayling task 
(as seen in chapter 3 and as reported by other studies e.g. Channon et al., 2006), a test 
which is sensitive to ACC function (Nathaniel-James et al., 1997).  Imaging studies 
have revealed abnormalities in this region in TS, including evidence of decreased grey 
and white matter (Muller-Vahl et al., 2009).  
Patients with TS exhibit some characteristics that are similar to those 
displayed by patients with medial OFC dysfunction. For example, patients with TS 
exhibit NOSIS whilst inappropriate social behaviour is exhibited by patients with 
sustained orbitofrontal damage (e.g. Beer, John, Scabini & Knight, 2006). 
Dysfunction of this region has also been linked to poor prioritization of solutions to 
interpersonal problems (Saver & Damasio, 1991). In keeping with this view, one 
study reported that patients with TS produced fewer solutions and selected poorer 
final solutions than controls in response to problematic social scenarios (Channon, 
Crawford, Vakili & Robertson, 2003). These findings add support to the conclusion 
that the social cognitive deficits seen in TS result from dysfunction of the ACC 
CSTCC (as described by Alexander et al., 1986). 
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The difficulties with drawing inferences about mental states that were 
exhibited by some patients with TS are likely to reflect dysfunction within ACC 
rather than DLPFC circuitry. This tentative conclusion is based on the finding that 
patients with TS performed well on a WM task linked to DLPFC functioning. There is 
evidence that the ACC is also involved in tic suppression and, as suggested above, 
this factor could be related to some of the observed deficits. Thus, increased ACC 
activity occurs during tic suppression (Peterson et al., 1998) and there is a positive 
correlation between activity in this region and tic severity (Stern et al., 2000). 
Engagement of the ACC CSTCC in tic suppression may result in fewer resources 
being available for social cognitive tasks. It is perhaps likely that one of the processes 
involved in tic suppression is a form of inhibition. However, there was no evidence 
that performance on measures involving this executive function was linked to the 
observed social cognitive deficit.  
Other deficits on social cognitive tasks exhibited by patients with TS that 
could also be related to dysfunction within the ACC circuit included poor reasoning in 
relation to social stimuli associated with negative emotions. The VMPFC (which 
includes medial OFC, part of the ACC CSTCC) has a role in the automatic regulation 
of emotional behaviour (Philips et al., 2003). The ACC is activated in situations that 
require the control of negative emotional responses (Ochsner et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, the resolution of conflict associated with negative emotion activates 
ventral ACC and the amygdala (Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel & Hirsch, 2006). Poor 
regulation of or control over negative emotion provides one explanation for the 
finding that patients with TS exhibit an increased tendency to reject offers during the 
UG. The conventional response to unfair offers could involve the suppression of an 
urge to reject that derives from negative affect due to the realisation of unfairness. 
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Dysfunction of the ACC CSTCC (as described by Alexander et al., 1986) could be 
associated with poor control over this urge leading to an increased number of 
rejections. 
One region that may fulfill a particularly important role during the UG is the 
insula. The insula has connections to the ACC and amygdala (Shelley & Trimble, 
2004) and is active when subjects decide to reject an unfair offer (Sanfey et al., 2003). 
The insula is also active during tic release (Stern et al., 2000; Lerner et al., 2007) and 
when neurologically intact participants suppress the natural urge to blink (Lerner et 
al., 2009). This region contains a somatotopic representation of the subjective feelings 
associated with one’s movements of the body (Craig, 2009) and could sense the 
premonitory sensations linked to motor tics (Kwak, Dat Vuong & Jankovic, 2003). 
Lerner et al. (2009) see the insula as a “sensor and executor of physiological urges” 
(pp. 220) whereas the ACC is seen as providing motivational input to suppress an 
urge. Failure of the ACC to suppress an urge may result in a tic.  
The OFC has medial and lateral regions. The lateral OFC is connected to the 
insula (Shelley & Trimble, 2004). Consequently, the lateral OFC CSTCC could be 
implicated in the deficits exhibited by patients on the UG. Changes in the functioning 
of the lateral OFC CSTCC were found by Jeffries et al. (2002), who showed that 
patients with TS exhibit abnormal activity in frontostriatal pathways involving the 
lateral OFC and insula. 
Dysfunction within the lateral OFC CSTCC could also be implicated in 
patients’ deficits on tasks involving non-literal language. The IFG, which can be 
considered part of the lateral OFC CSTCC, is active during the processing of sarcasm 
(Uchiyama et al., 2006). Studies have reported abnormalities of the IFG in patients 
with TS. For example, one imaging study reported decreased white matter in this 
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region (Muller-Vahl et al., 2009). The IFG is also active during the Hayling task 
(Nathaniel-James et al., 1997) and some studies implicate this structure in inhibitory 
control (Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2004).  It may therefore be speculated that 
dysfunction of the IFG in TS could lead to difficulties in the comprehension of non-
literal language. 
The social cognitive deficits described in this thesis could be related to the 
incidence of NOSIS in TS. One way is through poor inferential reasoning about 
people’s mental states in response to their behaviour. For example, some patients 
could make socially inappropriate remarks because they fail to consider other 
people’s feelings. However, it may be speculated that NOSIS could occur in patients 
who are aware of the negative affective consequences of socially inappropriate 
behaviour, in association with emotional dysregulation.  
NOSIS are dependent on the stimuli in the patient’s immediate environment. 
In patients who exhibit these symptoms, an intial evaluation of reinforcement 
contingencies signalled by the environment could be associated with a greater 
awareness of potential behaviours linked to negative affective consequences (e.g. 
shouting “fatty” on seeing a person who is overweight). This process is likely to 
involve the OFC which is involved in the appraisal of stimuli in relation to associated 
reinforcement contingencies (e.g. Rolls, 2004). An awareness of the negative 
connotations associated with a particular behaviour may be associated with a change 
in autonomic arousal. Changes in autonomic arousal could act as a deterrent to warn 
against behaviour linked to negative reinforcement. Autonomic arousal is regulated 
by the heavily interconnected amygdala and insula. These neural structures process 
negative affective experiences and contribute to social judgments (Shah, Klumpp, 
Angstadt, Nathan & Phan, 2009). The anticipatory autonomic arousal associated with 
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the awareness of potential socially inappropriate behaviours could be heightened in 
patients with TS. Increased arousal in TS could lead to greater psychological and 
physical discomfort. This increased discomfort could lead to an urge to release the 
behaviour in order to reduce the anticipatory arousal. Feeling an urge to act and 
feeling discomfort as a result of the increased arousal are likely to involve the insula 
and ACC. The insula both senses interoceptive information and is involved in the 
generation of subjective feelings and urges (Craig, 2009). The ACC is also activated 
by autonomic arousal (Critchley, 2005). In healthy individuals, ventromedial 
prefrontal regions help regulate arousal and somatic state through the amygdala 
(Williams et al., 2004). In TS, failure of VMPFC and\or ACC to control or regulate 
this arousal could lead to NOSIS, and other symptoms of emotional dysregulation 
(such as the social cognitive deficits described in chapter 3).  
One interesting consequence of this model is that efficacious treatments for TS 
could regulate the functioning within these neural regions by either: reducing 
emotional arousal, encouraging the attenuation of autonomic responses associated 
with the arousal or enhancing cortical control over the arousal. Future research should 
investigate the possibility of increased autonomic reactivity in patients with TS.  
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5.2: Implications for Social Cognition 
 
The experimental findings described in this thesis demonstrate that striatal 
dysfunction may lead to a range of deficits in abilities related to social cognition. The 
different social cognitive difficulties exhibited by each patient group can offer insight 
into issues related to the study of social cognition in general. These include the impact 
of executive functioning, semantic knowledge and personal experience on ToM 
performance. 
 
THEORY OF MIND AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 
 
As discussed in section 1.6, developmental (e.g. Carlson et al., 2002), clinical 
(Henry et al., 2006) and imaging (Saxe et al., 2006) studies have explored the 
relationship between performance on ToM and executive tasks. Executive functions 
could make different contributions to ToM performance. WM could allow one to hold 
different perspectives of the world in mind. Other executive functions, such as 
attentional set-shifting and\or inhibition may be needed to switch away from one’s 
own to another’s perspective in order to understand their mental state. 
The social cognitive tasks administered are likely to vary in their demands on 
executive function. Accordingly, one reason for the differing social cognitive deficits 
exhibited by patients with BG disorders is likely to be the degree of executive 
dysfunction exhibited by patients with these disorders. Greater executive deficits were 
exhibited by patients with PD than patients with TS. Patients with PD also performed 
poorly on the standard false belief task which did not elicit significant impairment in 
patients with TS. It could be that reasoning about beliefs involves greater cognitive 
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demands because beliefs are abstract. Accordingly, patients with PD would be 
expected to perform more poorly on the false belief task as a result of WM deficits 
and attentional difficulties. These findings appear to be in accordance with those 
reported by Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon Peretz (2007) who showed that difficulties in 
reasoning about cognitive mental states (i.e. ‘cool’ ToM) could arise in association 
with lesions to DLPFC.  
Patients with PD exhibited little difficulty in understanding faux pas which 
involved reasoning about affective mental states. In contrast patients with TS 
performed poorly on this task. The poor performance exhibited by patients with TS on 
the faux pas task was not correlated with executive dysfunction. Shamay-Tsoory & 
Aharon-Peretz (2007) showed that damage to VMPFC (which includes medial OFC) 
could lead to deficits in affective ToM. The findings reported in chapter 3 appear to 
support the suggestion that dysfunction within medial OFC can lead to particular 
impairments in ToM involving affective mental states (i.e. ‘hot’ ToM) which appear 
to be independent of executive dysfunction. 
The findings reported in this thesis indicate that certain executive functions are 
likely to be important for ToM performance. Relationships were observed between 
ToM performance and WM and verbal fluency scores in the experiments reported in 
chapter 2. However, these relationships were not found consistently. This could be 
because it is necessary to have an executive deficit at a certain threshold before it 
leads to a decrement in ToM performance. This possibility was supported by the 
finding that mainly patients with WM scores below the group median performed 
poorly on the ToM vignette task in experiment 3.  
WM could be critically important for ToM reasoning as indicated by 
developmental studies (e.g. Gordon & Olson, 1998) and the findings in chapter 2. 
  201 
General Discussion 
WM ability reflects the capacity to hold and manipulate information in one’s mind. In 
order to understand a person’s false belief, one must hold in mind the situational 
context (or series of events) so as to allow the adoption of the perspective of the 
person holding the false belief. In this way, WM could make an incidental 
contribution to ToM performance, that is, it is not considered part of the perspective 
taking process itself. 
Some authors suggest that WM may be considered to make a more 
fundamental contribution to ToM. Apperly, Samson and Humphreys (2005) suggest 
that although participants with deficits in WM can perform poorly on false belief 
tasks due to performance demands, it is also possible that belief reasoning is carried 
out in a generic WM system (pp.573). For example, the WM system could provide a 
basis for holding in mind one’s own perspective and the perspective of another, and 
be involved in the ‘decoupling’ of those perspectives (Gallagher & Frith, 2003). This 
would mean that even controlling performance demands will not necessarily lead to 
an improvement in performance as patients would continue to demonstrate difficulties 
in competence. The experiments with patients with PD in chapter 2 can be considered 
to provide some evidence for this proposal, as patients continued to make false belief 
errors in some conditions involving reduced WM demands (PD experiments 2 and 3). 
There are also difficulties investigating the contribution that inhibition makes 
to ToM performance. The ToM deficits exhibited by patients with TS (chapter 3) 
were not related to the mild inhibitory difficulties observed on the Hayling task. 
However, inhibition could still have contributed to patients’ difficulties in some way. 
Patients’ performance on other tasks provided evidence of poor reasoning in 
association with stimuli related to negative affect. It could be that patients exhibit 
most inhibitory difficulties when reasoning is influenced by negative emotions. This 
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would explain the deficits on social cognitive tasks linked to negative emotion (the 
faux pas task, UG, ‘socially competitive emotions’ task etc.), in contrast to the lack of 
prominent difficulties on the Stroop (experiments 2 & 3) and the standard false belief 
vignette task (experiment 1), which did not involve emotion. Perhaps broader types of 
executive function should be considered slightly different abilities depending on the 
context in which they are used or measured (see Aron, 2007). Inhibition for example, 
would be better conceptualised as a collection of abilities that can be applied to 
cognition, emotion or behaviour. It could therefore follow that particular types of 
inhibition are more relevant to performance on different ToM tasks. For example, 
performance on tasks that involve inhibition of one’s own emotion could be more 
closely related to reasoning about another’s emotion. 
In summary, it is hard to determine the exact contribution made by different 
executive functions to ToM. It could be that the roles of certain executive functions 
overlap or are interdependent. For example, understanding another person’s mental 
state could involve first ignoring one’s own mental state through a process of 
inhibition. The perspective taking process that involves imagining another person’s 
point of view could be seen as involving a shift of attention, but this shift of attention 
may further be conceptualized as involving inhibitory ability. As shifting away from 
one’s own perspective could be considered to require inhibition and/or attentional set-
shifting there are even problems with knowing whether the executive functions are 
themselves truly independent.  
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THE ROLE OF SEMANTIC KNOWLEDGE AND PERSONAL EXPERIENCE ON 
TOM PERFORMANCE 
 
ToM performance on tasks such as the faux pas task could be influenced by 
semantic knowledge about social norms and convention. Reasoning about socially (or 
morally) acceptable behaviour should provide a greater opportunity for factors such as 
social learning or even moral reasoning to influence performance. Children can 
acquire an understanding of what constitutes socially unacceptable behaviour through 
a process of classical or operant conditioning, whereby the child learns to associate 
certain behaviour with negative consequences (Aronfeed, 1968). These consequences 
may not always require an understanding of another’s mental state. During the faux 
pas task, the participant could recognize a socially inappropriate remark simply 
because past experience or learning informed them that making that kind of remark is 
out of place rather than because they truly reasoned about the implications of such 
behaviour, such as the negative emotion felt by the subject of an insulting remark. It is 
possible that patients with PD in experiment 1 performed well on the faux pas task 
simply by recognizing the violation of a social norm rather than reasoning about 
mental states. Task performance does not provide such a pure measure of ToM ability 
(as discussed in section 5.1) in cases where performance is not contingent on on-line 
reasoning about mental states. 
Reasoning about an emotion in another and one’s own emotional experience 
appear to be related and perhaps involve the same neural substrate (e.g. Wicker et al., 
2003). The reduction in fear response in HD could therefore be associated with poor 
appreciation of this emotion when expressed by others. This possibility is supported 
by the observation that HD patients exhibit poor recognition of fearful facial 
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expressions (e.g. Henley et al., 2008). As HD involves neural degeneration later in 
life, this may imply that the neural substrates involved in understanding an emotion in 
another (‘hot’ ToM) are necessary for on-line performance and not just for learning. 
As one’s own emotional experience changes, one’s ability to reason about other’s 
emotional experience could also change. The findings reported in this thesis suggest 
that structures thought to play a key role in one’s own emotional experience (such as 
the amygdala and insula) appear to subserve processes that have a greater impact on 
ToM performance than previously appreciated. 
 
THE ASSESSMENT OF TOM: DEFINING DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
IMPAIRMENT 
 
Careful task design should allow the type or level of deficit exhibited by a 
participant to be specified.  The extended questioning associated with the faux pas 
task provided qualitative data that led to an enhanced appreciation of the nature of 
changes in ToM exhibited by participants with TS (chapter 3). The subtle differences 
in reasoning exhibited by patients with TS were most apparent on later questions on 
the faux pas task that addressed the content of characters’ minds more explicitly. The 
social cognitive deficits demonstrated by patients with TS raise an important issue 
relating to the assessment of ToM ability. These patients made significantly more 
errors on many social cognitive tasks in comparison to controls. However, on many 
occasions, patients did demonstrate evidence of the ability to reason about mental 
states. The findings relating to the performance of patients with TS indicate poor 
scores on ToM tasks do not necessarily indicate a deficit in terms of a lack of ability. 
Perhaps patients’ unconventional responses should not be referred to as ‘deficits’. 
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There appeared to be a difference between patients’ performance on tasks that 
required more spontaneous reasoning about mental states and those that directed 
participants to think about ToM more explicitly. In TS experiment 2, deficits were 
evident on a non-literal language task that asked participants to select appropriate 
non-literal remarks from a short list before discussing their meaning. However, the 
same group of patients performed well on another non-literal language task when the 
remarks had to be accepted as appropriate because the patients were simply asked to 
explain them. This task is likely to have directed reasoning about mental states more 
explicitly, as the participant was asked to think about what the character meant by 
their remark, rather than whether the remark made sense at face value. These 
discrepancies in performance indicate that certain tasks can reveal deficits in a certain 
level of ToM. Consequently, reasoning about mental states spontaneously and 
reasoning about them when explicitly directed or cued to do so could be viewed as 
separate abilities. 
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5.3: Implications for Models of Frontostriatal Circuitry 
 
 
The anatomical model of basal ganglia-cortical interactions most frequently 
used to account for the deficits seen in patients with BG disorders is the CSTCC 
model developed by Alexander et al., (1986). Although more than 20 years old, this 
model can still provide an initial framework for attempting to identify the 
neurological bases underlying the cognitive and emotional deficits reported in this 
thesis. However, many of the social cognitive difficulties exhibited by patients with 
HD and TS in the current series of experiments cannot be accommodated by the 
Alexander et al. model. The current findings therefore highlight the need to develop a 
more detailed and inclusive model of frontostriatal interactions. 
 
FINDINGS THAT CAN BE UNDERSTOOD THROUGH REFERENCE TO THE 
MODEL DESCRIBED BY ALEXANDER ET AL. (1986) 
 
Some of the findings of this series of experiments fit well with existing model 
of CSTCCs (Alexander et al., 1986). These include the observed executive 
dysfunction in patients with PD and HD. Such difficulties are likely to occur due to 
dysfunction with the dorsolateral prefrontal CSTCC as a result of dysfunction of the 
dorsal striatum. The model could also account for the changes to ToM in TS which 
are likely to be related to pathological changes in ACC circuitry. Imaging studies of 
TS patients (e.g. Muller-Vahl et al., 2009) have reported abnormalities within regions 
that form part of the ACC CSTCC. 
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The experiments in this thesis provide evidence that the CSTCCs 
conceptualised by Alexander et al. (1986) are likely to make different contributions to 
performance on social cognitive tasks. Patients with PD (chapter 2) predominantly 
exhibit deficits associated with dysfunction of the DLPFC CCSTC. The executive 
deficits that result from this can lead to poor reasoning about false belief (impairments 
in ‘cool’ ToM). Patients with TS and HD appear to exhibit slightly different 
impairments which are in keeping with dysfunction of circuitry involving the OFC. 
The patterns of deficits exhibited by patients across the different tasks suggest that 
reasoning about affective mental states (‘hot’ ToM) and social norms utilizes the ACC 
CSTCC. These findings therefore provide further support for the existence of different 
frontostriatal circuits which can make different contributions to performance on 
cognitive and social cognitive tasks.  
 
FINDINGS THAT ARE NOT ACCOMMODATED BY ALEXANDER ET AL.’S 
(1986) MODEL 
 
Some of the findings reported in this thesis are difficult to accommodate in the 
CSTCC models as originally described by Alexander et al. (1986). The social 
cognitive deficits described in experiments carried out with patients with HD and TS 
implicate the involvement of structures that are not described in terms of frontostriatal 
circuitry. Fear deficits in HD and poor performance on the ‘Eyes test’ as exhibited by 
patients with TS are likely to implicate the amygdala. The performance of patients 
with TS on the UG (experiment 3) implicates changes in neural functioning involving 
the insula. This structure is also implicated in disgust deficits in HD (as reported in 
other studies, e.g. Henley et al., 2008). In relation to Alexander et al’s model, it is not 
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clear why the amygdala or insula should be dysfunctional in HD or TS, as these 
regions are not suggested to be directly influenced by the outputs of any of the 
CSTCCs. However, the amygdala and insula do have connections to the regions of the 
OFC that are considered part of the ACC and lateral OFC CSTCCs. Anatomical 
models of basal ganglia-cortical interactions should be extended to encompass a 
stronger role for temporal structures in the functioning within frontostriatal circuits. . 
There could be changes in functioning within the amygdala and insula, in the 
connections between these structures and other neural regions, and\or within other 
neural regions that influence these structures. 
A further limitation of the model described by Alexander et al. (1986) is that 
the roles of certain parts of the BG, in particular the STN, were not outlined. The 
model refers to the direct pathway through the BG but does not consider the indirect 
pathway that passes through the STN. The STN, which is now known to have an 
important role in affect, could contribute to the deficits exhibited by patients with HD 
in Chapter 4. Dysfunction of the STN (Le Jeune et al., 2008) has been linked with 
changes in fear responses and patients with PD undergoing DBS of STN can show 
changes in mood including increased anger (Okun et al., 2009). Although this nucleus 
is clearly implicated in motor function, it has more recently begun to be recognized as 
subserving a key role in limbic functions (Haegelen et al., 2009). An updated model 
of frontostriatal circuitry could specify how particular parts of the STN are involved 
in different frontostriatal pathways and associated functions. Joel and Weiner (1997) 
suggest that the STN can be separated into sensorimotor (dorsolateral), cognitive-
associative (ventromedial) and limbic (medial) regions. For example, the 
ventromedial tip of the STN receives afferents from cortical regions including medial 
prefrontal and ACC (Canteras, Shammah-Lagnado, Silva & Ricardo, 1990). Different 
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parts of the STN could therefore be involved in different frontostriatal circuits. An 
improved model would include a description of the roles of these subdivisions of the 
STN. 
DIFFICULTIES CONCEPTUALISING THE FUNCTIONAL ANATOMY OF THE 
MEDIAL AND LATERAL ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX 
 
One particular difficulty with using Alexander et al.’s model (1986) to 
interpret clinical findings results from the division of the OFC into medial and lateral 
regions. The medial and lateral OFC form critical parts of separate frontostriatal 
circuits: the ACC CSTCC and lateral OFC CSTCC respectively. Although such a 
subdivision could allow for greater specificity, it is difficult to identify particular 
functions that are associated with these subregions. There is currently limited 
literature available to aid the distinction between medial and lateral OFC as many 
studies refer simply to ‘orbitofrontal cortex’.  
A further difficulty concerns the problem of specifying which of the CSTCCs 
the amygdala forms part of. The amygdala receives many projections from the OFC 
but relatively few from BA 10 (Ghashghaei, Hilgetag & Barbas, 2007) which can be 
considered part of lateral OFC CSTCC (as described by Alexander et al., 1986). It 
may therefore be that the amygdala has a greater influence on the ACC CSTCC than 
the lateral OFC CSTCC.  
Similar problems apply to the insula. The insula has connections with many 
parts of the OFC (Shelley & Trimble, 2004) and activity in the anterior insula is often 
mirrored in changes in the the IFG (Craig, 2009). However, the anterior insula is also 
strongly connected to the amygdala (Holstad & Barbas, 2008) so could influence the 
functioning of both the ACC and lateral OFC CSTCC. 
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The STN could also play an important role in both the lateral OFC and ACC 
circuits. DBS of the STN can affect activity in the insula and orbitofrontal regions 
including the IFG (Schroeder et al., 2003). Connections via the OFC (Canteras et al., 
1990), may also allow the STN to modulate the activity of the amygdala (Le Jeune et 
al., 2008), although there is currently no evidence for direct connections between the 
STN and OFC.  
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5.4: Future Research and Conclusion 
 
The experiments presented in this thesis have revealed that deficits in social 
cognition are exhibited by patients with BG disorders. Further work is essential in 
order to address specific issues that have been raised in relation to the nature of the 
impairments exhibited by these patient groups and to determine the neural basis for 
these difficulties. The findings discussed in previous chapters also motivate the design 
of investigations that will enhance our understanding of social cognition and the 
neuroanatomical circuits involved in different cognitive functions. 
 
STUDIES INVESTIGATING SOCIAL COGNITION 
 
One area of social cognition that merits further research is the relationship 
between ToM and executive functioning. For example, the experiments conducted 
with patients with PD have shown that executive limitations such as deficits in WM 
can contribute to difficulties with ToM. Different facets of ToM could make differing 
executive demands. For example, there may be a varying executive contribution 
whether reasoning about cognitive or affective mental states. Zelazo et al. (2005) 
suggest that like ToM, executive functions can be categorised as ‘hot’ if they involve 
affect or ‘cool’ if not. Although many studies have investigated the relationship 
between ‘cool’ executive functions on fluency, WM and shifting tasks, fewer have 
investigated links between ToM and performance on tasks involving ‘hot’ executive 
functions, such as affective decision making tasks. Future studies could investigate 
relationships between performance on tasks involving ‘hot’ or ‘cool’ aspects of ToM, 
and both ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ executive tasks.  
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A potential limitation of the research described here is the lack of inclusion of 
an attentional set-shifting task. Patients with PD exhibit deficits in set-shifting (e.g. 
Cools et al., 2001b; Lees & Smith, 1983) and Natsopoulos et al., (1997) showed that 
reasoning impairments can be linked to poor set-shifting performance. Frye, Zelazo 
and Palfai (1995) showed that children’s ToM performance can also be related to 
mental shifting ability. Kloo and Perner (2003) reported correlations between 
children’s set shifting performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sorting Task 
(DCCST) and false belief tasks. They further showed that training children on one of 
these tasks led to improved performance on the other kind of task. These authors 
suggest their findings indicate that a common ability is needed for the DCCST and 
false belief task, to be precise, the ability to understand that an object or entity can be 
viewed in more than one way (i.e. possess more than one description) at the same 
time. Understanding false belief necessitates an appreciation that two people can have 
different views or descriptions for the same world. The DCCST requires a shift from 
sorting cards based on one descriptive dimension (e.g. colour) to another dimension 
(e.g. shape). As set shifting deficits can be related to impairments in ToM it would be 
useful to assess set-shifting alongside performance on the ToM tasks in patients with 
BG disorders.  
Our understanding of the relationship between ToM and executive functioning 
may be enhanced through studies that can relate specific processes involved in ToM 
to particular executive functions. The perspective taking process involved in ToM 
could require an initial inhibition of one’s own mental state state prior to the 
expression of the ability to shift attention in order to appreciate another’s point of 
view. Studies could identify specific deficits with inhibition or attentional set-shifting 
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that were related to ToM impairment. This would enable ToM deficits to be 
accounted for in terms of precise underlying executive processes. However, there are 
clear difficulties with such investigations, as the contribution of some executive 
functions could overlap, or be interdependent.  
One way executive functioning is likely to affect ToM performance is through 
inferential reasoning. Some of the ToM deficits reported in this thesis could be linked 
to general difficulties with inferential reasoning. This limitation should be addressed 
in future research by investigating patients’ performance on tasks that involve 
inferential reasoning but not ToM. Studies have indicated links between executive 
deficits and impairments in inferential reasoning (e.g. Monetta et al., 2008). Perhaps 
non-inferential ToM tasks are easier than inferential ToM tasks because they are 
associated with fewer executive demands. The ToM deficits exhibited by patients 
with PD could have resulted from poor inferential reasoning due to executive 
dysfunction. However, PD experiment 2 provided little evidence that ToM deficits 
were a result of inferential reasoning deficits because patients made many errors on 
non-inferential ToM vignettes. It is possible that ToM may depend on inferential 
reasoning and executive functions in neurologically intact individuals. Further 
research could investigate relationships between executive performance and matched 
inferential and non-inferential ToM tasks.  
Another factor related to task design that could be addressed by future work 
concerns the style of questioning. This factor could explain why some findings 
reported in this series of experiments are not always in agreement with the existing 
literature. For example, tasks that assess the spontaneous use of ToM may yield 
different results to those which question the ability more directly or explicitly. 
Differences in the style of questioning could also have played a role in the pattern of 
  214 
General Discussion 
impairments exhibited by patients with TS in experiment 2. Deficits could also have 
been apparent on one measure of non-literal language (the Pragmatic Story 
Comprehension Task) but not another (the Hinting Task) because the former measure 
questioned patients’ understanding in a less direct way than the latter. Future research 
should compare the performance of patients on a range of tasks so that the skill 
assessed is sometimes implicit to the task while on other occasions the skill is more 
explicitly questioned. This could also help to specify whether the participants tested 
exhibit specific deficits at a particular level. 
A further issue that may be elucidated by future research is the relationship 
between one’s own emotional experience and the understanding of emotion as 
expressed by others.  More specifically, it would be useful to know whether the HD 
patients who exhibited reduced feelings of fear in response to fear-eliciting stimuli 
also exhibited difficulty in recognising this emotion in others. One limitation of the 
HD experiment described in this thesis is that the patients tested did not complete 
tasks that involved understanding others’ emotions. The concurrent inclusion of tasks 
involving both the evaluation of one’s own emotion and the identification of that 
emotion in another would provide a better evaluation of whether dysfunction within 
the same system could impair both of these abilities. 
The experiments carried out with patients with TS have raised another 
important issue, that is, the consequences of an actor’s behaviour appear to have an 
important influence on reasoning about that actor’s intentions. Patients with TS 
showed a tendency to think that the unintentional offensive remarks described in the 
faux pas task were intentional. This could have been due to increased focus on the 
negative consequences associated with that action (i.e. the victim’s feelings of 
offence). Other studies have indicated that there may be a particularly important role 
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for the influence of consequences when reasoning about intentions (Young & Saxe, 
2008). Further research should investigate the contribution of outcome information in 
reasoning about intentions as such factors are likely to have important implications in 
areas such as moral judgment and jury decision making. 
 
STUDIES TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE SOCIAL COGNITION AND RELATED 
REASONING PROCESSES IN PATIENTS WITH BG DISORDERS 
 
The social cognitive difficulties identified in patients with PD, HD and TS 
could have significant impact on patients’ social functioning. For example, in HD, 
changes in the emotional processing of fear could impact on quality of life by leading 
to poor decision making due to a lack of consideration for negative consequences. It 
would therefore be useful for further experiments to collect data from structured 
questionnaires that assess everyday behaviour and quality of life. Documenting the 
incidence of NOSIS in the TS patients tested on the social cognitive tasks used in the 
experiments described in chapter 3 would offer insight into whether NOSIS were 
related to the social cognitive deficits observed, and could arise in association with 
emotional dysregulation.  
The evidence of possible emotional dysregulation in patients with TS was 
present despite the finding that patients exhibited limited inhibitory difficulties on 
executive measures. The increased number of rejections made by patients with TS 
during the UG could indicate that patients act more impulsively specifically in 
response to stimuli associated with negative affect. This increased impulsivity may 
resemble disinhibition. Future research could directly compare patients’ performance 
on tasks requiring inhibition that did, or did not, involve affective information or cue 
affective states. For example, performance on a standard Stroop or Go-no go task 
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could be compared to performance on an emotional Stroop or Go-no go task. The 
emotional version of these inhibitory tasks is likely to involve ‘hot’ executive 
functioning, which could be more sensitive to TS (see section 3.5). Relationships 
between performance on ‘hot’ executive tasks and tasks involving ‘hot’ ToM could 
also be investigated. 
Changes in the ACC CSTCC (as described by Alexander et al., 1986) in TS 
(and possibly HD) could affect moral reasoning. Moral reasoning could rely on the 
function in this circuit along with its connections to medial OFC (e.g. Moll et al., 
2002). Some of the erroneous responses given by TS patients appeared to involve 
blame or anger in response to a social behaviour associated with negative 
consequences. This occurred on the faux pas task when patients saw the faux pas as 
intentional and suggested that the protagonist was ‘nasty’ or ‘mean’. A similar 
response was seen during the UG when patients who showed increased levels of 
rejections appeared to feel more frustration in response to unfair offers. Some patients 
with TS appear particularly sensitive to the negative affect that can accompany 
violations of socially appropriate behaviour. On many occasions patients remarked 
that the proposer ‘should be fair’. However, further research should better clarify 
patients’ reasons for rejection during the UG. Future studies could also investigate 
patients’ performance on tasks involving moral judgment by manipulating the 
affective information contained about a victim. In addition, whether an actor’s 
intentions or the consequences that result from the actor’s actions are positive, 
negative or neutral could be varied. 
Another area worthy of investigation in TS is counterfactual thinking, a kind 
of reasoning that is related to social cognition. Counterfactual thinking does not 
necessarily require reasoning about mental states, but does involve looking at the 
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world from an alternative perspective, as does ToM.  Counterfactual thoughts are 
generated after an event, when a person thinks about how things could have turned 
out differently. Although counterfactual thinking can happen after a positive event in 
association with a positive emotion (such as relief), counterfactual thoughts occur 
most often after a negative event which results in negative affect (Roese, 1994). It 
may be speculated that if patients with TS are more sensitive to stimuli related to 
negative affect, they could display an increased tendency to reason counterfactually.  
Some of the errors made by patients with TS on the faux pas task support the 
idea that these patients pay more attention to counterfactual type thoughts. During the 
faux pas task, patients often exhibited a tendency to assume that the protagonist’s 
offensive remark was made intentionally. Patients could have engaged in 
counterfactual reasoning, identified the fact that offending the victim was avoidable, 
and then decided that the protagonist should have had greater insight into the possible 
consequences of their behaviour. A study by Goldinger, Kleider, Azuma and Beike, 
(2003) showed that more attention to counterfactual information is associated with 
greater attribution of responsibility. Patients with TS may have seen the protagonist as 
more responsible for their insulting remark if counterfactual thoughts were 
particularly salient. 
 Goldinger et al. (2003) showed that limiting cognitive resources makes it 
more difficult for neurologically intact subjects to ignore a counterfactual thought. 
Participants in this study were given counterfactual information that should have been 
discounted in order to make a logical judgment. This information had a much greater 
influence on participants’ judgments when they were holding a concurrent memory 
load during reasoning. It may be speculated that the inhibitory difficulties exhibited 
by patients with TS could contribute to a similar effect. Difficulty in ignoring a 
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counterfactual thought (that offense could have been avoided) after generating it 
could have further contributed to patients’ tendency to blame the protagonist and not 
appreciate their false belief (the remark is not offensive).  
Further research should also investigate counterfactual reasoning in HD. As 
patients with HD appear to be less subjectively ‘fearful’ this could be associated with 
poor consideration of the negative consequences of behaviour and so a reduction in 
the spontaneous generation of counterfactual thoughts. 
 
STUDIES TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE THE NEURAL BASES OF DEFICITS 
IN SOCIAL COGNITION IN PATIENTS WITH BG DISORDERS 
 
The deficits in social cognition revealed by the experiments in this thesis have 
been linked to possible dysfunction in specific CSTCCs (as described by Alexander et 
al., 1986). However, the extensive connectivity within these circuits makes it difficult 
to specify whether the impairments can be linked to dysfunction of particular 
structures within those circuits. For example, the deficits exhibited by patients with 
HD in the subjective experience of fear are likely to reflect amygdala dysfunction. 
However, the lateral OFC also appears to be involved in the evaluation of some 
stimuli that are linked to this emotion, such as fearful facial expressions (e.g. Liang et 
al., 2009). Both carefully designed behavioural studies and the use of functional 
imaging during task performance would allow better specification of the neural 
substrates that are implicated in the observed deficits.  
Future investigations should seek to specify whether HD involves dysfunction 
of the ACC. The deficits exhibited by patients with HD (chapter 4) implicate the 
amygdala, which could affect the functioning of the ACC CSTCC (as described by 
  219 
General Discussion 
Alexander et al., 1986). It would also be constructive to investigate the performance 
of patients with HD on the tasks used with patients with TS (chapter 3). One study 
provided possible evidence for deficits on some of these tasks (Havet-Thomassin et 
al., 2008).  
Other behavioural studies should assess the performance of all three patient 
groups on tasks linked specifically to lateral OFC. Studies have indicated that patients 
with PD can exhibit difficulty in the recognition of negative emotion expressed by 
others through facial expressions (e.g. Suzuki, Hoshino, Shigemasu & Kawamura, 
2006) or vocally (Dara, Monetta & Pell, 2008). Studies could compare the 
performance of patients on tasks involving these abilities (which may be more closely 
linked to lateral OFC functioning) and other ToM tasks linked to medial OFC 
functioning. Little research, if any, has addressed the performance of patients with TS 
on tasks linked to the lateral OFC. However, overactivity in this region has been 
associated with OCD (Ursu & Carter, 2009). Future research should therefore 
compare the performance of patients with and without this comorbidity on such tasks. 
The deficits in non-literal language in TS reported in experiment 2 could implicate the 
IFG. This structure can be considered part of the lateral OFC CSTCC (as described by 
Alexander et al., 1986). The non-literal language task used in TS experiment 2 did not 
involve affective or acoustic cues. Further research should, therefore, investigate 
whether patients’ deficits are still apparent when these cues are present. 
It is possible that the social cognitive deficits exhibited by patients with BG 
disorders result more from poor connectivity between structures within a circuit rather 
than changes in functioning within a particular structure. For example, amygdala 
dysfunction could occur in disorders of the BG in a number of ways. The amygdala 
projects to the OFC directly, but could also influence this region indirectly, through 
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projections to the ventral striatum within the ACC CSTCC. Dysfunction of the 
striatum could also affect the amygdala indirectly via the action of frontostriatal 
pathways that terminate in OFC, which in turn sends projections to the amygdala. The 
striatum also has the potential to affect the functioning of the amygdala more directly, 
via the intramlaminar nucleus of the thalamus. It would therefore be useful to use 
imagining techniques that can provide a measure of the integrity of the connections 
between regions. 
Recent imaging studies have also used a technique termed functional 
connectivity. This technique involves the identification of correlated changes in 
activity in different brain regions and can be employed to identify neural networks 
that are involved in particular cognitive tasks. For example, it is likely that patients 
with TS exhibit dysfunction with the emotional salience network described be Seeley 
et al. (2007). This network involves the anterior insula, ACC, amygdala, 
hypothalamus, and ventral striatum, so includes structures that are part of the ACC 
CSTCC (described by Alexander et al., 1986). The salience system integrates sensory 
data with visceral, autonomic and hedonic “markers” that allow the organism to make 
decisions about what to do next. Other studies have provided evidence of changes in 
the functioning of neural networks in patients with clinical conditions, such as TS 
(Church et al., 2009). Future research could identify the neural networks involved in 
the social cognitive tasks that have elicited deficits in this series of experiments and 
identify whether particular pathways involved in these networks are dysfunctional in 
patients with movement disorders.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
BG disorders are primarily seen as disorders of movement though recently 
patients with these diseases have been recognised as having a number of cognitive 
difficulties. This series of experiments has demonstrated that three patient groups with 
disorders of the BG exhibit changes in social cognition. Changes in social and 
emotional functions therefore appear to represent an integral component of these 
neuropsychiatric conditions. 
Chapter 3 reported particularly striking social cognitive deficits in patients 
with TS. This disorder has not previously been considered to involve difficulties with 
social reasoning. The deficits on a range of tasks involving ToM indicated that some 
patients with TS exhibit deficits in inferring mental states. Difficulties are also 
apparent when patients with TS reason about social situations involving negative 
emotion, perhaps as a result of emotional dysregulation. These changes in social 
cognition suggest that TS is associated with dysfunction of structures including the 
amygdala, insula, and other regions involved in the ACC and lateral OFC CSTCCs. 
The social reasoning difficulties exhibited by patients with TS extend beyond 
reasoning about mental states so as to affect their understanding of non-literal 
language and humour, as well as impairing economic decision making. Changes in 
social cognition in TS could also be related to the occurrence of NOSIS, as explained 
in section 1 of this chapter. These findings can therefore encourage greater insight 
into some of the symptoms associated with this disorder, the basis for which has so far 
remained unexplained.  
Other BG disorders are associated with social and emotional deficits. Patients 
with HD exhibit unexpectedly reduced fear reactions when confronted by stimuli that 
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elicit this emotion strongly and reliably in neurologically intact individuals. This 
finding makes a vital contribution to the existing literature by implicating the 
involvement of the amygdala, a temporal structure, in this disorder. Many of the 
neural substrates commonly linked to social cognition (e.g. medial OFC) appear to 
function normally in PD. Nevertheless, the experiments reported in chapter 2 indicate 
that at least under certain conditions, patients with PD exhibit deficits in ToM. These 
changes are likely to have a considerable impact on patients’ everyday functioning 
and may pose important treatment implications. 
The findings reported in this thesis have highlighted critical limitations in the 
current conceptualisation of frontostriatal circuitry as defined in the classic paper of 
Alexander et al. (1986). This model of frontostriatal interactions was revolutionary at 
the time it was developed. Critically, it challenged the widely held assumption that the 
BG’s sole role was in motor control. Although more than two decades have now 
passed, Alexander et al.’s model is still extremely influential. The findings reported in 
this thesis clearly indicate that the description of CSTCCs outlined by these authors 
do not provide an adequate explanation for the range of symptoms exhibited by 
patients with disorders of the BG. This is because the existing descriptions of 
CSTCCs do not specify how striatal dysfunction can affect the amygdala and insula. 
The social cognitive deficits exhibited by patients with HD and TS in particular can 
therefore only be accounted for through the development of a more precise and 
comprehensive model of frontostriatal circuitry. 
Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease and Tourette’s syndrome have long 
been classified as disorders of movement. The experiments reported in this thesis 
have demonstrated that patients suffering from these conditions also show profound 
alterations in affect and social cognition. The social cognitive deficits observed 
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compel us to consider these disease states in a new light and encourage the 
advancement of plausible neurobiological accounts for the behavioural changes 
associated with these disorders. These findings further challenge contemporary 
conceptualisations of how the striatum, which is the major site of pathology in these 
conditions, affects the functioning of the prefrontal cortex and associated limbic 
structures. A greater understanding of the functional interactions between the basal 
ganglia, amygdala and insula, and the development of more refined psychological 
tests will play a critical role in further elucidating the neural and psychological 
processes underlying social cognition.
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